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CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER FEDERAL
COURT JURISDICTION:
A DEFENSE OF THE TRADITIONAL
VIEW
Julian Velasco*
The extent of Congress's authority to control the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts has been the subject of unending academic debate.1 The or-
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1. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, Two Tiers];
Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of My Death are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1651 (1990) [hereinafter Amar, Reply]; Akhil Reed Amar, Taking Article III Seri-
ously: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 442 (1991) [hereinafter Amar,
Reply to Friedman]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of
1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990) [hereinafter Amar, Judiciary Act]; Paul M. Bator,
Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030
(1982); Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the
Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988 (1982); Irving Brant, Appel-
late Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse Of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REv. 3 (1973);
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of
the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control Over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 89 (1990) [hereinafter Casto, Two Tiers]; William R. Casto, The First Congress's
Understanding of Its Authority Over the Federal Courts' Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1101
(1985) [hereinafter Casto, First Congress]; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Fed-
eral Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article 111, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984) [hereinafter Clinton, Guided Quest]; Robert N. Clinton, A
Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures
from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1515 (1986) [hereinafter Clinton, Early
Implementation]; Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal
Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The
Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990); Gerald
Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide
to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1362 (1953); Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article II1, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1569 (1990); Henry J. Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction:
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thodox view long has been that Congress possesses nearly plenary
authority to restrict federal court jurisdiction. There has been no
shortage, however, of commentators who have taken exception to that
view. Because Congress has only rarely tested the limits of its authority,
there have been few opportunities for the Supreme Court to address the
issue. Moreover, the few Supreme Court pronouncements that do exist
can largely be classified as dicta. The resulting scarcity of law in this area
has fueled the speculation of academics and legislators alike.
The controversy can be broken down into at least three issues. The
first issue concerns congressional authority to control the jurisdiction of
the inferior courts. The Constitution grants Congress the authority to or-
dain and establish, from time to time, such inferior courts as it may
choose. Nevertheless, some argue that Congress's authority is limited to
deciding which inferior courts to create, not whether to create them.
The second issue involves congressional authority over Supreme Court
jurisdiction. Although the Constitution grants Congress the authority to
make "Exceptions" and "Regulations" to the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction, some argue that Congress's authority is limited by other con-
stitutional provisions, both explicit and implicit.
Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53 (1963); Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power
Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1961) [here-
inafter Ratner, Supreme Court]; Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial
Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982)
[hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Con-
gressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and
a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to
Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal
and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, Supreme
Court]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control
Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 143 (1982) [herein-
after Redish, Reaction]; Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Inter-
pretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1633 (1990) [hereinafter Redish, Common
Sense]; Charles E. Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court's Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV.
959 (1982); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitu-
tional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 95
HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfa-
vored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981); William
W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 229 (1973);
Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law
and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (1977) [hereinafter
Wechsler, Law and Logistics]; Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) [hereinafter Wechsler, Courts and Constitution]; Gordon G.
Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United
States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1189; Gordon G. Young, A Critical Reassess-
ment of the Case Law Bearing on Congress's Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower
Federal Courts, 54 MD. L. REV. 132 (1995).
Federal Court Jurisdiction
The third issue deals with congressional authority to curtail the jurisdic-
tion of both the Supreme Court and the inferior courts simultaneously.
Even if congressional authority over Supreme Court appellate jurisdic-
tion and jurisdiction of the inferior courts is plenary, some argue that
there are still limits on Congress's ability to restrict both simultaneously.
The heart of the debate lies in whether Congress is authorized to re-
move specific subjects from the jurisdiction of federal courts when moti-
vated by hostility to their substantive decisions. Throughout history,
various members of Congress have attempted to do just that, generally
without success. 2 According to the traditional view, Congress is free to
use its power in this manner. While most traditionalists believe this
would be imprudent, some believe it could serve a legitimate function.
Critics, however, argue that this would be an abuse of Congress's power
because it would invite the state courts to disregard the federal prece-
dents on the matter. Thus, they view it as an illegitimate attempt by Con-
gress to amend the Constitution indirectly by statute, rather than by the
stricter procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court's 1996 decision to grant certiorari on an expedited
basis in the case of Felker v. Turpin3 temporarily sparked hopes and fears
that the Court would issue a rare pronouncement on the limits of Con-
gress's power. Felker involved a challenge to certain provisions of the
"Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996," which limited
the Supreme Court's review of second or successive federal habeas
corpus appeals. The Court ordered arguments on whether these provi-
sions amounted to an unconstitutional restriction on the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. Because the Court decided that the Act "does not
repeal [its] . . . authority to entertain a[n original] petition for habeas
corpus" under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, it held that "there can be no plausible
argument that the Act has deprived [it] of appellate jurisdiction in viola-
2. For a very limited sampling, see S. 1760, 97th Cong. (1981) (discussing a bussing
remedy in school desegregation cases); S. 1742, 97th Cong. (1981) (discussing voluntary
prayer in public schools); H.R. 867, 97th Cong. (1981) (addressing abortion); H.R. 2365,
97th Cong. (1981) (addressing gender discrimination in the military); S. 917, 90th Cong.
(1968) (discussing state criminal convictions based on voluntary confessions); H.R. 11926,
88th Cong. (1964) (discussing state apportionment plans); S. 2646, 85th Cong. (1957) (dis-
cussing activities of congressional committees; legislation regarding subversive activities;
state bar admission requirements). Each of these bills, and many others like them, failed
to pass Congress.
3. 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
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tion of Article III, § 2." 4 Thus, the Court did not reach the issue and
failed to offer any guidance on how it might otherwise have ruled.
This Article presents a defense of the traditional view. Not long ago, it
was said that "no commentator thus far ha[d] offered a complete, coher-
ent and convincing account of congressional power to limit federal juris-
diction."5 This Article analyzes the text as well as the history and
structure of Article III in an attempt to address that issue. By setting
forth a comprehensive interpretation of Article III that reaffirms the
traditional view, this Article shows that the modern assault on that posi-
tion, while insightful, is fundamentally misguided.
In Part I, this Article canvasses the existing academic commentary on
the issue and suggests various weaknesses in each of the theories that
would serve to limit Congress's power. In Part II, this article provides a
comprehensive interpretation of Article III that is consistent with the
traditional view, while avoiding the errors made by previous commenta-
tors, proponents and critics alike. In Part III, this Article reviews the
historical evidence to determine how well the competing theories of fed-
eral jurisdiction are supported. Finally, in Part IV, this Article discusses
certain structural issues and demonstrates both the error and the futility
of reinterpreting the Constitution to limit Congress's control over federal
jurisdiction. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the traditional view
presents the best account of Congress's ability to restrict federal court
jurisdiction.
I. THE COMPETING THEORIES
A. Orthodoxy
The traditional view is that Congress possesses nearly unlimited au-
thority to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts.6 This view is
based on the combination of two well-established principles: that Con-
gress may regulate the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, and that Con-
gress may make exceptions and regulations to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.
The existing records of the Constitutional Convention show that,
although the existence of a Supreme Court was presupposed, whether
there should be any inferior courts was sternly debated. In fact, at one
4. Id. at 2339. Ironically, it is not entirely clear that the Court has the authority to
entertain an original application for habeas corpus because the Court's original jurisdiction
does not include habeas corpus cases. See infra notes 324 and 359 and accompanying text.
5. Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 206.
6. Congress is not permitted to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond
the limits of the judicial power. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46:671
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point the Framers voted not to establish inferior courts at all. In the
"Madisonian Compromise," however, the delegates ultimately decided to
avoid the issue by granting Congress the discretion to decide whether to
establish inferior courts.7 In Sheldon v. Sill,8 the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that Congress had the authority to decide not only whether
inferior courts should be created, but also the extent of their jurisdiction.9
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this holding repeatedly.1"
In addition, the Constitution prescribes that the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court shall be subject to "such Exceptions, and ... Regu-
lations as the Congress shall make."11 In Ex parte McCardle,1 2 the
Supreme Court ruled that Congress has the authority to prescribe
7. Reflecting this compromise, the Constitution provides, "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested ... in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART
AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 10-11 (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER]; 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 124-25 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS].
8. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
9. Id. at 448. The Court stated:
Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but
such as the statute confers. No one of them can assert a just claim to jurisdiction
exclusively conferred on another, or withheld from all.
The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power of the United
States, but has not prescribed how much of it shall be exercised by the Circuit
Court; consequently, the statute which does prescribe the limits of their jurisdic-
tion, cannot be in conflict with the Constitution, unless it confers powers not enu-
merated therein.
Id.
10. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 697-98 (1992) (stating that Congress
may limit the jurisdiction of the Article III courts it chooses to create); Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1973) ("[Congress] was not constitutionally required to create
inferior Art. III courts .... Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, was it required to
invest them with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III."); Lockerty
v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ("The Congressional power to ordain and establish
inferior courts includes the power 'of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, con-
current, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and
character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.' " (quoting Cary v.
Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845))); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330
(1938) ("There can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States."); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260
U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (stating that every inferior court "derives its jurisdiction wholly from
the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its
discretion, provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution.");
Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 521 (1898) ("It is for Congress
to say how much of the judicial power of the United States shall be exercised by the
subordinate courts it may establish from time to time.").
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
12. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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whatever exceptions and regulations to Supreme Court appellate jurisdic-
tion it may choose.13 Despite the fact that McCardle was pending and
oral arguments already had been heard, the Supreme Court dismissed the
case after Congress repealed the jurisdictional grant.14 This suggests that
Congress's power over Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is extremely
broad.15 The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this view as well.
16
13. The Court stated:
[T]he appellate jurisdiction of this court is not derived from acts of Congress. It
is, strictly speaking, conferred by the Constitution. But it is conferred "with such
exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make."
The exception to appellate jurisdiction in the case before us ... is not an infer-
ence from the affirmation of other appellate jurisdiction. It is made in terms. The
provision of the act of 1867, affirming the appellate jurisdiction of this court in
cases of habeas corpus, is expressly repealed. It is hardly possible to imagine a
plainer instance of positive exception.
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only
examine into its power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions
to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.
What, then, is the effect of the repealing Act upon the case before us? We
cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in
any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist,
the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dis-
missing the cause.
Id. at 512-14.
14. See id. at 508.
15. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 42 (5th ed. 1994) ("[Mc-
Cardle] has long been read as giving Congress full control over the Supreme Court's appel-
late jurisdiction .... ).
16. See De La Rama Steamship Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 386, 390 (1953) (citing
McCardle); Colorado Cent. Consol. Mining Co. v. Turck, 150 U.S. 138, 141 (1893) ("[I1t has
been held in an uninterrupted series of decisions that this court exercises appellate jurisdic-
tion only in accordance with the acts of Congress upon that subject."); American Constr.
Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key W. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 378 (1893) ("This court.., can
exercise no appellate jurisdiction, except in the cases, and in the manner and form, defined
and prescribed by Congress."); The "Francis Wright," 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1882) ("What [the
Supreme Court's appellate] ... powers shall be, and to what extent they shall be exercised,
are, and always have been, proper subjects of legislative control.... Not only may whole
classes of cases be kept out of the jurisdiction altogether, but particular classes of questions
may be subjected to re-examination and review, while others are not."). But see Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.11 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("There is a serious
question whether the McCardle case could command a majority view today.").
The Supreme Court had endorsed broad congressional power over its appellate jurisdic-
tion prior to McCardle. See Daniels v. Railroad Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1865) ("In
order to create such appellate jurisdiction in any case, two things must concur: the Consti-
tution must give the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must supply the requisite
authority."); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119 (1847) ("By the constitution of
the United States, the Supreme Court possesses no appellate power in any case, unless
conferred upon it by act of Congress ...."); Turner v. Bank of North-America, 4 U.S. (4
DalI.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799) ("[T]he political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power
(except in a few specified instances) belongs to congress.... [C]ongress is not bound, and it
Federal Court Jurisdiction
Finally, the traditional view has had no difficulty combining the hold-
ings of Sheldon and McCardle to reach the conclusion that Congress
could exclude entire categories of cases from the federal court jurisdic-
tion altogether.17 The Supreme Court apparently embraced this view in
at least one case. 8 True traditionalists maintain that Congress is free to
restrict federal court jurisdiction for virtually any reason-including ex-
plicit hostility to the decisions of the federal courts.' 9 Congress could
exceed its authority only by violating some independent constitutional
would, perhaps, be inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, to every
subject, in every form, which the constitution might warrant."); see also Wiscart v. Dauchy,
3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 321, 327 (1796) ("If Congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceed-
ings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we cannot
depart from it.").
17. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 1, at 1038 ("If the Constitution means what it says, it
means that Congress can make the state courts ... the ultimate authority for the decision
of any category of case to which the federal judicial power extends."); Gunther, supra note
1, at 914:
Those who read the exceptions clause broadly with respect to the Supreme Court
and who accept the widely held view about broad congressional control of lower
federal court jurisdiction find it hard to see anything in article III that would bar
congressional action, as a matter of sheer constitutional power, to remand federal
constitutional issues for final state court adjudication. Such a scheme seems con-
sistent with the constitutional language and the Framers' intent .... ;
Wechsler, Courts and Constitution, supra note 1, at 1005 ("Congress has the power by
enactment of a statute to strike at what it deems judicial excess by delimitations of the
jurisdiction of lower courts and of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.").
18. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ("Article III left Congress free to
establish inferior federal courts or not as it thought appropriate. It could have declined to
create any such courts, leaving suitors to the remedies afforded by state courts, with such
appellate review by this Court as Congress might prescribe." (emphasis added)).
19. See Wechsler, Courts and Constitution, supra note 1, at 1005-06:
There is, to be sure, a school of thought that argues ... that the supremacy
clause or the due process clause of the fifth amendment would be violated by an
alteration of the jurisdiction motivated by hostility to the decisions of the Court.
I see no basis for this view and think it antithetical to the plan of the Constitution
for the courts-which was quite simply that the Congress would decide from time
to time how far the federal judicial institution should be used within the limits of
the federal judicial power; or, stated differently, how far judicial jurisdiction
should be left to the state courts, bound as they are by the Constitution as "the
supreme Law of the Land ....";
see also Gunther, supra note 1, at 920 ("In my view, the basic structure of article III affords
precisely that power to Congress, and that power may even be exercised, as Herbert
Wechsler argued years ago, to express disaffection with Court decisions."); cf. Charles L.
Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 845 (1975):
It seems to me to say that Congress may make any exceptions it regards as wise to
the appellate jurisdiction of the [Supreme] Court. For my part, I stand with Her-
bert Wechsler on this question, and see no ground at all, none at all, for importing
exceptions into this 'exceptions' power. (footnote omitted).
1997]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 46:671
provision."0 For example, if Congress granted jurisdiction to a court con-
ditioned upon its reaching an unconstitutional result, such a grant (or the
condition) could be disregarded as an unconstitutional invasion of the
judicial power."1 Similarly, if Congress enacted a jurisdictional statute
barring access to the federal courts based on race or gender, it would be
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause. 2 Finally, it might easily be conceded
that Congress has no authority to remove cases from the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction.23 Beyond those limits, however, Congress is
believed to possess plenary authority to restrict the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
B. The "Essential Role"
For many, the idea that Congress could exclude an entire category of
cases from the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary based on hostility to
substantive decisions is wholly unsatisfactory. Therefore, commentators
have suggested solutions that would place some limits on congressional
power while recognizing its broad discretion.
Perhaps the most famous of these solutions comes from the late Profes-
sor Henry Hart. In his article, The Power of Congress to Limit the Juris-
diction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,4 Professor Hart
recognizes the implications of Sheldon and McCardle, but refuses to sur-
20. See Bator, supra note 1, at 1034 ("It is commonplace to say that Congress' power
to regulate the jurisdiction of the ... federal courts cannot be exercised in a manner that
violates some other Constitutional rule. In that sense-and in that sense only -it can be
said that Congress' power is not plenary.").
21. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872) (holding unconstitutional
a jurisdictional statute requiring courts to dismiss a case if it finds a factor that will require
a result objectionable to Congress); see also Gunther, supra note 1, at 910 ("[Elven if
Congress can withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts in a whole class of cases, it
cannot allow a federal court jurisdiction but dictate the outcomes of cases, or require a
court to decide cases in disregard of the Constitution. That is a significant limitation.");
Redish, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 923 ("Although Congress may possess authority
to remove completely from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction substantive areas of
law, it may not instead provide the Court with jurisdiction but direct it to act in an uncon-
stitutional manner or require that the Court interpret the Constitution in a particular
way.").
22. See Bator, supra note 1, at 1034 ("[A] statute which said that whites only may
resort to the district courts would be invalid."); Gunther, supra note 1, at 916 ("Congress
could not limit access to the federal courts on the basis of race or wholly irrelevant criteria
such as a litigant's height, weight, or hair color.").
Although the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to the
States and not the federal government, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause guarantees equal protection vis-A-vis the federal government.
See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
23. See infra Part II.G.2.
24. See Hart, supra note 1, at 1363.
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render to them. Rather, he devises his own limiting principle for the con-
gressional power to regulate Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction: "[T]he
exceptions must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the
Supreme Court in the constitutional plan."25 Professor Hart understood
that this measure is an "indeterminate" one, but found it to be less prob-
lematic than "reading the Constitution as authorizing its own destruc-
tion." 26 Although he admitted that the Supreme Court had never done
or said anything to suggest that it was prepared to adopt his view, this did
not disturb him. Professor Hart maintained that the Court has never had
any reason to adopt his view as, "Congress so far ha[d] never tried to
destroy the Constitution."27
Professor Hart's "essential role" theory, while appealing, presents
many intellectual difficulties. The indeterminacy that does not seem to
trouble him is nevertheless deeply problematic for others. According to
the Supreme Court, for instance, inability to discern a workable standard
for resolving an issue is grounds for dismissing it as "nonjusticiable."28
Moreover, Professor Hart's theory was developed out of whole cloth, and
had absolutely no basis in either the text of the Constitution or any
Supreme Court decision.29 It is therefore more an exercise in "wishful
thinking" than legal reasoning.
30
25. Id. at 1365.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). In fact, many of the factors considered
relevant for political-question analysis would suggest that the courts should consider the
issue nonjusticiable:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
29. Professor Hart himself virtually concedes as much. See supra text at note 27; see
also Gunther, supra note 1, at 903 ("Proponents of the [essential role] thesis cannot readily
(and do not) rely on the constitutional language ...."); Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at
220 ("[Essential functions] arguments have little grounding in explicit text or firm constitu-
tional history.").
30. See Redish, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 911; see also id. at 906-07 (quoting
Hart, supra note 1, at 1372).
When Professor Henry Hart made that statement in 1953, he provided absolutely
no indication of exactly what Supreme Court functions were to be deemed "es-
sential," how anyone was to answer that question, or on what basis he found such
Catholic University Law Review
Professor Leonard Ratner has attempted to refine Professor Hart's
thesis by defining the "essential role" of the Supreme Court. According
to Professor Ratner, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution31 requires
that federal law shall be uniform throughout the United States and shall
prevail over state law in the event of conflict.32 Believing the Supreme
Court to be "the constitutional instrument for implementing the
supremacy clause," Professor Ratner argues that the Supreme Court's
"essential appellate functions under the Constitution are (1) to provide a
tribunal for the ultimate resolution of inconsistent or conflicting interpre-
tations of federal law by state and federal courts, and (2) to provide a
tribunal for maintaining the supremacy of federal law when it conflicts
with state law or is challenged by state authority."33
Although Professor Ratner adds substance to Professor Hart's thesis,
his theory also lacks the support of constitutional text or Supreme Court
precedent. In addition, Professor Ratner's thesis generates problems of
its own. First, the claim that the Constitution requires uniformity of deci-
sions is questionable.34 Even if uniformity were constitutionally required,
however, the Supreme Court would not be necessary to fulfill this func-
tion. Congress could create unreviewable specialty courts which could
provide the required uniformity in their area of expertise-e.g., an Abor-
tion Court.35
Second, Professor Ratner provides scant support for his conclusion that
the Supreme Court was intended to be "the principal instrumentality for
a limitation in the Constitution. In light of this, Professor Hart's comment could
at best be characterized as conclusory and at worst as simply off-hand.
To quote Professor Hart, who perhaps should have better heeded his own implied
warning, "whose Constitution are you talking about-Utopia's or ours?"
Id.
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
32. See Ratner, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 160.
33. Id. at 161.
34. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 263 ("Article III in fact requires no such
uniformity, as the permissibility of vesting unreviewable jurisdiction in various lower fed-
eral courts illustrates."); Sager, supra note 1, at 57 ("[U]niformity and institutional self-
defense were matters that could have been safely entrusted to the discretion of
Congress.").
35. See infra notes 433-35 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.E.
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implementing the supremacy clause." 36 Read narrowly, the Supremacy
Clause applies only to state courts; read properly, it applies equally to all
courts.37 The Federalist, upon which Professor Ratner relies heavily, ac-
knowledged that Supreme Court review was unnecessary.38 If necessary,
the supremacy of federal law can be enforced by the inferior courts with-
out any need for Supreme Court appellate review of state court cases.
Professor Ratner argues further that Ex parte McCardle was not neces-
sarily contradictory to the "essential role" theory. Although in that case
the Supreme Court permitted Congress to repeal its habeas corpus juris-
diction under one act, he noted that "the Court carefully pointed out that
the repeal did not affect its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
under... [another act]."39 Moreover, shortly thereafter in Ex parte Yer-
ger,4° the Court specifically held that the alternative path of habeas
corpus review remained open. Thus, Professor Ratner concluded that
"[c]learly the language of Ex parte McCardle does not sanction congres-
sional impairment of the essential Constitutional functions of the
Supreme Court."41 Far more clear, however, is the fact that neither
McCardle nor Yerger actually contradict the traditional view. In Yerger
the Court acknowledged explicitly and unequivocally that its appellate
habeas corpus jurisdiction is given subject to regulation by Congress.42
A further problem with the "essential role" theory, as articulated by
Professors Hart and Ratner, is that it fails to articulate an "essential role"
for the Supreme Court beyond that for the federal judiciary as a whole.
The Constitution vests judicial power equally in the Supreme Court and
in the inferior courts.43 The Constitution also makes all Article III judges
36. Ratner, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 165 & n.41.
37. Cf Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1959).
38. This was true both as to cases heard in state courts, see THE FEDERALIST No. 82,
at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("I perceive at present no im-
pediment to the establishment of an appeal from the State courts to the subordinate na-
tional tribunals .... "), and as to cases heard in lower federal courts, see id. No. 81, at 486
("Justice through ... [the inferior courts] may be administered with ease and dispatch and
appeals may be safely circumscribed within a narrow compass.").
39. Ratner, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 179.
40. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
41. Ratner, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 180.
42. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 103 (1868). The Yerger Court merely stated
that the importance of habeas corpus in the constitutional scheme "forbid[s] any [statu-
tory] construction giving to doubtful words the effect of withholding or abridging this juris-
diction." Id.
43. The Constitution provides, "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. No special role for the Supreme
Court can be discerned from this language. See generally infra Part II.B. But see Evan H.
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structurally equal:44 they are all appointed by the President with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate,45 provided life tenure46 subject to im-
peachment, 47 and are guaranteed undiminishable salaries. 4' Given these
facts, it is difficult to argue that the Supreme Court has an "essential role"
over and above that of the entire federal judiciary.4 9
This critique is hardly fatal, however, as the theory can be modified to
protect the "essential role" of the entire federal judiciary, rather than just
the Supreme Court's. This is the view taken by Professor Leonard Sager,
who argues that "[u]nrestricted use of the state courts as the exclusive
forums for article III business is ... inconsistent with the constitutional
commitment to a radically independent federal judiciary.,
5
1
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV.
817, 828-34 (1994) (discussing the importance of the distinction between "supreme" and
"inferior" courts).
44. Professor Amar has been a particularly forceful advocate of this argument. See,
e.g., Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1510, 1536-39; Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at
221-22.
45. It should be noted, however, that the Constitution requires only that the Supreme
Court justices be appointed in this manner:
[B]y and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, [the President] shall appoint
... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. It, § 2, cl. 2. The judges of the inferior courts would presumably be "infer-
ior Officers" who could be appointed by the other methods prescribed in the above pas-
sage. But see Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 235 n.103 (questioning the validity of this
theory).
46. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices dur-
ing good Behaviour .... U.S. CoNsT'. art. III, § 1.
47. "[A]II civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Im-
peachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemean-
ors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
48. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts .... shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Con-
tinuance in Office." U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 1.
49. Arguably, the Supreme Court is unique in certain respects. It is the only court
created by the Constitution itself. Its existence is mandatory, and its Justices must be ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Also noteworthy is that the Constitution does not establish
"the Supreme Court," but rather "one supreme Court"-i.e., one court which shall be
supreme. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1. See, e.g. Caminker, supra note 43, at 828-34 (discussing
the importance of the distinction between "supreme" and "inferior" courts).
50. Sager, supra note 1, at 64-65.
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To support his theory, Professor Sager points to the "judicial indepen-
dence requirements of Article II1.,51 The Constitution merely requires,
however, that federal judges be "independent;" nowhere does it tie this
requirement to the adjudication of cases per se. If there were such a re-
quirement, it would have to apply to all cases within the judicial power
because the "independence requirements" apply equally to all the enu-
merated cases.
52
Professor Sager also relies on an analogy to non-Article III federal
tribunals, stating that if Congress's ability to give Article III cases to fed-
eral tribunals whose judges do not enjoy Article III security is limited,
Congress should be similarly limited in its ability to relegate Article III
cases to the state courts.53 Non-Article III federal tribunals, however, are
not analogous to state courts. The constitutional status of "Article I"
courts is questionable, which is why their jurisdiction must be limited.54
In contrast, the constitutional status of state courts of general jurisdiction
is unimpeachable. Thus, Professor Sager's argument that congressional
51. See id. at 61-68. Article III provides for life tenure and undiminishable salaries;
these requirements apply to all Article III courts but not to other tribunals. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
52. "[Tlhe salary and tenure provision is in no way limited to cases involving constitu-
tional rights. Rather, it applies to any case heard by an article III court, which of course
includes such mundane fare as diversity cases and the like." Redish, Reaction, supra note
1, at 152; see infra Part II.G.1.
Even if the requirement could somehow be limited to certain categories of cases within
the judicial power (such as those arising under federal law), each and every case in those
categories would have to be heard by an Article III court. It is implausible that the salary
and tenure provisions were intended implicitly to require so much.
53. See Sager, supra note 1, at 63.
54. The Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested" in Courts whose judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall
[receive an undiminishable salary]." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). Non-Arti-
cle III federal tribunals do not meet these requirements and therefore cannot exercise the
judicial power of the United States. Cf Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co, 458 U.S. 50, 71-76 (1982). In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court held portions
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutional because it vested too much authority in
non-Article III federal tribunals. See id. at 87. The plurality, led by Justice Brennan, was
of the opinion that "[tihe judicial power of the United States must be vested in Art. III
courts." Id. at 63-64; see also id. at 59. Faced with numerous precedents permitting the
existence of non-Article III tribunals under some circumstances, the plurality reduced
them to three limited instances, "each recognizing a circumstance in which the grant of
power to the Legislative and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so
exceptional that the congressional assertion of a power to create legislative courts was
consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separation of
powers." Id. at 64. "Only in the face of such an exceptional grant of power has the Court
declined to hold the authority of Congress subject to the general prescriptions of Art. III."
Id. at 70.
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limits applicable to non-Article III federal tribunals should also apply to
state courts is a non sequitur.
Professor Sager's version of the essential role is not very demanding:
[Tjhere must be limits on Congress' ability to make the state
courts the exclusive arbiters of article III matters. And those
limits surely are crossed when Congress attempts to divest the
Supreme Court, and all other federal courts, of jurisdiction at
least to review state court decisions on constitutional challenges
to governmental behavior.55
Such a description of the "essential role" seems quite reasonable. It is
well-defined, yet flexible, and deferential to congressional authority. Pro-
fessor Sager's approach, however, lacks an adequate legal foundation.
Although Professor Sager makes strong policy arguments, he does not
demonstrate that his theory is constitutionally mandated or judicially
enforceable.56
In short, there is no constitutional support for the theory that a judi-
cially enforceable "essential role" exists for the Supreme Court or the
federal judiciary.
C. Mandatory Jurisdiction
For some, the idea that Congress exercises any control over the federal
judiciary is unnerving. It should come as no surprise, then, that even
stronger limits-virtually eliminating congressional discretion alto-
gether-have been suggested.
One of the earliest restrictive theories can be found in Justice Joseph
Story's opinion in the case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.57 In Hunter's
Lessee, a recalcitrant Virginia Court of Appeals refused to obey a man-
date from the Supreme Court, insisting that the latter had no appellate
jurisdiction over state court decisions.58 When the case returned to the
55. Sager, supra note 1, at 65. Professor Sager's thesis has been criticized on the
ground that "there is no logical way to limit the need for an article III court to police the
states to cases involving assertions of constitutional rights." Redish, Reaction, supra note
1, at 148. There is, however, a logical basis for this limitation. If Congress were biased in
favor of the states over the federal government, then there would be little benefit to al-
lowing Article III courts to police state court interpretations of federal statutes. Given that
Congress could refuse to pass substantive federal law and could defer to state control, it
could certainly limit itself to passing laws which are favorable to the states. Amendments
aside, however, the Constitution is beyond the reach of Congress. An independent inter-
pretation of the Constitution would therefore serve a useful function. Nevertheless, there
is no basis in the Constitution for such a limit.
56. Cf. Gunther, supra note 1, at 898 (emphasizing the "distinction between constitu-
tionality and wisdom").
57. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
58. See id. at 322.
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Supreme Court, Justice Story argued at length that the judicial power of
the United States was mandatorily vested in the federal judiciary by the
Constitution.59 Justice Story also argued that cases arising under federal
law, particularly federal criminal law, could not be heard in state court.6 °
Thus, he concluded that Congress was required to create at least some
inferior courts, if only to hear such cases.6 '
It is ironic that Justice Story, who at some points in his opinion paid
close attention to the text of Article III,6 apparently ignored its mandate
on this point. The Constitution clearly states that Congress "may" estab-
lish inferior courts,63 not that it "must."'  It is clear that the Framers
59. See id. Justice Story stated:
The language of [Article III] throughout is manifestly designed to be mandatory
upon the legislature. Its obligatory force is so imperative, that congress could not,
without a violation of its duty, have refused to carry it into operation. The judi-
cial power of the United States shall be vested (not may be vested) ....
If, then, it is a duty of congress to vest the judicial power of the United States, it
is a duty to vest the whole judicial power. The language, if imperative as to one
part, is imperative as to all.
Id.
60. See id. at 337. Justice Story is particularly forceful with respect to criminal cases,
stating "[n]o part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can, consistently with the
constitution, be delegated to state tribunals." Id. Justice Story continues, however, stating
that no cases arising under federal law could be heard in state courts:
In the first place, as to cases arriving under the constitution, laws, and treaties of
the Untied States. Here the state courts could not ordinarily possess a direct
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction over such cases could not exist in the state courts
previous to the adoption of the constitution, and it could not afterwards be di-
rectly conferred on them; for the constitution expressly requires the judicial
power to be vested in courts ordained and established by the United States.
Id. at 334-35.
61. See id. at 331. Justice Story stated:
[C]ongress are [sic] bound to create some inferior courts, in which to vest all that
jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United
States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original cognizance. They
might establish one or more inferior courts; they might parcel out the jurisdiction
among such courts, from time to time, at their own pleasure. But the whole judi-
cial power of the United States should be, at all times, vested either in an original
or appellate form, in some courts created under its authority.
Id.
62. Justice Story's attention to the text is evident from his arguments. See infra text
accompanying note 59 (analyzing Justice Story's argument that "shall" does not mean
"may"); see also infra text accompanying note 84 (analyzing Justice Story's argument that
the word "all" is used selectively throughout Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution).
63. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested.., in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CoNsTr. art. III, § 1
(emphasis added).
64. "If 'shall' means 'must,' then 'may' has to mean 'can, but need not."' Amar, Two
Tiers, supra note 1, at 212.
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intended to provide Congress with the discretion to create inferior
courts.65 Moreover, Justice Story mistakenly assumed that certain cases
were necessarily beyond the purview of state courts.66 Accordingly, his
conclusion that inferior courts are necessary to fulfill the constitutional
plan was flawed.
History has all but ignored Justice Story's thesis. 67 Justice Story him-
self appeared to believe that the mandatory language of the Constitution
was neither self-executing nor enforceable by the courts. 68 Yet, there are
65. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
66. Since Congress was not obligated to create any inferior courts, the Constitution
must make sense under the assumption that no inferior courts would be created. The
Framers must have envisioned that some courts would be available to hear cases arising
under federal law. The obvious candidates would be the state courts. This intuition is
confirmed by the Supremacy Clause, which states that the "constitution, and the laws of
the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of
the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution
or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 38 (arguing that federal court jurisdiction is generally
concurrent with state court jurisdiction). History has proven this true. See, e.g., Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
67. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 n.9 (1973) ("[T]he ... statements
in Hunter's Lessee ... did not survive later cases."); see also Bator, supra note 1, at 1031
("The position that the Constitution obligates Congress to create lower federal courts, or
(having created them) to vest them with some or all of the jurisdiction authorized by article
11I, has been repudiated by an unbroken line of authoritative judicial and legislative
precedent.").
68. See, e.g., White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D.R.I. 1818) (No. 17,547). The
entire opinion of the court read as follows:
BY THE COURT. This court has no jurisdiction, which is not given by some
statute. The 11th section of the judicial act of 1789, c. 20, declares, that the circuit
court shall have original cognizance, among other cases, of suits "'between a citi-
zen of the state, where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state."' No
clause of this or any subsequent act has enlarged this jurisdiction so as to embrace
the present case. The constitution declares, that it is mandatory to the legislature,
that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies "'be-
tween citizens of different states"'; and it is somewhat singular, that the jurisdic-
tion actually conferred on the courts of the United States should have stopped so
far short of the constitutional extent. That serious mischiefs have already arisen,
and must continually arise from the present very limited jurisdiction of these
courts, is most manifest to all those, who are conversant with the administration
of justice. But we cannot help them. The language of the act is so clear, that
there is nothing on which to hang a doubt. Neither of the parties in this suit is a
citizen of the state, where the suit is brought. The suit must, therefore, be
dismissed.
Id.
This case strongly suggests that Justice Story's two-tiered theory is not exactly the same
as Professor Amar's; otherwise, he would not have considered diversity jurisdiction to be
mandatory. See infra Part 1D; see also infra notes 164, 364-66 and accompanying text. But
see infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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still those who maintain that the establishment of inferior courts is consti-
tutionally required.
For example, Professor Julius Goebel has argued that the Framers'
choice of the words "ordain and establish" in Article III suggests that
Congress was not intended to have discretion to create inferior courts.6 9
This thesis has been dismissed as "uncharacteristically thinly supported
and unpersuasive. '"70 Leaving aside the question whether the words "or-
dain and establish" are more imperative than their predecessor "consti-
tute[ ],,,71 the same sentence clearly states that Congress may create
inferior courts. It is difficult to believe that the Committee on Style,
whose purpose was merely "to revise the style of and arrange the articles
which had been agreed to,"72 would have undone the Madisonian Com-
promise, particularly in such a cryptic manner.
Another advocate of mandatory inferior courts, Professor Theodore
Eisenberg, recognizes that under the Madisonian Compromise, Congress
was granted the discretion to establish and abolish inferior courts. He
argues, however, that in light of changed circumstances, the option to
abolish the inferior courts is no longer constitutionally viable.73 This the-
ory has been criticized extensively.74 The premise that changed circum-
stances could somehow amend the structural provisions of the
69. 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 247 (1971). Goebel asserts:
That the Committee [on Style] intended to convey the sense of an imperative is
apparent from the choice of the most forceful words in the contemporary consti-
tutional vocabulary-"ordain and establish"-to direct what Congress was to do.
Id.
70. PAUL M. BATOR, ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 13 n.46 (2d ed. 1973).
71. The draft submitted to the Committee on Style read as follows: "The Judicial
Power of the United States both in law and equity shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by
the Legislature of the United States." See GOEBEL, supra note 69, at 246.
72. 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 553; see also id. at 554, 564.
73. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 513. Eisenberg asserts:
It is ... no longer reasonable to assert that Congress may simply abolish the lower
federal courts. When Supreme Court review of all cases within Article III juris-
diction was possible, lower federal courts were perhaps unnecessary. As federal
caseloads grew, however, lower federal courts became necessary components of
the national judiciary if the constitutional duty of case by case consideration of all
federal cases was to be fulfilled. It can now be asserted that their existence in
some form is constitutionally required.
Id.
74. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 217-18; Bator, supra note 1, at 1035-36;
Gunther, supra note 1, at 914; Redish & Woods, supra note 1, at 70-75; Sager, supra note 1,
at 35-36.
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Constitution ipso facto is incredible. 75 The argument of changing circum-
stances, if anything, suggests the desirability of congressional discretion to
assess from time-to-time the need for inferior courts. 76 Professor Eisen-
berg's theory also proves too much. If federal court review of all cases
arising under federal law is essential, then even the existing scheme of
certiorari from state court decisions would appear to be constitutionally
deficient.77 Professor Eisenberg's permission to make exceptions for the
"preservation of the quality of federal justice ' 78 is of questionable value 79
and lacks any constitutional grounding.
Justice Story's theory has also been developed in another direction,
building upon his claim that "the whole judicial power of the United
States should be, at all times, vested either in an original or appellate
form, in some courts created under its authority."8 Professor Robert
Clifiton is a principal advocate of the "mandatory vesting" theory. 81 Pro-
fessor Clinton argues that the constitutional language, particularly the use
of the word "shall," establishes that Congress was not intended to have
75. See Bator, supra note 1, at 1036; Gunther, supra note 1, at 914; Redish & Woods,
supra note 1, at 71-72. One wonders how far this principle could be taken by the Supreme
Court. Could the Court, for example, decide that the Presidential veto is no longer neces-
sary or justifiable? Could it decide, under the principle of "one man, one vote," as pro-
nounced in Reynolds v. Syms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), that equal suffrage in the Senate among
all states, regardless of population, was no longer constitutional? (Although Article V
specifically forbids this, the prohibition is perhaps unenforceable: just as an act cannot
make itself unrepealable by future legislation, neither can a constitution make itself
unamendable.) Surely, if the court cannot alter the constitutional provisions for the struc-
ture of the other branches, it cannot be permitted to change the constitutional provisions
for the structure of its own branch. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 38 at 44
(James Madison) ("No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause ... .
76. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 382:
The fundamental premise of Madison's compromise was the perception that
the extent to which lower federal courts were needed to assure the effectiveness
of federal rights should be a matter for legislative judgment made from time to
time rather than a matter for constitutional judgment made once for all time....
Thus the fact that conditions today are different from those in 1789 with respect
to the need for and role of lower federal courts seems to support the wisdom of
the compromise rather than furnish an excuse for its abandonment.
Id.
77. Given that the Supreme Court is only able to hear a small fraction of all federal
cases that are tried in state court, the practice of certiorari, rather than appeal as of right, is
inadequate to fulfill the alleged "constitutional duty of case by case consideration of all
federal cases."
78. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 516.
79. "Eisenberg fails to recognize that violence to constitutional rights may be achieved
just as much by a neutral scheme promoting efficiency as by legislation spurred by 'sub-
stantive disagreement' with judicial decisions." Redish & Woods, supra note 1, at 74.
80. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816).
81. See Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 741; see also Clinton, Early Implemen-
tation, supra note 1, at 1515.
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discretion over the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. As will be argued
more fully later, however, the Framers' use of the word "shall" does not
support this conclusion.82 In addition, Professor Clinton, like Justice
Story, ignores other constitutional language which directly mitigates that
result.83
D. The Two-Tier Theory
Yet another approach that has developed, the "two-tier theory," can be
viewed as a compromise position. Remarkably, this theory can also be
traced back to Justice Story's opinion in Martin .8'4 According to this view,
the judicial power is mandatorily vested in the federal judiciary, but it
need not extend to all the categories of cases enumerated in Article III;
rather, there are two tiers to federal jurisdiction. In the first tier are cases
arising under federal law, cases affecting ambassadors, etc., and cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In this tier, the judicial power must
extend to "all Cases"-i.e., each and every case. Thus, Congress's power
is limited to deciding which federal courts, the Supreme Court, an inferior
court, or both, should have jurisdiction.85 The second tier is comprised of
the enumerated "controversies." Because the judicial power need not ex-
tend to all such controversies, Congress has the authority to decide the
extent of federal court jurisdiction.
82. See infra Parts II.A and II.C.
83. See generally infra Part II.
84. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 333-34 (1816).
It will be observed that there are two classes of cases enumerated in the constitu-
tion, between which a distinction seems to be drawn .... In [the first] ... class
the expression is, and that the judicial power shall extend to all cases; but in ...
the second class, the word "all" is dropped seemingly ex industria. Here the judi-
cial authority is to extend to controversies (not to all controversies) to which the
United States shall be a party .... From this difference of phraseology, perhaps,
a difference of constitutional intention may, with propriety, be inferred .... In
respect to the first class, it may well have been the intention of the framers of the
constitution imperatively to extend the judicial power either in an original or ap-
pellate form to all cases; and in the latter class to leave it to congress to qualify
the jurisdiction, original or appellate, in such manner as public policy might
dictate.
Id.
It is not entirely clear that Justice Story espoused precisely the two-tier theory but the
language quoted above suggests that he did. See supra note 68 and accompanying text;
infra notes 164, 364-66 and accompanying text.
85. This may seem similar to Clinton's view of congressional authority, but it applies
only to cases in the first tier. The difference is greater than it may appear. For Clinton, the
Exceptions Clause is itself merely distributive in nature. For Justice Story, the Exceptions
Clause has the traditional meaning view, but is limited by other provisions of Article III.
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Professor Akhil Reed Amar, a modern advocate of this theory, has
developed it extensively and forcefully.8 6 Professor Amar claims that,
while many interpretations of Article III focus only on certain portions of
the text to the exclusion of others, this theory provides a comprehensive
interpretation of Article III. In addition, he argues that the structure and
history of Article III strongly support this thesis.
Professor Amar's textual argument is one of relative superiority. He
claims that this interpretation is more comprehensive than the others.
Yet there is much that Professor Amar overlooks. For example, he im-
properly regards the terms "cases" and "controversies" as synonymous.8 7
He makes an analogous mistake with "jurisdiction" and "judicial
power."88 He also disregards the repetition of the word "in" in the Vest-
ing Clause.89 Finally, as Justice Story and Professor Clinton before him,
Professor Amar mistakenly assumes that word "shall" is a mandate to
Congress.9" This Article will provide an even more comprehensive inter-
pretation of the text of Article III.
Professor Amar's structural argument is twofold, based upon the judi-
cial independence requirements for Article III and upon the relative im-
portance of the cases in the first tier by comparison to those in the second
tier. The salary and tenure provisions of Article III, however, simply are
not jurisdictional requirements in the relevant sense.91 Furthermore,
Professor Amar's views as to the relative importance of the various cate-
gories of cases are debatable, particularly his assignment of "Controver-
sies to which the United States shall be a Party" to the lower tier.92 His
86. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 205; see also Amar, Reply to Friedman,
supra note 1, at 442; Amar, Reply, supra note 1, at 1651; Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1,
at 1499.
87. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 244 n.128. But cf. Amar, Reply, supra note
1, at 1656-57 ("[Tlhe civil/criminal distinction, whether or not ultimately persuasive, is
wholly irrelevant.").
88. Although Amar does not assume that the "judicial Power" and "jurisdiction" are
exactly synonymous, he does assume that the former encompasses the latter. See Amar,
Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 231 n.88 ("The 'judicial Power' is not simply the power to speak
in the name of the nation-a power that is vested in all Article III judges-but also com-
prehends the subject matter jurisdiction to decide all cases in certain categories."); see also
id. at 233. This is an assertion for which he provides no real support. See infra note 196
and accompanying text; cf infra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
89. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 231 n.88. The Constitution provides that
"[tjhe judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CONST. art. Ill, § 1 (emphasis added).
90. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 215 (finding that "shall" is a mandate).
91. See infra Part II.G.1.
92. Amar himself recognizes, but dismisses, the problem with assigning these catego-
ries of cases to the non-mandatory second tier. See Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at
1508, 1524. According to The Federalist, however, "[c]ontroversies between the nation and
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theory is also undermined by the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
over "those [Cases] in which a State shall be a Party." Although he
would place such cases in his permissive tier of jurisdiction, the constitu-
tional grant of Supreme Court original jurisdiction is self-executing 9a and
beyond Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause,94 making federal
jurisdiction over state-party cases more mandatory than permissive. 95 In
any event, without the support of the text, Professor Amar's structural
arguments fail, for jurisdiction over even the most important categories is
not necessarily mandatory in each case.
Finally, Professor Amar argues that the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
records of the Constitutional Convention, two of the best indicators of
its members or citizens can only be properly referred to the national tribunals." THE FED-
ERALST No. 80, supra note 38, at 476; see also HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 386-
87 ("Why did the drafters of Article III single out cases affecting ambassadors, etc., for
mandatory treatment and leave Congress an option in cases in which the United States was
a party?"); Casto, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 91 ("But why are cases involving the United
States itself relegated to the less important second tier? Surely the leaders in the early
Republic did not view government litigation as less important than cases in the first tier.").
Other categories also cause problems. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 1, at 1582-84.
93. See California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979) ("The original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is conferred not by the Congress but by the Constitution itself. This juris-
diction is self-executing, and needs no legislative implementation.") (citing Kentucky v.
Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 96 (1861); Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 492
(1855); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 332 (1816)).
94. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
95. This undermines not only Amar's structural arguments, but his textual arguments
as well. The awkward omission of the selectively-used word "all" becomes difficult to ex-
plain. Thus, it is not surprising to find Amar defending the indefensible: congressional
control over the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. See Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury,
Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Ct-. L. REV. 443, 478-
88 (1989); Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 254-55 n.160. Even the Marshall court, which
Professor Amar believes supported his two-tier theory, did not believe that Congress could
restrict the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 820-21 (1824).
In order to support his position, Amar relies on the Necessary and Proper Clause. There
is no reason, however, to view congressional control over the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction as either "necessary" or "proper," particularly in light of the "mandatory" lan-
guage of the Granting Clause: "the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." U.S.
CoNs-. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Moreover, the fact that there is an explicit
Exceptions Clause for the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction strongly suggests, partic-
ularly under generally accepted rules of construction (such as inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius-the inclusion of one is the exclusion of others) that Congress has no authority to
make exceptions to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Amar must realize that even
if state-party cases seem to be within the permissive tier under the first paragraph of Arti-
cle III, Section 2, this inference must be tempered by other language in Article III which
clearly leads to a different result-just as Amar might argue that, although the Exceptions
Clause seems to apply to "all other cases before mentioned," the inference must be tem-
pered by other language in Article III which limits that power.
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the original intent of the Framers,96 support his thesis.97 Although at first
the various drafts of the Constitution from the Convention may seem to
support Professor Amar's theory, this Article will demonstrate that, upon
closer examination, they do not. 8 In addition, Professor Amar's attempt
to show that the first Congress departed remarkably little from the plan
of the Constitution is unpersuasive to many who believe that there were
significant gaps between the constitutional limit of federal jurisdiction
and that provided for by the Judiciary Act-even as to cases in the first
tier.99 By comparison, the Judiciary Act is perfectly compatible with the
traditional view.100
E. Other External Limits
It has become popular to insist that even if Congress has plenary au-
thority to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it cannot use this
power to violate any other provisions of the Constitution.' 0 ' Thus, Con-
gress may not violate the constitutional guarantees of due process and
equal protection in formulating any jurisdiction-stripping statute. Al-
though it has been argued that a statute that would remove certain sub-
jects from federal jurisdiction premised on hostility to the substantive
decisions of the Supreme Court would violate those constitutional guar-
antees,10 2 these arguments are unpersuasive.
Due process arguments are doomed to fail. The Supreme Court long
has held that due process does not require any level of appellate re-
96. That the records of the Constitutional Convention are a reliable indicator of the
Framers is obvious. For discussion of the first Judiciary Act as an indicator of the original
intent, see infra note 321-22 and accompanying text.
97. See generally Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1; see also Amar, Reply, supra note
1; Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1.
98. See infra Part III.A.
99. See infra notes 340-50 and accompanying text (elaborating on Section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789); see also HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 386 ("Why did [the
Judiciary] Act leave some significant gaps in federal court jurisdiction, even in the
'mandatory' categories?"); Meltzer, supra note 1, at 1585-1602 (questioning the historical
roots of the two-tier thesis in the Judiciary Act of 1789).
In his defense, Amar never sought "to prove that Congress has always self-consciously
understood the limits of its power to regulate jurisdiction." Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1,
at 260 n.175. Nevertheless, his "contention is that the actions of Congress in passing juris-
dictional statutes have always by and large comported with the basic requirements of Arti-
cle III with, perhaps, de minimis exceptions." Id.
100. At the least, the First Judiciary Act is perfectly compatible with the view presented
in this Article. See infra notes 321-32 and accompanying text (providing the subsequent
history to the Judiciary Act of 1789).
101. See supra note 21 (presenting other sources that discuss the unconstitutional inva-
sion of judicial powers).
102. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 1, at 68-77; Tribe, supra note 1, at 129; see also Van
Alstyne, supra note 1, at 264.
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view,10 3 much less a right to Supreme Court review.1"4 Adjudication by a
state court is adequate under the due process guarantee.
Equal protection arguments fare significantly better. Because no per-
son is to be "den[ied] ... the equal protection of the laws,"105 Congress is
not permitted to discriminate unfairly against a particular class of liti-
gants. Thus, Congress is not permitted to restrict access to the federal
courts based on race, gender, creed, etc.10 6 Any statute that did so would
properly be held unconstitutional by the courts.
However, there are those who argue further that, in allocating jurisdic-
tion, Congress is not permitted to discriminate among various constitu-
tional rights. The fundamental problem with this view, however, is that
"rights don't have rights; people have rights."
10 7
According to Professor Lawrence Tribe, Congress is not permitted to
impose impermissible burdens on constitutional rights.108 Being forced
to litigate a matter in state courts simply cannot be considered an "imper-
missible burden" per se. Professor Tribe's argument, however, is that a
"selective repeal [of jurisdiction] ... sends a clear signal to hostile state
and local officials,"10 9 and, therefore, must be considered "a severe im-
pingement upon the rights thus placed beyond the shield of federal pro-
tection."' 10 Ironically, Professor Tribe argues that a "wholesale repeal [of
federal jurisdiction], even under strict scrutiny, would not necessarily be
invalidated." ' Under this view, the Exceptions Clause seems to be an
all-or-nothing power. Congress can give full jurisdiction, or enact a
"wholesale repeal," but it is not permitted to make specific "exceptions"
103. See generally Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64 (1972); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 18 (1956); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
104. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ("Article III left Congress
free to establish inferior federal courts or not as it thought appropriate. It could have
declined to create any such courts, leaving suitors to the remedies afforded by state courts,
with such appellate review by this Court as Congress might prescribe." (emphasis added)).
105. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1; see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)
(holding that although the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause applies only
to states, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees equal protection vis-A-vis
the federal government).
106. See Gunther, supra note 1, at 916 ("Congress could not limit access to the federal
courts on the basis of race or of wholly irrelevant criteria such as a litigant's height, weight,
or hair color.").
107. Redish, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 917.
108. Tribe, supra note 1, at 141-46. But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 48 n.27 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]he essay's broader attempt to impeach jurisdic-
tional statutes under various Bill of Rights provisions seems in retrospect to have been
somewhat overreaching.").
109. Tribe, supra note 1, at 145-46.
110. Id. at 144.
111. Id. at 145.
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to a general rule of jurisdiction. This result suggests that the argument is
unsound. It is "wholesale repeal," if anything, that would be suspect
under the Exceptions Clause." 2 As Professor Tribe himself notes, "[T]he
reference to exceptions and regulations indicates that something substan-
tial is to remain after Congress's subtractions have been performed.""' 3
Professor Sager notes that "Congress is not empowered to burden the
exercise of a constitutional right-not, at least, without a compelling justi-
fication. '1 1 4 Thus, he argues that "constitutional claimants ... [cannot
be] deprived of timely and effective judicial relief.""' 5 A jurisdictional
statute that merely grants state courts finality over a particular constitu-
tional issue, however, does no such thing. The state courts remain avail-
able to grant "timely and effective judicial relief" for any and all rights
they find in the Constitution.
The theoretical premise of such arguments-that state courts would ac-
cept an invitation from Congress to disregard the Constitution-is ques-
tionable. Indeed, state courts are at least as independent of Congress as
Article III federal courts because Congress has no authority to infringe
upon their independence at all. 1 6 Moreover, under the Supremacy
Clause, state courts are all bound to enforce the Constitution." 7 It must
be presumed that they will do so.
That state courts might come to different substantive conclusions than
the Supreme Court does not mean that they are disregarding the Consti-
tution. 1 8 Nowhere does the Constitution state that the Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, or that the decisions of the Supreme
Court, shall be the "supreme Law of the Land.""' 9 If jurisdiction is the
112. See infra note 211 and accompanying text (explaining jurisdictional restriction as
an exception).
113. Tribe, supra note 1, at 135.
114. Sager, supra note 1, at 70.
115. Id.
116. See Redish, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 912 ("Vis a vis Congress at least, state
courts remain as independent as article III federal judges, because Congress has no power
to regulate either their salary or tenure.").
117. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
118. For example, it cannot fairly be said that the inability to find a substantive right to
abortion must be due to a disregard for the Constitution itself; at most, it is only a disre-
gard for Supreme Court precedent.
119. See TRIBE, supra note 108, at 34-35:
[A]t least so long as the manner in which our nation's fundamental document is to
be interpreted remains open to question, the 'meaning' of the Constitution is sub-
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authority to decide a case, it must include the authority to decide the case
wrongly. 120 Corrections, if any, must come on appeal. 121 State courts
may decide cases wrongly-just as the Supreme Court may decide cases
wrongly.122 But just as the latter is constitutionally acceptable, so must
be the former. It would be incredible for federal courts to rule unconsti-
tutional a jurisdiction-stripping statute merely because state courts could
decide such cases incorrectly.
123
Furthermore, at least with respect to certain rights, an exception to fed-
eral jurisdiction could be said to discriminate against a class of litigants,
and not simply against the particular subject matter. An example is abor-
tion, a constitutional right subject to exercise only by women. Violation
of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection (in contrast to a viola-
tion of an anti-discrimination statute), however, requires a showing of
ject to legitimate dispute, and the Court is not alone in its responsibility to ad-
dress that meaning. Rather, a variety of actors must make their own
constitutional judgments, and possess the power to develop interpretations of the
Constitution which do not necessarily conform to the judicially enforced interpre-
tation articulated by the Supreme Court....
Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 258 n.170:
Article VI does not make the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States, as interpreted only by the Supreme Court, the supreme law of the land.
Instead, different actors of government are permitted to have different under-
standings of that supreme law. The genius of the system is that . . . the several
branches must cooperate .... ;
Wechsler, Courts and Constitution, supra note 1, at 1006:
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, do not pass on constitutional ques-
tions because there is a special function vested in them to enforce the Constitu-
tion or police the other agencies of government. They do so rather for the reason
that they must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction
and in doing so must give effect to the supreme law of the land. That is, at least,
what Marbury v. Madison was all about. I have not heard that it has yet been
superseded, though I confess I read opinions on occasion that do not exactly
make its doctrine clear.
But see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that "the interpretation of the...
[Constitution] enunciated by this Court ... is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of
the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States, 'any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.'"). Of course, the mere fact that the
Supreme Court maintains this position does not necessarily make it so. See infra note 413
and accompanying text. Both as a matter of principle, see infra note 120 and accompany-
ing text, and as a practical matter, see infra note 121 and accompanying text, it is difficult
to see how this doctrine could be enforced without appellate review by the Supreme Court.
120. See Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1916) ("Jurisdiction is a matter of
power and covers wrong as well as right decisions.").
121. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 235 (1908) ("[T]he judgment is unimpeachable,
unless reversed.").
122. See infra notes 407-12 and accompanying text; see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (describing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), as "an uncon-
stitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States").
123. See infra note 412 and accompanying text.
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124discriminatory purpose. It would be wrong to attribute a sexist intent
to any such jurisdiction-stripping statute. Opponents of abortion rights
are not misogynists; that there are significant numbers of women among
them demonstrates this fact.
The true motivation in the case of such controversial jurisdiction-strip-
ping proposals is simply hostility to the Supreme Court's decisions, which
are seen as exceeding legitimate authority under the judicial power.
Without more, this cannot be deemed a constitutionally illegitimate mo-
tive. Although under the principle of "separation of powers" each
branch of government is independent of the others, the principle of
"checks and balances" encourages each branch to use its legitimate pow-
ers to prevent overreaching by the other branches.125 It is unquestioned,
for example, that if the federal courts perceive that Congress or the Presi-
dent is exceeding legitimate authority, the courts may use the judicial
power to decide cases in conformity with the Constitution and rule the
statute or action unconstitutional.' 26 It is also unquestioned that if the
President feels that Congress or the courts exceeded their authority, he
may use the veto power or the pardon power to counteract them. Like-
wise, if Congress views the President as exceeding his authority, it can use
the power of the purse to restrict him.127 Similarly, if Congress perceives
the Supreme Court to be exceeding its constitutional authority, Congress
is permitted-even obliged-to use its legitimate powers, including those
under the Exceptions clause, to curb the Supreme Court. Far from being
illegitimate, congressional hostility to federal court decisions should be
considered a "compelling interest."' 28
124. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
125. "[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the
same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others .... Am-
bition must be made to counteract ambition." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 38, at
321-22 (James Madison). See generally infra Part IV.A.
126. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 172-80 (1803).
127. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7. ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
128. See Ratner, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 954:
[R]emoval of [certain categories of) ... cases from the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction, if otherwise authorized by the exceptions and regulations clause,
would not violate equal protection, because the purpose, not achievable by a less
intrusive alternative, would then be the constitutionally approved and necessarily




II. A COMPREHENSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT
Having reviewed the existing interpretations of Article III and their
limitations, this Article will now offer a new interpretation intended to
avoid the errors made by previous commentators.
The appropriate starting point for any interpretation is the text of the
Constitution:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be di-
minished during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority; -to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls; -to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction; -to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party; -to Controversies between two or more
States; -between a State and Citizens of another State; -be-
tween Citizens of different States; -between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.1 29
A. "Shall be vested"
Article III begins with the words, "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested . . . ." Many assume that this language was in-
tended to be mandatory. 130 This is not an unreasonable assumption, for
the word "shall" often denotes a mandatory meaning, particularly when
used in legislation.1 31 The word is capable of many different meanings,
129. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
130. See supra Parts I.C and I.D.
131. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLACK'S] ("As
used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word ['shall'] is generally imperative or
1997]
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however 132-including even a merely permissive reading. 133 In Article
III itself, "shall" is used in both the mandatory sense-e.g., "The trial of
all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury"' 34 -as well
as the permissive sense-e.g., "such Exceptions, and under such Regula-
tions as the Congress shall make. '135 In fact, the term commonly shifts
its meaning even in midsentence. 136 Therefore, a careful examination of
the Constitutional context is required to determine the proper meaning
of the word "shall."
The opening language of Article III closely parallels the opening lan-
guage of the first two Articles of the Constitution, each of which estab-
mandatory."); see also BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1171 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter
BALLENTINE'S] ("Providing generally, but not always, a mandate .... ").
132. See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE, 939 (2d ed.
1995) [hereinafter GARNER] ("Shall has as many as eight senses in drafted documents.").
133. See BALLENTINE'S, supra note 131, at 1171 (denoting "shall" as "[s]ometimes
meaning 'may,"'); BLACK'S, supra note 131, at 1375 ("[Shall] may be construed as merely
permissive or directory (as equivalent to 'may'...."); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1075 (10th ed. 1993) [hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S] ("1 archaic A: will
have to: MUST B : will be able to: CAN"). Even in dictionaries available at the time of the
Constitutional Convention, the word was capable of a permissive reading. See JOHN ASH,
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Shall (1775) ("To be hereafter determined to,
to be hereafter permitted to."). The more common definition was merely an indication of
the future tense. See, e.g., N. BAILEY, UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
Shall (1782) ("[Tlhe sign of the future tense."); DYCHE, NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTION-
ARY, Shall (1765) ("[I1n Grammar, it is called the sign of the future tense."). The future
tense can signify either a mandate or simply a statement of fact. The latter is consistent
with a self-executing interpretation of the word "shall."
134. U.S. CONST. art. Il1, § 2, cl. 3.
135. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Cf Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 786
n.147:
Arguably, one of the most glaring departures from the framers' consistent use
of the word "shall" in its mandatory sense is the so-called exceptions and regula-
tions clause of Section 2, of article III .... While the term "shall" in this clause
conventionally has been thought only to connote a future tense, the word may
have been used in an imperative sense. According to the thesis of this Article,
Congress was obligated to invest the entirety of the specified appellate jurisdic-
tion in the Supreme Court or, at least, in inferior federal courts. Since article III
did not fully describe ... the size or procedures of the Supreme Court or require
the creation of inferior federal courts, it was imperative for Congress to enact
regulations to carry this constitutional mandate into effect.
Id. Clinton's argument, however, cannot possibly apply to another permissive use of the
word "shall" in Article III: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... arising under
*.. Treaties... which shall be made .... " U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
Surely there was no obligation to make treaties in the future.
136. GARNER, supra note 132, at 939 (emphasis omitted). One such example can be
found in Article III itself: "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court
shall [not 'may'] have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Excep-
tions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall ['may'] make." U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, cl. 2.
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lishes one of the three branches of government. It is reasonable,
therefore, to read the three provisions analogously. 137 In these provi-
sions, the proper reading of the word "shall" is not exactly a mandatory
one.
There is no doubt that the opening language of Article I was intended
to be self-executing rather than mandatory. 138 By proclaiming that "[a]ll
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress,"'1 39 the
Constitution itself establishes the legislature. It does not merely author-
ize-or even command-someone else to do so. Article I is more fairly
paraphrased as stating that the legislature is hereby created than that the
legislature must be created.
Likewise, the opening language of Article II is self-executing, not
mandatory. By stating, "The executive Power shall be vested in a Presi-
dent of the United States of America,"140 the Constitution establishes the
Presidency, it does not merely require the Congress to do so.
It is only logical that the opening language of Article III be interpreted
similarly. The appropriate interpretation is not that Congress must vest
the judicial power in the federal judiciary, but that the Constitution itself
does the vesting. It would be strange to interpret the language differently
for the judiciary than for the other branches. It would be even more odd
to interpret the Constitution as having established only two branches of
government and merely authorizing the others to establish the third. This
rings especially true since the third branch is a co-equal branch, as all will
concede. Thus, the only acceptable interpretation is that the Constitution
itself establishes the judiciary, and that its language is self-executing
rather than mandatory.
Justice Story, therefore, was incorrect when he stated that "[t]he lan-
guage of [Article III] ... is manifestly designed to be mandatory upon the
legislature."'' The judiciary is no more dependant upon Congress for
judicial power than the President is for executive power.'4 2 If the Consti-
137. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 231-32; see also Clinton, Guided Quest,
supra note 1, at 841-42.
138. Apparently, both Amar and Clinton recognize this fact. See Amar, Two Tiers,
supra note 1, at 232 ("Read together, the first three Articles of the Constitution establish
three equal and co-ordinate branches of federal government, each of which derives its
power not from the other branches, but from the Constitution itself." (emphasis added));
Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 842 ("[T]he framers virtually tracked the self-
executing commands of articles I and II .
139. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
140. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
141. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816).
142. The fact that Congress is constitutionally entitled to decide whether and how to
create inferior courts does not change this result, for the Constitution by its own terms
vests the judicial power only in whatever inferior courts Congress decides to create.
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tutional mandate is merely a directive to Congress, then Congress could
choose to ignore it, thereby annihilating the judiciary. The inevitable re-
sponse, that the courts could rule Congress's inaction unconstitutional
and directly follow the Constitution, is proof that the language is indeed
self-executing.
Under either interpretation, it remains true that the Constitution re-
quires that there be a federal judiciary vested with the judicial power.
Nevertheless, it is important to arrive at the correct interpretation of
these words. The self-executing interpretation, unlike the mandatory
one, reaffirms the equality of the judicial branch of government which,
like the legislative and executive branches, is established by the Constitu-
tion. More importantly for present purposes, it shows that there is no
mandate to Congress in the opening language of the Constitution. The
word "shall" is simply not addressed to Congress.
B. "In"
The judicial power is vested by the Constitution, but in whom is it
vested? A cursory examination leads to the conclusion that it is vested in
the federal judiciary as a whole. This is the view of most commentators.
A careful reading of the constitutional text, however, shows that it is not
so simple.
The Constitution vests the judicial power "in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."' 43 It is important to note what the Constitution does not do.
It does not vest judicial power "in a federal judiciary, which shall consist
of one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." Nor does it vest judicial power "in
one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." If either of these alternatives were
adopted, it could fairly be said that the judicial power was vested in the
federal judiciary as a whole.
The Constitution does something different; it repeats the word "in."
This may be a subtle distinction, but it is important. By repeating the
word "in," the Constitution vests the judicial power, the entire judicial
power, in the Supreme Court, and also in whatever inferior courts Con-
gress creates. The whole judicial power is vested separately in each; it is
not simply shared by the two.144 To ignore the repetition of the word
143. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
144. It is arguable from the text of Article III, Section 1 that while the judicial power is
vested in its entirety in the Supreme Court alone, it is vested in its entirety only in the
inferior courts as a whole. Thus, even under the mandatory theories, jurisdiction over each
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"in" is easy, even convenient, but it is intellectually dishonest. There is
no reason to suppose that it is merely excess verbiage.145
Professor Amar suggests that the second use of "in" may have been
added to avoid confusion; to make it clear that Congress's discretion ex-
tends only to the inferior courts, and that the existence of one Supreme
Court is mandatory. 46 It is doubtful, however, that the omission of the
second "in" would lead anyone to such a conclusion. Alternative word-
ing would not have been difficult to formulate, even if this were the con-
cern of the drafters. For example, language similar to the opening
language of Article I would have worked perfectly. As suggested earlier,
the provision in question could have read as follows: "The judicial Power
shall be vested in a federal judiciary, which shall consist of one supreme
Court and such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." Moreover, many of the early drafts in the Consti-
tutional Convention contained language which avoided this ambiguity
and which could have been emulated.147 Thus, it is only fair to assume
that the use of the second "in" is significant and that the judicial power is
constitutionally-required case would not have to be vested in each inferior court. How-
ever, this is a strained and hyper-technical reading of the text. A natural reading of the
text suggests that the judicial power is vested in its entirety in each Article III court. Once
it is understood that the judicial power does not include jurisdiction, the problems disap-
pear. See infra Part II.E. Even if it were determined that the judicial power is vested in
the inferior courts as a whole and not in each inferior court, however, this would not affect
the general argument that the grant of judicial power to the inferior courts is independent
of the grant of judicial power to the Supreme Court.
145. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be pre-
sumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore
such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it."); see also Amar, Two
Tiers, supra note 1, at 242 ("Where possible, each word of the Constitution is to be given
meaning; no words are to be ignored as mere surplusage.").
146. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 231 n.88.
147. For example, the very first plan considered by the Convention, provided as fol-
lows: "9. [Resolved]. That a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more
supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature...."
1 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 21. Similarly, the resolutions sent to the Committee of Detail
provided as follows: "Resolved. That a national Judiciary be established to consist of One
Supreme Tribunal .... Resolved. That the national Legislature be empowered to appoint
inferior Tribunals." Id. at 132-33. Finally, an early draft of the Committee of Detail pro-
vided as follows:
"5. The Judiciary
1. shall consist of one supreme tribunal
2. the judges whereof shall be appointed by the senate
3. and of such inferior tribunals, as the legislature may
(appoint) <establish> ....
2 id. at 146.
By the time the Constitution emerged from the Committee of Detail, it contained the
dual "in." See 2 id. at 186.
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vested independently in the Supreme Court and in the inferior courts. As




Section 2 begins by stating that "[tihe judicial power shall extend to"
certain enumerated cases. Once again, the Constitution uses the word
"shall," and the question arises whether or not this was intended to be
mandatory. If "shall extend" is mandatory, then the federal courts may
be required to hear many cases. 49 The constitutional text could then be
paraphrased as follows: "The judicial power must be exercised in the fol-
lowing cases ... "150
A mandatory reading has been defended by many commentators, most
notably Professor Amar.' 5' He argues that federal jurisdiction must in-
clude all cases in his first tier of categories. However, because he believes
that the judicial power is vested in the federal judiciary as a whole, he
believes that the Constitution merely requires that some federal court be
148. Professor Amar believes that the judicial power includes actual jurisdiction, which
would make the vesting of the entire judicial power in the inferior courts "deeply problem-
atic." Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 231 n.88. Once it is understood, however, that the
judicial power is something different than actual jurisdiction, and is actually only the capac-
ity to receive jurisdiction, there is no such problem with vesting the entire judicial power in
each Article III court. See generally infra Part ILE; infra note 162 and accompanying text.
149. Actually, once the entire text of Article III is properly understood, even this is not
true. The Constitution states only that the judicial power extends to the enumerated cases.
Nowhere is there a command that any court's jurisdiction, or the aggregate jurisdiction of
all federal courts, extend to those cases. See infra Part II.E.
150. It has been argued that "[s]ince Article III speaks of the judicial power, and not of
the judicial duty, it is plausible to believe that this power may be waived [by Article III
judges], much as Congress may waive its legislative power by declining to pass laws."
Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 233 n.96. If this assertion is true, the constitutional text
might fairly be paraphrased as follows: "The federal courts must be permitted to exercise
the judicial Power over the following cases ...."
However, this is a highly questionable interpretation. Article I provides that "[tlhe Con-
gress shall have Power To" do certain enumerated things. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
There is no obligation in this language. Had Article III read that the judiciary "shall have
Power" over certain cases, then it would enjoy similar discretion. However, Article III
provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to" the enumerated cases. Id. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1. Using a mandatory interpretation of "shall," as Professor Amar does, there is no
discretion here, either for Congress or the judiciary.
151. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 239-46, 254-57. Professor Clinton also de-
fends this view in an even more demanding form: He would require that federal jurisdic-
tion include all of the enumerated cases. See Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 749-
50. However, it is precisely because Clinton's interpretation is more demanding than
Amar's that this Section will focus on the latter to the exclusion of the former. If, as will be
shown, Professor Amar's interpretation is too broad, then a fortiori, Professor Clinton's is
flawed as well.
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available to hear each of the constitutionally-required cases. This can be
either in original jurisdiction or on appeal, but according to Professor
Amar, it need not be both.
152
Contrary to Professor Amar's argument, the judicial power is not sim-
ply vested in the federal judiciary as a whole. It is independently vested
in the Supreme Court and in the inferior courts.15 3 Thus, if "shall ex-
tend" is mandatory on Congress, the Supreme Court would have judicial
power which "must" extend to the constitutionally-required cases, and
the inferior courts would have judicial power which "must" extend to
them as well.154 This is a result that Professor Amar would have a diffi-
cult time defending.
On the other hand, "shall" can be interpreted as self-executing, as in
the Vesting Clause. Under this view, there is no mandate to Congress
because the work is done by the Constitution itself. This is consistent
with similar uses of the word "shall" in the Constitution. Just as the Arti-
cle III Vesting Clause is analogous to the Vesting Clauses in Articles I
and II, so too is the enumeration of cases in Article III analogous to the
enumeration of powers in Articles I and II. When Article I provides that
"Congress shall have Power To" do certain things, 15 5 "shall" is clearly
self-executing rather than mandatory. Similarly, when Article II provides
that "[t]he President shall be the Commander in Chief," or "shall have
Power" to do certain things,'56 "shall" is self-executing, not mandatory.
The instant provision must be read similarly: the "shall" in "shall extend"
is self-executing, not mandatory.
Furthermore, the word "shall" is only part of the equation. The word
"extend" is not unambiguous, either.'57 Professor Amar implicitly inter-
prets the word in a mandatory sense to mean "to include. ' 58 However,
the proper definition of the word "extend" is a non-mandatory one,
152. Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 255-57.
153. See supra Part l.B.
154. Even if, as has been suggested, the mandate is only on Congress, and the courts
have the "power" without the "obligation" to review such cases, Congress is still required
to provide jurisdiction for both the Supreme Court and some inferior court in each consti-
tutionally-required case. But see supra note 150 (arguing that constitutional text does not
support this interpretation). While this is much less burdensome, it is still a tall order.
155. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
156. See id., art. II, § 2.
157. See BLACK'S, supra note 131, at 583 ("Term ['extend'] lends itself to great variety
of meanings, which must in each case be gathered from context.").
158. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 229 ("[Tlhe judicial power of the United
States must, as an absolute minimum, comprehend [i.e., include] the subject matter juris-
diction to decide finally all cases involving federal questions, admiralty, or public ambassa-
dors."), quoted in Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1504.
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meaning "to reach." '159 Thus, the relevant constitutional text is best para-
phrased as follows: "The judicial power hereby reaches the following
cases .... "160 Despite the self-executing "shall," the words "shall ex-
tend" are more permissive than mandatory; they are better interpreted as
"can include" rather than as "must include., 161
This interpretation is more plausible than the mandatory interpretation
in that it avoids the inherent difficulties described above. Courts are sim-
ply rendered capable of hearing any of the enumerated cases. 161 In addi-
tion, this interpretation comports with a natural reading of the text of the
Constitution, which seems to define the scope of judicial power rather
than create any obligations.
163
159. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S, supra note 133, at 411 ("1 : to stretch out in distance,
space, or time : REACH <their jurisdiction -ed over the whole area> 2 : to reach in scope or
application <his concern -s beyond mere business to real service to his customers>"); see
also NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 427
(1851) ("To stretch; to reach") [hereinafter NOAH WEBSTER].
160. "Hereby reaches" seems to be the only plausible interpretation of the words "shall
extend" in the various drafts of the Constitution generated by the Committee on Style. See
infra notes 259, 287 and accompanying text.
161. To clarify, the argument is not simply that "shall extend" means "can include." See
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 331-32 (1816) (rejecting the argument "that [the
words 'shall extend'] are equivalent to the words 'may extend,' and that 'extend' means to
widen to new cases not before within the scope of the power"). Rather, the argument is
that "can include" is a closer paraphrase than is "must include." Once the distinction be-
tween jurisdiction and judicial power is understood, it becomes clear that this is the true
import of the words. See infra Part II.E. There is no constitutional requirement that fed-
eral jurisdiction must include the enumerated cases; however, since the judicial power
reaches those cases, federal jurisdiction can include them.
162. Cf Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) ("The Constitution simply
gives to the inferior courts the capacity to take jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it
requires an act of Congress to confer it."); The "Francis Wright," 105 U.S. 381, 385 (1881)
("[W]hile the appellate power of this court under the Constitution extends to all cases
within the judicial power of the United States, actual jurisdiction under the power is con-
fined within such limits as Congress sees fit to prescribe."); Daniels v. Railroad Co., 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1865) ("The original jurisdiction of this court, and its power to receive
appellate jurisdiction, are created and defined by the Constitution; and [Congress] can en-
large neither one .... But it is for Congress to determine how far, within the limits of the
capacity of this court to take, appellate jurisdiction shall be given .... ); Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824) (stating that Article 1It, Section 2,
clause 1 "enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the
constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States .... ).
163. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.1, at 167 (2d ed. 1994)
("Article III of the Constitution defines the federal judicial power in terms of nine catego-
ries of 'cases' and 'controversies."'); WILLIAM A. SUTHERLAND, NOTES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 517 (1904) ("The object of [Article III, Section 2] is to define
the judicial power...."); cf Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 239 ("[Article III,] section 2
elaborates on that 'judicial Power' by defining the cases to which it 'shall extend.'").
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D. "All Cases" and "Controversies"
In Article III, Section 2, the Constitution enumerates the categories of
cases to which the judicial power extends. More important for present
purposes than the categories themselves, however, is how they are de-
scribed. Both Justice Story and Professor Amar point out that for certain
categories of cases, the Constitution states that the judicial power shall
extend to "all cases"-which they interpret to mean each and every
case-while for other categories, the judicial power extends only to "con-
troversies"-not necessarily all controversies. 164 From "this difference of
phraseology," Justice Story and Professor Amar conclude that the judicial
power must extend only to certain categories of cases: those preceded by
the words "all cases." For the remaining "controversies," the judicial
power need not extend to each and every case. Thus, Congress has
greater authority to regulate "controversies. "165
One major problem with this interpretation should be obvious from the
prior discussion. Since "shall extend" is not mandatory,166 the selective
use of the word "all" cannot lead to their conclusions. 67 A second and
more substantive problem is that both Justice Story and Professor Amar
164. "Each and every" is certainly a plausible interpretation of the word "all." Stand-
ing alone it appears to be the best interpretation. However, it is neither the only interpre-
tation, nor, in the context of Article III, the best. As will be shown in this Section, "all
cases" is better interpreted as "all types of cases."
However, even if "all cases" is interpreted as "each and every case," Professor Amar's
conclusion is not the only one possible. Rather than distinguish between mandatory and
permissive tiers of jurisdiction, the selective use of the word "all" could distinguish be-
tween exclusive and concurrent tiers of jurisdiction. Justice Story proposed such an inter-
pretation. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 333-37 (1816) ("[I]t is
manifest that the judicial power of the United States is unavoidably, in some cases, exclu-
sive of all state authority, and in all others, may be made so at the election of congress.").
Because he interpreted "shall extend" as mandatory, Justice Story believed that cases in
the first tier were necessarily exclusive and that those in the second tier were concurrent,
with an option for Congress to make them exclusive. However, if "shall extend" is closer
to 'can include' than 'must include,' then the two tiers would instead distinguish those cases
in which Congress has the power to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts (be-
cause federal jurisdiction can include all such cases) and those in which Congress can grant
only concurrent federal jurisdiction (because federal jurisdiction cannot include all such
cases). Structural arguments as to the relative importance of the cases in the first tier
support an exclusive/concurrent interpretation as much as they support a mandatory/per-
missive interpretation.
165. See supra Part I.D. Under the extreme view, "controversies" is satisfied by the
assignment of two controversies to the federal courts, which quota has long ago been met.
Thus, Congress would no longer need to assign any controversies at all to the federal
courts. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 240 n.119.
166. See supra Part I.C.
167. 'Congress cannot be required to grant jurisdiction over all such cases because
"shall" is not a mandate to Congress. At most, the judicial power automatically extends to
all such cases. Jurisdiction does not. See infra Part II.E.
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ignore an even more glaring "difference of phraseology"-the selective
use of the words "cases" and "controversies." Justice Story assumed, and
Professor Amar agrees, that the words are synonymous. The evidence
does not support this view.
Professor Amar's own "quintessentially interpretivist" method should
prevent him from dismissing any distinction too hastily. 168 He agrees that
selective word choices may not be disregarded. 169 He even takes pains-
taking efforts to develop how the word "all" must have been intentionally
used selectively. Yet he dismisses a plausible distinction between the very
next words, "cases" and "controversies," and concludes that the words
were used synonymously.
170
The plausible distinction between the two words is that "controversies"
has a meaning limited to civil cases, while "cases" is a broader word en-
compassing both civil cases and criminal cases. Such was the distinction
ascribed long ago by Justice Iredell in Chisolm v. Georgia,' which has
been referred to by the Supreme Court on various occasions.1
72
Professor Amar rejects the distinction by arguing that there is no evi-
dence that any difference in meaning was intended.' 73 His assignment of
the burden of proof is odd. When different words are used, the better
assumption is that different meanings were intended unless proven other-
wise. Professor Amar offers no proof that the words are synonymous; he
assumes that they are and requires proof to the contrary.
It is difficult to imagine what sort of proof one can reasonably require.
There is no reason to expect explicit definitional proof from the Constitu-
tional Convention or the ratification debates. One could hardly expect to
find working definitions for every term preserved in the scant records.
Rather, one should look to outside contemporary sources for definitions.
Then, as now, the word "controversy" was generally synonymous with the
word "dispute"'I7 -hardly a word to describe criminal proceedings. In
168. Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 207 n.7.
169. See id. at 242. In order to give such significance to "shall" and "all," Professor
Amar must confront the text very seriously.
170. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 183-85 and ac-
companying text.
171. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 431-32 (1793) ("[lIt cannot be presumed that the general word
'controversies' was intended to include any proceedings that relate to criminal cases .... ").
172. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937); Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 723 (1929); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-
57 (1911).
173. See Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1543-44; Amar, Reply, supra note 1, at
1656.
174. Compare 9A WORDS AND PHRASES 65-67 (1960 & 1996 Supp.), and IA C.J.S.
Actions § 5 (1985), and MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S, supra note 133, at 252 ("a discussion
marked esp. by the expression of opposing views : DISPUTE"), with SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
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fact, in one of the early drafts of the Constitution, the word "dispute" was
used in lieu of "controversy. 1 75  Moreover, while the term "cases"
clearly refers to both civil and criminal cases, the enumerated "controver-
sies" seem limited to civil cases. 176 Interpretations of the term rendered
shortly after the ratification of the Constitution confirm the limited
meaning of "controversy. ,177 In short, there is good reason to believe
that "controversies" were limited to civil cases while "cases" were not.
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE Controversy, (10th ed. 1810), and N. BAILEY,
UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY Controversy (1730), and WILLIAM
PERRY, ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 112 (3d. Brookfield ed. 1806), and JOHN
ASH, A NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE Controversy
(1775), and D. FENNING, THE ROYAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY Controversy (1775), and
THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM PARDON, NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY Controversy
(1765); see also 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 420-21 (Tucker ed. 1803) (referring to
controversies as disputes); 1 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 667 (8th ed. 1914) ("A dispute
arising between two or more persons.") [hereinafter BOUVIER'S].
175. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 147.
176. The judicial power clearly extends to state civil cases under the various jurisdic-
tional heads. However, state criminal cases are a different matter. State criminal cases
may fall within the judicial power if they "aris[e] under" federal law. However, state crimi-
nal cases involving only state law issues do not fall within the judicial power. In accord-
ance with the general principal that one sovereign will not enforce the penal laws of
another, the enumerated "controversies" have not been interpreted to include criminal
cases. See Oklahoma v. Gulf, Col. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 290, 297-300 (1911);
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289-93 (1888); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 390-99 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 377 (1816);
see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
536 n.2 (1833) (discussing BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES).
177. In addition to Chisolm v. Georgia, see supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES referred to the same distinction:
6. To controversies to which the United States shall be a party. The word cases
used in the preceding clauses of this article comprehends, generally, I apprehend
all cases, whether civil or criminal, which are capable of falling under these heads,
respectively ....
The word controversies, as here used, must be understood merely as relating to
such as are of a civil nature. It is probably unknown in any other sense, as I do
not recollect ever to have heard the expression, criminal controversy. As here
applied, it seems particularly appropriated to such disputes as might arise be-
tween the U. States and any one or more states, respecting territorial, or fiscal,
matters .... Or between the U. States and their debtors, contractors, and agents.
This construction is confirmed by the application of the word in the ensuing
clauses, where it evidently refers to disputes of a civil nature only, such for exam-
ple, as may arise between two or more states; or between citizens of different
states; or between a state, and the citizens of another state; none of which can
possibly be supposed to relate to such as are of a criminal nature, unless we could
suppose it was meant to deprive the states of the power of punishing murder or
theft, if committed by a foreigner, or the citizen of another state.
1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 174, at 420-21 (1803) (alteration in original);
see also 3 STORY, supra note 176, at 536 n.2 (citing BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES and
Chisolm v. Georgia).
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If one is not convinced that those are the appropriate meanings of the
words, it nevertheless can be shown that the Constitution does not actu-
ally use the words synonymously. Admittedly, the Constitution some-
times refers to "controversies" as "cases,' 78 which leads Professor Amar
to conclude that the words are synonymous. 179 "Cases," however, are
never referred to as "controversies." So the most that can be said is that
the word "cases" encompasses "controversies," but not vice versa.' 80
This general observation-that "cases" is broader than, but includes,
"controversies"-is consistent with the civil/criminal distinction, thereby
providing additional support for the interpretation.
Once it is established that the term "cases" encompasses "controver-
sies," among other things, the selective use of the word "all" becomes
easy to understand. "All" could have been used to show that more than
just "controversies" were included; in other words, "all [types of] cases,"
as opposed to "controversies" only.' 8 ' This use of "all" with "cases" may
seem somewhat redundant, but it is fairly common parlance and used to
emphasize the broad meaning that is intended. While this interpretation
178. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. In setting forth the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, the Constitution refers to controversies "in which a State shall be a Party"
as "those [cases]." Also, in setting forth the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
the Constitution refers to "all the other cases," which must include the "controversies."
179. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 244 n.128.
180. The civil/criminal distinction is also maintained in the first Judiciary Act, which
neither refers to criminal cases as "controversies," nor grants to any federal court jurisdic-
tion over criminal cases in any of the categories of "controversies." See Act of Sept. 24,
1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
181. Indeed, Professor Amar himself would have a difficult time interpreting those
words, as used in the appellate jurisdiction-granting clause, in any other manner. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make." (emphasis added)). Surely under Professor
Amar's theory, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction (and derivatively Congress's
Exceptions power) does not extend to "each and every other case before mentioned," but
only to "all the other types of cases before mentioned."
The former interpretation would be problematic on two fronts. On the one hand, it
would seem to prevent the Supreme Court from hearing the appeal of any case which
happens to fall within its original jurisdiction-because only if the particular case does not
fall within the Court's original jurisdiction does the case fall within its appellate jurisdic-
tion. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 392-405 (1821) (permitting the
Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases within its constitutional
grant of appellate jurisdiction, even if such cases also fall within the constitutional grant of
original jurisdiction). At the very least, then, Professor Amar must read this provision as
"each and every other type of case before mentioned."
On the other hand, it would also mean that Congress's Exceptions power applies in
"each and every other case," including federal question cases brought in State court. Pro-
fessor Amar would have a difficult time cabining Congress under this interpretation. How-
ever, some leeway could be gained for him by reading the provision as applying generally
to all the categories rather than specifically to each case.
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of "all" may not be very rich in meaning, it is surely a plausible interpre-
tation-and it accounts for the textual differences rather than merely ig-
noring them.
18 2
To this day, Professor Amar remains unpersuaded that there is any dif-
ference between "cases" and "controversies." Nevertheless, he believes
that any distinction would be "wholly irrelevant." The fact remains, he
argues, that "the judicial power shall extend to 'all' [criminal and civil]
cases in the first tier, but not necessarily 'all' [civil] controversies in the
second." '183 As has been demonstrated, however, "all cases" can and
should be interpreted as "all types of cases" rather than "each and every
case." '84  Thus, the civil/criminal distinction is most certainly not
irrelevant.' 8
5
E. "Judicial Power" and "Jurisdiction"
After describing cases to which judicial power extends, the Constitu-
tion goes on to describe the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The care-
ful reader will pause to ponder the difference between the terms "judicial
power" and "jurisdiction." As a general matter, "difference[s] of phrase-
ology" should be presumed intentional unless proven otherwise.' 86 Ad-
mittedly, a distinction between "jurisdiction" and "judicial power" is
difficult to maintain. The terms are generally assumed to be synonymous
and are often used interchangeably. 87 However, a careful analysis
reveals that there is a subtle difference.
88
182. See Amar, Reply, supra note 1, at 1656-57. While "all cases" may be technically
redundant, it is by no means "awkward" as Professor Amar suggests. See id. at 1657. It is
a perfectly normal way to emphasize the breadth of the term.
Professor Amar also argues that "if the term 'controversies' simply means 'civil cases,'
the framers could have said so with great ease." Id. at 1656-57. But if the term "controver-
sies" means "civil cases," the Framers did say so-explicitly! The argument that the Fram-
ers could have been more explicit can only be made against interpretations that attempt to
infer too much from the text; it loses most, if not all, of its strength when the definition of a
particular term is the issue.
183. Id. at 1657.
184. See supra notes 171-82 and accompanying text.
185. It should be noted that even if "all cases" means "each and every case," Amar's
argument can be turned on him. The fact is irrelevant. Only the judicial power extends to
"all" such cases. As will be shown in the next Section, there is no command that actual
jurisdiction-other than perhaps the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction-extend to any
case at all.
186. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334 (1816); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
187. Any number of sources could be cited to demonstrate the fact that the terms "judi-
cial Power" and "Jurisdiction" are often used interchangeably, so the point must be con-
ceded ab initio.
188. One interesting discussion of the difference, however, occurs in the case of Kendall
v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 622-23 (1838). In the course of a discussion about
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The term "jurisdiction" predates the Constitution. Although it is a
broad and vague term, the commonly understood meaning is the author-
ity of a given court to hear and decide a given case. 189 The term "judicial
power," on the other hand, is original to the Constitution. To properly
understand the meaning of "judicial power," comparison should be made
to its constitutional analogues, the legislative power and the executive
power. The legislative power of the United States is the power to enact
laws for the United States. The executive power is the power to execute
the laws and act on behalf of the United States. The judicial power,
therefore, might best be understood as the general power to adjudicate
how the circuit courts had the constitutional power but not necessarily the statutory juris-
diction to issue writs of mandamus, the Court digresses into dictum about the distinction
between the "judicial Power" and "Jurisdiction":
That there is a distinction, in some respects, cannot be doubted; and, generally
speaking, the word power is used in reference to the means employed in carrying
jurisdiction into execution. But, it may well be doubted, whether any marked dis-
tinction is observed and kept up in our laws, so as in any measure to affect the
construction of those laws. Power must include jurisdiction, which is generally used
in reference to the exercise of that power in courts of justice. But power, as used in
the constitution, would seem to embrace both. Thus, all legislative power shall be
vested in Congress. The executive power shall be vested in a President. The
[j]udicial power.., shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority, &c. This power must certainly embrace jurisdiction,
so far as that term is applicable to the legislative or executive power. And as relates
to judicial power, the term jurisdiction is not used, until the distribution of those
powers among the several courts, is pointed out and defined.
There is no such distinction in the two sections of the [Act of February 27,
1801] in the use of the terms power and jurisdiction, as to make it necessary to
consider them separately. If there is any distinction, the two sections, when taken
together, embrace them both.
Id. (emphasis added).
This language aptly demonstrates both that there is a subtle difference between the terms
and the fact that the difference is not often strictly observed.
Although the Court states that "power, as used in the constitution, would seem to em-
brace both [power and jurisdiction]," the Court is not speaking specifically of the judicial
power, but only of the term "power" generally. With respect to the judicial power, the
Court notes that the subtle distinction is maintained in the Constitution even if not in the
various statutes which followed.
189. See BALLENTINE'S, supra note 131, at 690 (3d ed. 1969) ("[Tlhe right of a tribunal
to exercise its power with respect to a particular matter."); BLACK'S, supra note 131, at 853
("It is the power of the court to decide a matter in controversy .... "); BouVIER'S, supra
note 174, at 1760-68 ("The authority by which judicial officers take cognizance of and de-
cide causes .... The power to hear and determine a cause." (citation omitted)); GARNER,
supra note 132, at 488 ('[T]he power of a court to decide a case or enter a decree.'); cf.
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 718 (1838) ("Jurisdiction is the power
to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between parties to a suit, to adju-
dicate or exercise any judicial power over them."); United States v. Arrendondo, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 691, 709 (1832) ("The power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction."). But see
supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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cases and interpret the laws in the name of the United States. 90 In other
words, the judicial power is the general power of the judiciary while juris-
diction is the authority to exercise that power in a given case.' 91 The
distinction is subtle, but nonetheless important.
The Constitution provides that the judicial power "shall be vested" in
certain courts and "shall extend" to certain cases. The judicial power is
clearly irrevocably vested and unalterably defined by the Constitution.
Congress has no control over the judicial power. In fact, the Framers
specifically rejected a proposal that would have given Congress control
over the judicial power.192 By contrast, the Constitution explicitly grants
Congress control over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction1 93 and
implicitly over the inferior courts' jurisdiction. 94
190. See BLACK'S, supra note 131, at 849 ("'The authority exercised by that department
of government which is charged with the declaration of what law is and its construction.
The authority vested in courts and judges, as distinguished from the executive and legisla-
tive power."); BOUVIER'S, supra note 174, at 1740 ("The authority vested in the judges.
The authority exercised by that department of government which is charged with the decla-
ration of what the law is and its construction so far as it is written law."); JONATHAN S.
LYNTON, BALLENTINE'S LEGAL DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 353 (1995) ("1. The powers
granted to a court or to the JUDICIAL BRANCH of government by its constitution and stat-
utes. 2. The power of a court to perform a judicial act or to carry out a judicial function.");
see also Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 233 (describing judicial power as including
"power to speak in the name of the nation, to speak definitively and finally"). But see supra
note 187 and accompanying text.
191. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 718 (1838) ("Jurisdiction
is the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between parties to a
suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them"); see also supra notes 162
(citing cases stating that the Constitution grants Article III courts the capacity to receive
jurisdiction) and 187 (quoting Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 622-23
(1838)).
Others have focused on the distinction between the terms and have come to the same
conclusion. See, e.g., HAROLD W. CHASE & CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL IN-
TERPRETATION 5 (1974) ("It is important in the study of constitutional interpretation to
understand the distinction between 'judicial power' and 'jurisdiction.' 'Jurisdiction' is the
authority of a court to exercise 'judicial power' in a particular case."); EDWARD F. COOKE,
A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTION 94 (6th ed. 1995) (Judicial power "means
the power of a court to hear and pronounce a judgment and carry that judgment into
effect," while jurisdiction "is the authority of a court to exercise judicial power in a specific
case."); WILLIAM A. SUTHERLAND, NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
518 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1904) ("Jurisdiction is the power ... to adjudicate or
exercise judicial power .... ").
192. See infra text accompanying notes 288 and 293.
193. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (the Exceptions Clause).
194. Since Congress has the power "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court," the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to define the jurisdiction of
those courts. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 9 and 10; see also supra notes 9-10 and accom-
panying text.
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This scheme makes sense. It would be odd if any branch could take
away the "power" of any other branch; therefore, Congress arguably
should not be able to control the judicial power. On the other hand, the
ability of one branch to exercise its power is often limited by other
branches. For example, Congress's ability to exercise its legislative power
is limited by the presidential veto as well as by judicial review. Thus, it is
not unusual that Congress is able to control the jurisdiction of the
judiciary.
Constitutional scholars unanimously consider the first paragraph of Ar-
ticle III, Section 2 to set forth the limit of federal jurisdiction. In other
words, an Article III court may not exercise jurisdiction over any case
that does not fall within one of those categories. 195 However, the lan-
guage does not require that the jurisdiction of the federal courts be ex-
tended to the full limits of the judicial power. Professor Amar finds such
a requirement by interpreting the judicial power as different than, but
including, actual subject matter jurisdiction. He offers, however, no ana-
lytical support for this interpretation. 196 Moreover, this would lead to a
problematic result: because the entire judicial power is vested in the in-
ferior courts, they would have jurisdiction over all the enumerated
cases.' 97 The same would be true for the Supreme Court, although the
195. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809) ("[Tjhe statute
cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the constitution."); see also Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983) ("This Court's cases firmly establish that
Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds estab-
lished by the Constitution.").
196. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 231 n.88.
The key issue is the applicability of the Exceptions Clause, which applies only to jurisdic-
tion and not to judicial power. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2. Regardless of whether
the judicial power and jurisdiction refer to two different concepts or are synonymous, the
Exceptions Clause is not limited by, but rather controls, the words "shall extend." See
infra notes 217 and accompanying text (assuming judicial power differs from jurisdiction)
and 201 (assuming judicial power is synonymous with jurisdiction). Only if the judicial
power is different than, but necessarily and co-extensively includes, actual subject matter
jurisdiction could the words "shall extend" be read to limit the Exceptions power in any
way-and even that interpretation raises significant problems of its own. See infra notes
197-98 and accompanying text.
197, While the argument that the judicial power is vested only in the Supreme Court
and in the inferior courts as a whole is not grammatically foreclosed, the better reading of
the Vesting clause is that each Article III court is fully vested with the judicial power of the
United States. See supra note 144. This reading both supports and is supported by the
interpretation of the judicial power as the general power of the judiciary rather than juris-
diction as such. If the judicial power is vested in each Article III court, then it cannot
possibly include jurisdiction-or Congress would have no authority to control jurisdiction
at all. At the same time, if the judicial power is the general power of the judiciary "to
speak in the name of the nation," then the fact that any Article III court can exercise
judicial review suggests that the judicial power is fully vested in each Article III court, even
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more specific Exceptions Clause could be said to control the general lan-
guage of the Vesting Clause.198 However, because there is no Exceptions
Clause vis-A-vis the inferior courts, the inferior courts' jurisdiction would
have to include all of the cases to which the judicial power extends.
It may seem troubling that there is a ceiling for federal court jurisdic-
tion, but not an analogous floor. The only minimum discernable from the
text of the Constitution, however, is the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction.' 99 Moreover, the events at the Constitutional Convention
strongly suggest that the aggregate jurisdiction was not intended to al-
ways be co-extensive with the judicial power. To the contrary, the Fram-
ers of the Constitution left the establishment of inferior courts to
Congress's discretion. Furthermore, the Framers were uncertain Con-
gress would establish such courts."' 0 In light of this, one would expect the
Framers to have explicitly qualified the Exceptions Clause if they had
intended to limit it in the absence of inferior courts. The fact that the
Exceptions Clause is not qualified strongly suggests that the Framers had
no such intention.01
if such court lacks jurisdiction over certain cases. In any event, the interpretation proposed
in this Article does not hinge on this distinction.
198. Professor Amar, however, finds this interpretation problematic. See Amar, Two
Tiers, supra note 1, at 241 n.120 ("This is an inference that should not be lightly indulged if
an alternative reading is possible that would harmonize all the words .... ").
199. Perhaps some indeterminate minimum jurisdiction can be inferred from the fact
that Congress is only granted the authority to make exceptions and regulations to the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, rather than the explicit authority to control federal
jurisdiction at will. This contention will be dealt with later. See infra notes 211-14 and
accompanying text. For now it will suffice to note that the only categories of cases which
constitutionally require federal court jurisdiction are those few that fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
200. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the Framers granting to Con-
gress discretion to establish inferior federal courts).
201. Even if one is not convinced of the distinction between jurisdiction and judicial
power, the traditional view remains on solid ground. The argument of both the mandatory
and two-tier theories is, essentially, that Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause is
limited by the fact that the judicial power or jurisdiction "must include" the enumerated
cases. If, however, the judicial power or jurisdiction only "reaches" the enumerated cases,
see supra Part II.C., then Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause would not be
limited thereby. As it originated in the Committee of Detail, the Exceptions Clause was
clearly permitted to modify the language, "shall extend." See infra note 287 and accompa-
nying text. There is no reason to suppose that the relationship between the words "shall
extend" and the Exceptions Clause was implicitly modified thereafter.
In fact, as long as "shall" is self-executing rather than mandatory, see supra Parts II.A
and II.C, the traditional view survives: although the judicial power/jurisdiction automati-
cally extends to all the cases and to the controversies, Congress is permitted to make ex-
ceptions and there is no "must extend" to limit that power. But see supra note 196.
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F. "Exceptions" and "Regulations"
After describing the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the
Constitution states that "i]n all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make."2 °2 This sentence should be examined carefully.
"[A]I1 the other Cases before mentioned" is a reference to the cases
within the judicial power-i.e., those enumerated in the preceding para-
graph of Article III.203 Constitutional interpreters generally admit that
Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause applies to all of the enu-
merated categories of cases within the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction, including those arising under federal law. Opponents of that
power simply find other ways to limit it.
"[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction," once again,
could be viewed either as mandatory or self-executing. 0 4 Interpreted
mandatorily, it means that the Supreme Court must have appellate juris-
diction. However, this interpretation makes little sense given the Excep-
tions Clause that follows. 205 On the other hand, interpreted as self-
executing, it means that the Constitution itself vests the Supreme Court
with appellate jurisdiction, subject to the Exceptions Clause. This latter
interpretation seems most proper.20 6
The meat of the sentence is the Exceptions Clause, which limits the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction by "such Exceptions, and ... such
Regulations as the Congress shall make. °20 7 The term "Regulations" is
not very problematic. It could be characterized as the "authority to 'or-
202. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. Professors Clinton and Amar disagree. Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 241
n.120 (interpreting "shall" as mandatory); Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 782
(same). Justice Story disagreed as well, although he seemed to concede that "shall extend"
is controlled by the Exceptions Clause. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 332 (1816) ("The [Exceptions Clause itself] shows that the framers of the constitution
used the words ["shall extend"] in an imperative sense. What necessity could there exist
for [the Exceptions Clause] if the preceding words were not used in that sense?").
206. The distinction is a subtle one, but even those who have heretofore supported the
"mandatory" view would likely concede that it is actually self-executing. Otherwise, one
wonders what would happen if Congress should ignore the mandate. Even Ex parte Mc-
Cardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), which supported very broad congressional power,
admitted that, at least technically, the Constitution itself vests the Supreme Court with
appellate jurisdiction. See id. at 512.
207. U.S. CONST. art. Il1, § 2, cl. 2.
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ganize' Supreme Court jurisdiction. "208 When Congress creates rules of
procedure or evidence, it is regulating the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
This is not threatening to those who espouse mandatory theories of juris-
diction because it is, to some extent, a necessary function.
Exceptions, on the other hand, are threatening. A plain reading of the
term suggests that it means a departure from the general rule.20 9 The
Constitution establishes a general rule-that the Supreme Court has ap-
pellate jurisdiction over "all the other [enumerated] Cases"-but allows
Congress to make exceptions. Any departure from the general rule
would be an exception. Since the Constitution permits "such Exceptions
... as the Congress shall make," there do not appear to be internal limits
on this power.210
Experts have argued that in order for a jurisdictional restriction to be
an "exception," it must be relatively minor.211 Even accepting this debat-
able proposition for the sake of argument,212 Congress would still have an
enormous degree of control over the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Even
if an exception were made for some of the most controversial subjects-
e.g., abortion, school prayer, and busing-it would not be so great as to
find that there was no longer an exception but a new rule.213 Surely any
208. Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 778; see also Ratner, Supreme Court, supra
note 1, at 170 ("A 'regulation' in the latter part of the eighteenth century, as today, was a
rule imposed to establish good order." (footnote omitted)).
209. "Dictionaries in existence at the time of the Constitutional Convention defined an
'exception' as an exclusion from the application of a general rule or description." Ratner,
Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 168.
210. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Professor Clinton argues that the word "exceptions"
was merely intended to grant Congress a distributive power to exclude cases from the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction only if it vested jurisdiction in a lower federal court.
See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text. This is an interpretation that the words will
not bear. Professor Amar's interpretation of Article II leads to a similar conclusion with
respect to the first tier of jurisdiction. However, his view does not stem from his interpre-
tation of the Exceptions Clause, but rather from other language in Article III. See supra
note 85 and accompanying text. Thus, Professor Amar's interpretation is significantly
more defensible than Professor Clinton's.
211. See Ratner, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 170 ("[A]n exception cannot destroy
the essential characteristics of the subject to which it applies."); Sager, supra note 1, at 44
("An 'exception' implies a minor deviation from a surviving norm; it is a nibble, not a
bite."). But see THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 38, at 486 ("Justice through [the
inferior courts] may be administered with ease and dispatch and appeals may be safely
circumscribed within a narrow compass.").
212. A more moderate position asserts that "a total abolition of appellate jurisdiction
would be impermissible; ... something substantial is to remain after Congress' subtractions
have been performed." Tribe, supra note 1, at 135.
213. See Redish, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 902 ("[lIt is clear that even if all the
currently proposed jurisdiction-curbing legislation ... were enacted, that tipping point [i.e.,
the 'point the "exception" has become so large that it has effectively superseded the
"rule"'] would not have been reached.").
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one of those subjects would qualify as an exception, and Congress is per-
mitted to make multiple "Exceptions." So even if an exception must be
"a nibble [rather than] a bite, 214 multiple nibbles can amount to a sizea-
ble bite.
There are also those who argue that it would be improper for Congress
to take certain subjects out of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
This theory is indefensible considering the text of the Constitution. The
reference to "all the other Cases before mentioned" must mean that in
each enumerated category the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction
subject (in each case) to Congress's control.2 15 Thus, even in the category
of cases "arising under" federal law, Congress has the authority to make
such exceptions and regulations to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction as it
chooses. This authority must extend equally to mundane and controver-
sial cases, for there is nothing that limits its operation to the former.
Finally, Professor Amar argues that "the power to make exceptions
must be read in a way that does not conflict with the mandate that the
judicial power 'shall be vested' in a federal judiciary and 'shall extend' to
all cases in certain categories. '21 6 However, it is only the judicial power,
not jurisdiction, that "shall extend" to the enumerated cases.217 More-
over, "shall extend," as has been shown, is not so much mandatory as
descriptive.218 Thus, there is no conflict.
G. The Remainder
The majority of Article III, including the essential provisions dealing
with federal court jurisdiction, has now been reviewed. In order to en-
sure that nothing has been overlooked, however, this Article will now
review, if only briefly, the remaining language.
214. Sager, supra note 1, at 44.
215. Actually, an argument could be made that there should be no appellate jurisdic-
tion over "Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party," because those are assigned to the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction and its appellate jurisdiction is limited to "all the other Cases." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court has rejected this view.
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 392-405 (1821) (allowing Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over all cases within constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction,
even if such cases also happen to fall within constitutional grant of original jurisdiction).
Even the more moderate argument, that the Supreme Court cannot exercise appellate ju-
risdiction over cases which fall exclusively within the constitutional grant of original juris-
diction, is irrelevant for present purposes: it does not affect the interpretation of the
remainder of Article III, and any problems it generates apply equally to all interpretations
of Congress's authority. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
216. Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 255.
217. See U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend ....
218. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (discussing "shall extend").
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1. Independence of the Judiciary
The second sentence of Article III, Section 1 guarantees federal judges
life tenure and undiminishable salaries. Here; the Framers assured the
independence of the judiciary by freeing judges from the pressures of
seeking reappointment or avoiding Congress's disfavor.219 A plain read-
ing of the Constitution indicates no connection between these provisions
and jurisdiction-stripping. They are simply tenure and salary provisions.
Yet there are those who seek to make more of them.
Because their independence is guaranteed, Article III judges can be
said to be structurally superior to state court judges, who enjoy no similar
security. In addition, Article III judges are appointed and can be re-
moved at the federal level, which assures their competence and probity.
Again, there are no similar assurances with state court judges. At least
two arguments can be made as a consequence. The first is that state
courts are inadequate to have the final say over issues of federal law and,
therefore, it is important to have a federal court open to hear, if only on
appeal, each case involving federal law.22° The second argument is that
the tenure and salary requirements are constitutional requirements like
any other and, in order for them to be meaningful; Congress's ability to
remove cases from the federal judiciary must be limited.221
Neither of these arguments is particularly convincing. The first ignores
the crucial distinction between the desirable and the necessary.222 It may
be desirable to have federal courts hear each case involving federal law,
just as it may be desirable to have federal courts hear each diversity case.
But if neither is required by the text of the Constitution, then it is for the
Congress to decide how desirable or practical each truly is.
The second argument reads too much into the Constitution. The Con-
stitution requires simply that Article III judges have life tenure and un-
diminishable salaries. As discussed earlier, there is no constitutional
requirement that cases be decided by judges meeting those require-
ments.223 In other words, "the tenure and salary provisions ... were sim-
ply designed 'to preserve the integrity of federal courts when they
actually were used,' not to assure that they must be used.
224
In short, the tenure and salary provisions of Article III add little to the
present discussion. Although they are explicit requirements no less im-
219. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-79, supra note 38 at 469-75.
220. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 234.
221. See Sager, supra note 1, at 62-68.
222. Cf. Gunther, supra note 1, at 898, 908.
223. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
224. Gunther, supra note 1, at 915 (footnote omitted).
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portant than any others, they simply do not have any bearing on jurisdic-
tion-stripping issues.
2. Supreme Court Original Jurisdiction
The next provision states that, "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a
Party, the supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." '25 This provi-
sion uses "shall" in the self-executing sense because the Constitution di-
rectly grants the Supreme Court its original jurisdiction.226 Moreover,
since the Exceptions clause applies only to the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction, its original jurisdiction is beyond Congress's control.227
Thus, this provision is of limited relevance to this article.
Nevertheless, a few issues may be worth considering at this point. First,
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is the only explicit minimum for
federal court jurisdiction in the Constitution. Thus, Professor Amar is
able to argue that the traditional view itself "bifurcate[s] article III into
mandatory and permissive tiers by distinguishing between Supreme
Court original and appellate jurisdiction. ' 228 Although this is undeniable
from the text of the Constitution, it does not permit Professor Amar to
change the debate into a question of "which bifurcation theory makes the
most sense? 229 The Framers had their reasons for doing what they did;
commentators today may or may not find these reasons persuasive. 3 °
Any interpretation, however, must stay tied to the text of the document
being interpreted. As has been demonstrated, the traditional view re-
mains on solid ground even when one "take[s] seriously the words 'shall'
and 'all.'
2 3 1
In any event, the mandate of Supreme Court original jurisdiction is a
far cry from the mandate of jurisdiction over the first tier of cases in the
225. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
226. See supra Parts ILA, II.C.
227. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3525, at 216-17, 221 (2d ed. 1984); see also infra note 324 and accompanying text.
228. Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1523-34.
229. Id. at 1523.
230. See California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65-66 (1979) ("The Framers seem to have
been concerned with matching the dignity of the parties to the status of the court."). Com-
pare Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1523 ("[O]ne would be hard pressed indeed to
develop strong structural reasons for seeing all cases in the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction as qualitatively more important than all cases in its appellate jurisdiction-includ-
ing the all-important federal question category."), with Meltzer, supra note 1, at 1598 ("1
am quite satisfied ...with the traditional explanation for the original jurisdiction: that
federal jurisdiction over another sovereign is so sensitive that only the court of greatest
dignity should exercise it." (footnote omitted)).
231. Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1524-25.
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two-tier theory. The Constitution does not grant the Supreme Court ex-
clusive original jurisdiction, so there is nothing to prevent another court
from having concurrent jurisdiction over those cases.232 In fact, the judi-
cial power of the inferior federal courts specifically extends to these
cases,2 33 so Congress must at least be able to vest the inferior federal
courts with concurrent jurisdiction if it chooses. Even vesting state courts
with concurrent jurisdiction is not forbidden. As a policy matter, it might
be thought proper for Congress at least to include a right of removal in
that event,234 but again there is no explicit requirement to that effect.235
Thus, even the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is not strictly
mandatory.
One problem remains. The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction ap-
plies only to "all the other Cases before mentioned," which seems to ex-
clude the categories of cases in its original jurisdiction. 36 A very
plausible argument could be made that the language was merely intended
to mean that the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over any case
in which it did not exercise original jurisdiction (subject to the Exceptions
Clause). However, this interpretation does not seem to comport with a
strict reading of the text in question. 37 Nevertheless, the difficulty af-
232. See California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91, 93 (1972); Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930). But see Osborn
v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 821 (1824).
The language in the report of the Committee of Detail would have permitted exactly this
in cases of impeachment of federal officers (except for the impeachment of the President,
where the draft specifically forbade assigning jurisdiction to the inferior courts). See infra
text accompanying note 260. Such an explicit prohibition would have been unnecessary if
Supreme Court original jurisdiction were understood to mean exclusive jurisdiction. The
fact that the prohibition on assignment related only to the President strongly suggests that
the Committee of Detail believed the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction need not be
exclusive.
233. See supra Part II.B.
234. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 1597 n.96 ("That the [Supreme Court's original] juris-
diction [in the Judiciary Act of 1789] is concurrent only, with no removal to the Supreme
Court authorized should plaintiff file in a different forum, is hardly unproblematic." ); id.
at 1608 n.138.
235. Despite Professor Meltzer's misgivings, see supra note 234, the fact that the first
Judiciary Act did allow state courts concurrent jurisdiction without a right of removal over
certain cases within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction provides strong support for
this textual argument.
236. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 820 ("In those cases in which original jurisdic-
tion is given to the Supreme Court, the judicial power of the United States cannot be
exercised in its appellate form.").
237. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has properly interpreted the Granting clauses so
as to minimize the impact of this provision by holding that the Supreme Court can exercise
appellate jurisdiction over all cases within its appellate jurisdiction even if such cases also
happen to fall within its original jurisdiction. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 392-405 (1821). Thus, if a case in which a state is a party also arises under federal law,
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fects all interpretations equally.23 The traditional view, however, could
accept this limitation without losing its essential characteristic-the view
that Congress possesses nearly plenary power to restrict federal court ju-
risdiction. Even for mandatory theories of jurisdiction, this limitation
would not necessarily pose any serious problems, for an inferior court
could have jurisdiction over those cases, either originally, on appeal, or
both. A fortiori, the nonmandatory traditional view would not be
affected.239
3. "Both as to Law and Fact"
One final provision to consider are the words "both as to Law and
Fact" in the Exceptions Clause.2 4 ° It has been suggested that the Excep-
tions Clause modifies the word "Fact" rather than "appellate Jurisdic-
tion," and that, therefore, Congress's control over the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to making exceptions and
regulations to the Court's ability to review findings of fact.24' The con-
sensus, however, is that this interpretation is incorrect.242 First, the gram-
the Supreme Court can exercise appellate jurisdiction by virtue of the "arising under"
grant. See id.
238. Actually, the impact is felt much more keenly by the mandatory theories of juris-
diction. As admitted below in the text, mandatory theories could be satisfied by granting
state courts concurrent original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, etc., as long
as an inferior federal court had appellate jurisdiction over such cases. If, however, Con-
gress chose to abolish the inferior courts, then, under the mandatory view, state courts
could not have concurrent original jurisdiction. This is because the federal judicial power
"must" extend to such cases. Since the Supreme Court cannot exercise appellate jurisdic-
tion over any such cases, it must exercise original jurisdiction over every such case. (This
would also tie up the Supreme Court substantially.) Under the traditional view, concur-
rent jurisdiction does not pose a problem.
239. The traditional theorists generally do not believe that any federal review is neces-
sary as a matter of principle. Thus, even if inferior courts were unable to hear such cases, it
would present less of a difficulty for non-mandatory than for mandatory theories of
jurisdiction.
Of course, because the judicial power of the United States is fully vested in the inferior
courts, see supra Part II.B, they are capable of hearing every category of cases enumerated
in the Constitution-even if those cases cannot be heard by the Supreme Court on appeal.
240. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
241. See RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); Brant,
supra note 1; Merry, supra note 1, at 54 & n.6. But see Gunther, supra note 1, at 908 n.58
(describing Berger's change of opinion).
242. See Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 779 ("These arguments are almost
surely wrong, since the exceptions and regulations clause was introduced long before the
provision relating to appellate review of law and fact was inserted into the document.");
Gunther, supra note 1, at 901 ("[Tjhis 'facts only' limitation enjoys very little academic
support today." ).
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matical structure of the sentence strongly suggests otherwise.243 Second,
the records of the Constitutional Convention, 244 as well as The Federal-
ist,245 confirm the contrary reading. Finally, neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court has ever shared this interpretation.246 It seems entirely
safe to say that this interpretation is simply wrong.
The natural reading of the Exception Clause gives the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction to review both the law and facts of a case, and gives
Congress the ability to make exceptions and regulations which could en-
compass either fact or law or both.
H. Summary
The interpretation set forth above can be summarized as follows. First,
the term "shall," as used in the relevant provisions of Article III, is not
mandatory on Congress, but self-executing in nature. Second, the federal
judiciary must consist of one Supreme Court, but the existence of the
inferior courts is entirely within Congress's discretion. Third, the entire
judicial power is irrevocably vested in each Article III court, while the
only jurisdiction irrevocably vested in any Article III court is the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Fourth, the judicial power can only
be exercised on the enumerated cases. Fifth, there is no requirement that
the judicial power be exercised in any case (other than perhaps those
within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction). Finally, Congress is
243. See Redish, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 914 (discussing the "insurmountable
linguistic... obstacles" facing the theory); see also HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 7, at
381 n.26; Gunther, supra note 1, at 901 (noting the effect of grammar on interpretation of
the text).
244. A prior draft of the Constitution provided simply that "[iun all other cases before
mentioned, it [i.e., Supreme Court jurisdiction] shall be appellate, with such exceptions and
under such regulations as the Legislature shall make." 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 186.
The records reflect the following discussion:
Mr. Govr. Morris wished to know what was meant by the words "In all the
cases before mentioned it (jurisdiction) shall be appellate with such exceptions
&c," whether it extended to matters of fact as well as law-and to cases of Com-
mon law as well as Civil law.
Mr. Wilson. The Committee he believed meant facts as well as law & Common
as well as Civil law. The jurisdiction of the federal Court of Appeals had he said
been so construed.
Mr. Dickinson moved to add after the word "appellate" the words "both as to
law & fact which was agreed to nem: con.
2 id. at 431. (footnote omitted).
Thus, it is clear that the Framers intended the Exceptions Clause to modify "appellate
Jurisdiction" rather than "Fact," and that Congress's authority to make exceptions to
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction goes beyond mere limitations on that Court's review
of factual determinations.
245. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 38, at 481; id. No. 81, at 488.
246. See Redish, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 914-15.
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free to restrict the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the Supreme Court,
or both simultaneously as long as it does not violate any other constitu-
tional provisions.
III. HISTORICAL SUPPORT
As shown above, a truly comprehensive interpretation of Article III
demonstrates the traditional view that Congress has near plenary author-
ity to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This Article will now
examine historical sources to determine how well the interpretation com-
pares with the historical evidence dating back to the Constitutional Con-
vention. In addition, this Article will assess how well some competing
interpretations fare under the same evidence.
One point that should be kept in mind when parsing the historical
sources is that the text of the Constitution is the appropriate focal point
of any interpretation because it was the text, rather than any preceding
debates or subsequent history, that was ratified. Further, the text Was
intended to stand on its own. Under the rules of the Convention, the
proceedings were closed and "nothing spoken in the House [could] be
printed, or otherwise published or communicated without leave." '247 In
fact, the journal of the plenary proceedings of the Convention was not
published until 1819,248 some thirty years after the Constitution was rati-
fied. Arguably, the Framers themselves did not want the Convention to
be scrutinized in this fashion.249
Because the text no longer can be said to support the competing inter-
pretations, historical evidence may be less significant then it might other-
wise have been. For example, if "shall" is not mandatory, or if "all cases"
does not mean "each and every case," then any evidence that Professor
Amar finds supporting the relative importance of the cases in his two
tiers is irrelevant because there is still no requirement for Congress to
grant jurisdiction in important cases. If, however, the preceding textual
arguments are fundamentally misguided, then the present interpretation
may deserve reconsideration.25 °
247. 1 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 17.
248. See 1 id. at xii.
249. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 725 (1988) ("[T]he Framers themselves did not intend that their se-
cret deliberations at the constitutional convention would provide authoritative guidance.").
250. For example, if the records of the Constitutional Convention establish that judicial
power was originally vested "in one supreme Court and such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress shall ... establish," and that the Framers added the second "in" to avoid confusion,
then the conclusion that independent judicial power was vested in both the Supreme Court
the inferior courts would be questionable. This would not invalidate the interpretation
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A. The Constitutional Convention
In 1787, the Constitutional Convention convened to examine the weak-
nesses inherent in the Articles of Confederation. Two prominent plans,
discussed early in the deliberations by the Committee of the Whole were
the Virginia Plan, proposed by Mr. Randolph,25 a and the New Jersey
Plan, proposed by Mr. Patterson. 52 The major similarities between the
plans included the establishment of a Supreme Court and the indepen-
dence of the federal judiciary. These two points were never seriously de-
bated at the Convention and seemed to be accepted by all the Framers.
Thus, these two characteristics survived relatively unchanged in each suc-
ceeding draft of the Constitution.253 The major difference between the
two plans dealt with the inferior courts: the New Jersey Plan did not
proposed in this Article, but would certainly remove one of the obstacles facing the com-
peting interpretations. However, there is no such evidence.
251. The relevant part of the Virginia Plan read as follows:
9. [Resolved]. [T]hat a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or
more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National
Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually
at stated times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or dimi-
nution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of
such increase or diminution. [T]hat the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall
be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear
and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies & felonies on the high seas, cap-
tures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying
to such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collection of the Na-
tional revenue; impeachments of any National officers, and questions which may
involve the national peace and harmony.
1 REcORDS, supra note 7, at 21-22.
252. The relevant part of the New Jersey Plan read as follows:
5. [Resolved]. [T]hat a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a supreme
Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the Executive, & to hold their
offices during good behaviour, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed com-
pensation for their services in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so
as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminu-
tion; that the Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear & determine in
the first instance on all impeachments of federal officers, & by way of appeal in
the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights of Ambassadors, in all cases of
captures from an enemy, in all cases of piracies & felonies on the high seas, in all
cases in which foreigners may be interested, in the construction of any treaty or
treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts for regulation of trade, or the
collection of the federal Revenue: that none of the Judiciary shall during the time
they remain in Office be capable of receiving or holding any other office or ap-
pointment during their time of service, or for thereafter.
1 id. at 244.
253. The major difference in these provisions between the first draft and the final ver-
sion of the Constitution is that the salaries of the federal judges became increasable, but
remained undiminishable. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("Compensation ... shall not be
diminished . . .").
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include any, while the Virginia Plan did. This was a major issue at the
Convention and, as discussed earlier, was resolved in a compromise em-
powering, but not requiring, Congress to establish inferior courts.254
Another major difference between the plans dealt with the jurisdiction
of the federal judiciary. Some categories of cases were included in both,
such as impeachments, piracies, cases involving foreigners, and cases in-
volving the collection of revenue. The Virginia Plan also included a very
broad grant of jurisdiction covering all "questions which may involve the
national peace and harmony." The New Jersey plan had no similar provi-
sion, preferring to delineate specifically all cases over which the Supreme
Court would have jurisdiction.
After some debate, a broadly-worded resolution on federal court juris-
diction was sent to the Committee of Detail: "Resolved That the Jurisdic-
tion of the national Judiciary shall extend to Cases arising under the Laws
passed by the general Legislature, and to such other Questions as involve
the national Peace and Harmony." '55
The Committee of Detail was commissioned "to report a Constitution
conformable to the Resolutions passed by the Convention." '256 Its work
did not simply consist of cleaning up the resolutions or translating them
into a Constitution. Rather, the Committee of Detail was established to
develop a Constitution based on the resolutions.2 57 This necessarily in-
volved generating details for the Constitution.
The first major Committee draft was composed by Mr. Randolph with
emendations by Mr. Rutledge. This draft provided, in relevant part:
7. The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend
1. to all cases, arising under laws passed by the general
<Legislature>
2. to impeachments of officers, and
3. to such other cases, as the national legislature may
assign, as involving the national peace and harmony,
in the collection of the revenue
in disputes between the citizens of different states
<in disputes between a State & a Citizen or Citizens of another
State>
in disputes between different states; and
in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other countries are
concerned
254. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
255. 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 132-33.
256. 2 id. at 106.




<& in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn>
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only, except in
<Cases of Impeachment & (in)> those instances, in which the
legislature shall make it original; and the legislature shall organ-
ize it
8. The whole or a part of the jurisdiction aforesaid
according to the discretion of the legislature may be assigned to
the inferior tribunals, as original tribunals.
258
The broad "arising under" jurisdictional grant remained relatively un-
changed from the resolution. However, the details describing the cate-
gory of cases "involving the national peace and harmony" were added.
The most significant detail involved who should decide which cases fall
within that broad category. It was conceivable that the courts themselves
could decide whether to accept jurisdiction in any given case. However,
the Committee quickly settled on Congress to make the decisions. Con-
gress would assign certain cases to the judiciary, although only from a list
provided by the Constitution itself. In addition, Congress was explicitly
given broad discretion to provide for the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts. Thus, the idea of Congress controlling the scope of federal juris-
diction dates back to this draft, in which it is clear that there is no obliga-
tion to assign any cases "involving the national peace and harmony" to
any court.259
The final report from the Committee of Detail provided for federal
court jurisdiction as follows:
Art. XI [X] . . . Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed by the
Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other Public Ministers, and Consuls; to the trial of im-
peachments of Officers of the United States; to all cases of
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between
two or more States, (except such as shall regard Territory or Ju-
risdiction) between a State and Citizens of another State, be-
tween Citizens of different States, and between a State or the
Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases
of impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a
258. 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 146-47 (footnote omitted). The bracketed material
indicates emendations in Rutledge's handwriting.
259. There is no obligation for Congress to act because the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion "shall" extend only to such cases as Congress "may" assign, and the Congress "may"
assign cases to the inferior courts according to its discretion. This is further evidence that
"shall extend" was not intended in the mandatory sense. In the draft, at least, a mandatory
reading with respect to the cases involving the national peace and harmony is nearly
impossible.
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party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other cases
before mentioned, it shall be appellate, with such exceptions and
under such regulations as the Legislature shall make. The Legis-
lature may assign any part of the jurisdiction above mentioned
(except the trial of the President of the United States) in the
manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to
such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.260
Much of the structure remained from the initial draft, although some no-
table changes were made. For example, the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court was now assigned by the Constitution, not Congress. Professor
Clinton argues that with this change, Congress's authority to determine
the jurisdiction of the federal courts "had disappeared entirely."'26' At
the same time this change was made, however, the Exceptions Clause was
introduced. Thus, Congress retained its power in a slightly different form:
instead of having the power to grant jurisdiction, Congress now had the
power to take it away.
Professor Clinton notes several factors to support his argument that the
Exceptions Clause was not meant to grant Congress control over the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction.262  These factors merit detailed
consideration.
Professor Clinton first notes that "during the prior deliberations of the
Convention, no proposal hinting at congressional control over the scope
of jurisdiction of the rational judiciary have been offered. '2 63 To the con-
trary, the resolution referred to the Committee of Detail did so. By
resolving that federal jurisdiction would encompass "such other questions
as involve the national peace and harmony," the issue of who was to de-
cide which cases would meet that requirement was raised. Under eight-
eenth century thought, Congress was the most likely candidate. In fact,
Congress was settled upon quickly without contention as controller of
federal jurisdiction.
264
Second, Professor Clinton maintains that "the Committee's drafters
clearly differentiated between congressional power over the scope of fed-
eral court jurisdiction and the allocation of that jurisdiction under the
260. 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 186-87. This is substantially similar to the Wilson/
Rutledge draft which followed the Randolph/Rutledge draft in the Committee of Detail.
Cf. 2 id. at 172-73.
261. Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 775.
262. See id. ("[A] number of factors strongly suggest that the introduction of the ex-
ceptions and regulations clause was not intended to grant Congress any control over the
scope of jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court.").
263. Id.
264. Even if this were not so, the Necessary and Proper Clause would have given Con-
gress the authority to make such decisions. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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congressional authority over the structure of the federal judiciary." '265
Professor Clinton draws this conclusion from the fact that scope and
structure are treated in "separate sentences and paragraphs or blocks of
clauses." This is a fairly large inference from a rather minor detail.
Professor Clinton further argues that "the framers never really drafted
an exceptions and regulations clause as that term has come to be under-
stood today. '266 Rather, it was actually intended as two distinct clauses.
The "regulations clause," on the one hand, granted Congress the "author-
ity to 'organize' Supreme Court jurisdiction," by "mak[ing] rules of prac-
tice and procedure for the exercise of the constitutionally vested
jurisdiction of the Court., 267 The "exceptions clause," on the other hand,
"was at most an authority to delete a class of cases from the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in favor of exercise of power by an inferior federal
court., 268 This interpretation can hardly be supported by the text of the
draft. "Such exceptions" must be read as a reference to "as the Legisla-
ture shall make." It is quite unreasonable, as a grammatical matter, to
suggest that "such exceptions" refers to the potential assignments in the
following sentence, particularly when the immediately following "such"-
"such Regulations"-clearly refers to "as the Legislature shall make."
Moreover, the very next sentence of the Committee of Detail report
authorizes Congress to assign cases to the inferior courts. As Professor
Sager noted, "If the exceptions clause had been understood simply to au-
thorize Congress to shift jurisdiction from the Supreme Court to lower
courts, this language would have been superfluous.,
269
265. Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 777.
266. Id. at 781.
267. Id. at 778.
268. Id.
269. Sager, supra note 1, at 35 n.51. Professor Sager continued: "Indeed, because the
assignment language was discretionary, the assignment clause itself was contrary to the
view that Congress must vest jurisdiction in lower courts if Congress withholds jurisdiction
from the Supreme Court." Id.
It is not impossible to argue, as Professor Clinton does, that the two provisions are com-
plementary, in that assignment language would enable Congress to grant jurisdiction to the
inferior courts without removing it from the Supreme Court, while the Exceptions Clause
would permit Congress to remove such cases from the Supreme Court. See Clinton,
Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 792 n.167. Professor Clinton correctly noted that an Excep-
tions Clause alone would not have been adequate to accomplish the intended goal in this
draft: "[t]he separate clause authorizing the assignment of Supreme Court jurisdiction to
the inferior courts was necessary to delimit the scope of powers which constitutionally
could be assigned to such courts," because the jurisdictional menu in this draft was "only a
description of 'the jurisdiction of the supreme court,"' not of the judicial power. Id. How-
ever, he failed to realize that the assignments provision without an Exceptions Clause
likely would have been adequate because Congress presumably would have been free to
decide whether the assignment would be complete (i.e., exclusive) or only partial (i.e.,
1997]
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Professor Clinton's third factor suggesting a limited role for the Excep-
tions Clause "is that another potential construction exists for the word
'Exceptions."' 71 Under this "potential construction," the Exceptions
Clause "would have served to set off original from appellate juris-
diction. 2 71 This "potential construction" is difficult to deduce from the
text of the Constitution. 72 Furthermore, as Professor Clinton himself
points out, "this ... would have performed precisely the same function
syntactically and been somewhat redundant of the phrase that begins the
sentence in which it appears-'In all the other Cases beforementioned
,273
Professor Clinton's final factor is that "the Committee report retained
the mandatory phrase 'shall extend' when referring to the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. "274 This is Professor Clinton's strongest argument
because the instant draft speaks in terms of jurisdiction rather than judi-
cial power. However, it is much more reasonable to read the grant of
jurisdiction as controlled by the exceptions clause than vice versa.2 75 Af-
ter all, an exception by its nature defies some rule. Moreover, if "shall
concurrent). It is only because of other language-e.g., the existence of a separate Excep-
tions Clause-that this reading is foreclosed. See Sager, supra note 1, at 50 n.95 ("The
argument that the power to 'assign' the Court's jurisdiction entails the power to deprive
the Court of jurisdiction is ... undercut by the fact that the assignment provision ... was
accompanied by the exceptions clause, which itself apparently authorizes Congress to cur-
tail the Court's jurisdiction." (citation omitted)). Since the assignments provision could
have fully granted a distributive power to Congress, the Exceptions Clause likely was in-
tended to serve a different function.
However, even if an assignment provision could not fairly be interpreted in this manner,
the two provisions would remain independent of each other. Just as Congress could have
assigned jurisdiction to the inferior courts without creating exceptions to the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction, so, presumably, it could have made exceptions without making any
assignments. Professor Clinton's only defense is presumed on a mandatory interpretation
of "shall extend," and, therefore, fails. See supra Part II.C.
270. Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 779.
271. Id. at 780.
272. See id. at 779. Professor Clinton argues that this interpretation "is consistent with
Hamilton's original use of the phrase." Id. It is difficult to understand why Professor
Clinton emphasizes this point. Although he acknowledges that "there is no evidence that
the Hamilton plan was ever presented to the Convention," he speculates "that the docu-
ment [may have been] made available to members of the Committee of Detail." Id. at 780.
He then elaborates on the use of the Exceptions Clause in that document and argues that
the same meaning may have been intended in the Committee draft.
The Hamilton Exceptions Clause, however, differed significantly: "such exceptions as
are herein contained." 3 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 626. Had the Committee members
modeled their Exceptions Clause after the one in Hamilton's draft, they likely would have
incorporated the entire clause rather than only a misleading portion.
273. Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 780.
274. Id. at 782.
275. See infra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
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extend" is better interpreted as "can include" rather than "must in-
clude,, 2 76 there is no inconsistency with an ability to make exceptions. In
any event, this language was not integrated into the final Constitution.
Thus, Professor Clinton's "overwhelming case" is not so overwhelming
after all. There is no reason to attribute new meaning to the Exceptions
Clause.
As mentioned above, by simultaneously removing Congress's power to
assign Supreme Court jurisdiction and adding the Exceptions Clause, the
Committee of Detail exchanged a regime in which Congress grants
Supreme Court jurisdiction, for a regime in which Congress makes excep-
tions to Constitutionally granted jurisdiction. This seemingly minor
change had a major consequence. In the resolution and the initial Com-
mittee draft, Congress's control was limited to "cases involving the Na-
tional peace and harmony." In the Committee report, Congress's control
extended to all cases (other than those over which the Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction). The Convention accepted this new formulation
without objection, retaining it in each succeeding draft.
That the power was expanded without objection by the Federalists
should not be surprising. 77 Although in the context of an abstract de-
bate it may seem like a major expansion of congressional power, in the
context of the Convention it likely would not have been considered prob-
lematic. It must be remembered that the establishment of a Supreme
Court was generally accepted by the Framers. 78 Thus, there was little
concern that Congress might use this power to eviscerate the Supreme
Court-just as there was little concern that the Court would use judicial
review to usurp power from the other branches. From the Framers' per-
spective, there were too many attendant difficulties for either power to be
abused.79 In fact, at least with respect to Congress, the Framers' intu-
itions were correct, for Congress has rarely used its power under the Ex-
ceptions clause to restrain the Supreme Court. 8 °
276. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
277. But see Sager, supra note 1, at 51 ("[I]t is hard to imagine that the framers were
consciously adopting a provision that could completely unravel one of the most basic as-
pects of the constitutional scheme to which they had committed themselves.").
278. See supra text accompanying notes 253.
279. The Framers saw the courts as "[the government's ] means of executing its own pro-
visions by its own authority ... ." THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 38, at 478. Thus,
Congress would have to be hard pressed to want to eviscerate the federal judiciary. See
infra notes 400-02 and accompanying text. The Framers also were not concerned with
abuses by the judiciary because they believed that the judiciary lacked any "[ ]capacity to
support its usurpations by force." Tm FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 38, at 485.
280. See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Professor Amar argues that "[c]areful analysis of various drafts of the
Philadelphia Committee of Detail, which originated the two-tiered lan-
guage, confirms [his] reading of the import of the word 'all.' 2 81 The
Randolph/Rutledge draft clearly evidences a two-tiered model of jurisdic-
tion: The Supreme Court's jurisdiction automatically extends only to cer-
tain categories of cases (federal law and impeachments), and there is no
congressional power to make exceptions.2 82 However, that draft does not
support Professor Amar's interpretation of the word "all." If "all" meant
"each and every," then one would certainly expect to see the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction extend to "all impeachments" rather than simply to
"impeachments." The absence of "all," however, cannot be interpreted
to indicate merely permissive jurisdiction. Structurally, it is highly im-
probable, given a two-tiered jurisdictional framework, that the Commit-
tee would have placed impeachments in the non-mandatory tier.
Textually, there was no provision by which Congress could exclude any
impeachments. Professor Amar himself agrees, 83 but fails to realize that
the single, rather than selective, use of the word "all" does not support his
theory. 284 On the other hand, if "all cases" simply meant "all types of
cases," then one would not expect to find the word "all" before impeach-
ment because there is only one type of impeachment.285
Moreover, with the addition of the Exceptions Clause, the two-tiered
structure disappeared entirely. In the Committee's report, it was the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction that "shall extend" to the enumerated
cases- not the judicial power. And Congress was clearly permitted to
make exceptions to that jurisdiction. At least originally, then, the Excep-
tions Clause was permitted to modify "shall extend., 286 Moreover, since
281. Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1566.
282. See supra text accompanying note 258.
283. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 244 n.128.
284. Omission of the word "all" is a glaring departure from the Framers' "selective use"
of the word. Professor Amar is correct in pointing out that the omission of "all" from cases
of admiralty jurisdiction should not be taken to mean much because Rutledge "scribbled
[the additional] language on the bottom of the page" of Randolph's draft. See Amar, Re-
ply, supra note 1, at 1660; supra text accompanying note 258. The Committee of Detail
cleaned up this carelessness by the time of its report. See supra text accompanying note
260. By contrast, the impeachments language that was originally part of Randolph's draft
was not cleaned up in the final report. That this was a mere mistake is much less plausible
under the circumstances.
285. At first glance, one might be tempted to argue that in this draft there is no word
"controversies" with which to juxtapose "all cases"-a fact that would not be very support-
ive of the purported distinction. However, there is the synonymous, and perhaps even
more telling word, "dispute." See supra text at note 258; see also supra note 175 and ac-
companying text.
286. Both Professors Amar and Clinton disagree with this conclusion. See Amar, Two
Tiers, supra note 1, at 241 n.120; Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 782. However,
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there could be no argument that Congress had to distribute the judicial
power among the various federal courts (because there was no mention
of judicial power), Congress would have been able to remove some of the
enumerated cases from federal judicial cognizance altogether.287 Thus,
the two-tier theory is not very well supported by the various Committee
of Detail drafts after all,
After the Committee of Detail made its report, debate at the Conven-
tion was focused on that draft and changes were made to it. One particu-
lar string of proposals warrants a detailed examination:
Mr. Govr. Morris wished to know what was meant by the words
"In all the cases before mentioned it (jurisdiction) shall be ap-
pellate with such exceptions, &c" whether it extended to matters
of fact as well as law-and to cases of Common law as well as
Civil law.
Mr. Wilson. The Committee he believed meant facts as well
as law & Common as well as Civil law. The jurisdiction of the
federal Court of Appeals had he said been so construed.
Mr. Dickinson moved to add after the word "appellate" the
words "both as to law & fact which was agreed to nem: con:
Mr. Madison & Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out the be-
ginning of the 3d sect. "The jurisdiction of the supreme Court"
& to insert the words "the Judicial power" which was agreed to
nem: con:
even Professor Amar's interpretation of this draft leads to the unlikely conclusion that
Congress would have had no control over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction at all
with respect to cases in the mandatory tier. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 241 n.
120.
287. This strengthens the conclusion that the import of the words "shall extend" is
closer to "can reach" than "must include." See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
The presence of the word "all" does not advance the two-tier theory. Although the
Framers specifically added the word "all" for two more categories, they failed to add it for
impeachments. The omission was particularly conspicuous given that impeachments were
placed amidst the other categories for which "all" was used, making it difficult to believe
that the word "all ' was intended to mean "each and every," but not at all difficult to
believe that it was intended to mean "all types." See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying
text.
Even assuming that "all" meant "each and every," and "shall extend" meant "must in-
clude," Professor Amar is forced to argue that the Exceptions Clause, as reported by the
Committee of Detail, would not have permitted Congress to restrict the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction over the cases in the first tier. See supra note 286. In order to main-
tain that the Framers intended to establish his two-tiered theory, Professor Amar must
argue that the subsequent change of the term jurisdiction to judicial power was a conscious
decision to change the meaning of the exceptions clause as well (i.e., so as to permit excep-
tions even in the first tier of cases, as long as jurisdiction is vested in the inferior courts).
This is implausible given the summary fashion in which the change was proposed and
adopted. See infra text accompanying note 288. By contrast, the change would have made
no substantive difference based on the interpretation offered in this essay.
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The following motion was disagreed to, to wit to insert "In all
the other cases before mentioned the Judicial power shall be ex-
ercised in such manner as the Legislature shall direct"
[Ayes-2; noes-6.]
On a question for striking out the last sentence of sect. 3:
"The Legislature may assign &c-" . . . [Ayes-8; noes-O.]
288
The first proposal above establishes that the Framers never intended
the Exceptions Clause to modify the word "Fact." Quite to the contrary,
the Committee specifically inserted the clause "both as to Law and Fact"
to clarify the scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 289
Unfortunately, the second proposal passed without any recorded dis-
cussion. It seems safe to say that the Framers realized that the enumer-
ated cases were no longer a description of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction. Rather, in light of the Exceptions Clause and the Assign-
ment Clause, which made the list applicable to the inferior courts, the
enumerated cases became a description of the judicial power which re-
sides in both.
The third proposal was not adopted. It was a proposal to give Congress
explicit plenary control over the judicial power. According to Professor
Clinton, "[a] clearer rejection of congressional authority over judicial
powers is hard to imagine., 29 ° However, given Congress's control over
the federal judiciary which, even according to Professor Clinton, includes
the discretion to create inferior courts and to distribute the judicial power
among Article III courts, it seems inappropriate to read this as a rejection
of all congressional authority over the judiciary. Understood in context,
the rejection of the proposal was insignificant. At this point in the Con-
vention, the Framers were simply cleaning up the document. It is un-
likely that this third proposal represented a radically new concept,
particularly since the vote proceeded without recorded debate. Rather,
in keeping with other proposals, it was probably a mere stylistic
change.291 Congress already had the authority to make exceptions and
288. 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 431 (footnotes omitted).
289. See supra Part II.G.3.
290. Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 791.
291. See Redish, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 910 (speculating that the proposed
amendment could have been rejected for stylistic reasons). Redish writes:
[T]he Framers [probably] chose to leave the "inertia" of jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court, requiring Congress to take affirmative steps (i.e. make excep-
tions) to limit it, rather than require Congress to set out the Court's jurisdiction in
the first place and thus making exceptions merely by a failure to delineate, which
would have been the result of the amendment .... Indeed, for all we know, the
amendment may have been rejected because the Framers simply preferred the
style of the Committee on Detail, or because they believed there was no need to
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regulations. Some delegates may have wished to be more explicit in
granting Congress plenary authority, but others apparently felt that the
existing language was adequate. After all, even as a stylistic matter, such
strong language could have led to an unhealthy disrespect for a "co-
equal" branch of government.
Furthermore, the language of the proposal was substantively problem-
atic. Professor Sager notes, for example, that "[t]he delegates might have
understood the rejected language to allow Congress to increase the origi-
nal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and might have repudiated it on
this ground." 92 More importantly, the language of the proposal was dan-
gerously susceptible to abuse, for it gave Congress plenary authority not
only over jurisdiction, but over the judicial power. 293 Taken literally, this
provision might have empowered Congress to dictate to the courts how
they should decide the cases before them. This possibility would have
provided adequate cause for the provision's demise.
The fourth proposal was another tightening of the text. Describing the
enumerated cases as part of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court re-
quired the addition of a separate clause permitting such cases to be as-
signed to the inferior courts. Now that the enumerated cases were part of
the judicial power, which belonged equally to the inferior courts, it be-
came unnecessary.
After this point in the Convention, there were only minor changes in
what was to become Article III in the Committee on Style. The delegates
signed the final version of the text and offered it to the Union for
ratification.
B. The Ratification Process
Shifting attention from the Convention to the ratification process is a
difficult endeavor. Where the Convention involved an intellectual pro-
cess of devising a constitutional plan, the ratification process involved the
politics of acceptance and rejection of the text. The only influence one
could have on its meaning at this point was to convince others that the
adopt the amendment since the Committee's proposal effectively did the same
thing.
Id.; cf Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 797 n.177 ("[T]he fact that the proposal for
a grant of legislative power over the Court's jurisdiction was overwhelmingly rejected,
while the other semantic changes proposed during the debate were unanimously accepted,
suggests that the problem with the ... proposal was substantive, not rhetorical.").
292. Sager, supra note 1, at 50 n.95.
293. For a discussion of the difference between "judicial power" and "jurisdiction," see
supra Part ILE.
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text meant more or less than it really did.294 If one desired that the Con-
stitution be ratified, he might try to persuade others that the text meant
what he desired; conversely, if one opposed the ratification, he might at-
tempt to scare others into believing that the text meant what was feared
most. In such a setting, it is difficult to come to any reliable understand-
ing of the "original intent" of the ratifiers.2 95
Adding to the difficulty of the endeavor is the fact that the ratifiers
paid little attention to the issue of congressional control over the federal
judiciary.2 96 Therefore, one should not expect very much certainty in this
area. At most, one can merely hope to see whether the pattern of debate
supports or rejects the notion of broad congressional control.
Professor Clinton analyzed the ratification debates and concluded that
they support his theory that under Article II, Congress was not intended
to have any power over federal court jurisdiction, other than the limited
authority to distribute the power among the Supreme Court and the in-
ferior courts.2 97 Although a thorough examination of the ratification de-
bates is beyond the scope of this Article, an examination of Professor
Clinton's presentation of the evidence shows that his conclusions are not
irrefutable.
When confronted with language that contradicts his theory, Professor
Clinton is dismissive. At times, he forces ambiguities; 2 98 at other times,
294. "[Tlhe ratification process was less a deliberative procedure and more a political
forum in which prominent state politicians could advance their own interests and hinder
those of their opponents." Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 799.
295. Professor Clinton highlights the problem of determining the original intent of the
framers: "Where ... one finds a divergence of viewpoints ['between the drafters at Phila-
delphia and the delegates to the state conventions'], the question emerges as to which
original understanding is legally significant-the original intent of the delegates at Phila-
delphia or the understanding of the members of the state conventions that ratified the
document." Id. at 838. Resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. It will
suffice to say that the intent of the ratifiers is relevant in an attempt to ascertain the "origi-
nal intent" of the Framers of the Constitution.
296. See id. at 800 ("[Tlhe general issue of legislative control over the jurisdiction of the
national judiciary received almost no direct attention. Rather, when the issue arose at all,
it did so only in passing, during debates over other facets of the proposed judiciary
article.")
297. See id. at 797-840, 845.
298. For example, Professor Clinton finds Mr. Wilson's comment, quoted at infra note
307, to be "vague and inconclusive." Id. at 825. He also finds Randolph's comment,
quoted at infra note 304, to be "ambiguous." Id. at 808. Professor Clinton suggests, with-
out any support, that comments supporting congressional power to limit appeals in insig-
nificant cases "may have been made against an unarticulated assumption that less
significant cases could be relegated to the inferior federal courts-a position perfectly con-
sistent with the original distributive purposes of the exceptions and regulations clause." Id.
at 827. While this is certainly not impossible in theory, Professor Clinton offers no reason
to entertain the possibility.
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he deems problematic comments "revisionist."'299 Yet he cannot deny the
fact that it was widely understood and argued by both Federalists and
Anti-Federalists alike, that the Exceptions Clause gave Congress some
measure of control over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction be-
yond merely a distributive role.3 °° For example, when the Anti-Federal-
ists raised concerns that the Supreme Court's appellate review of facts
could be used to overturn jury trials, the federalist response was that
Congress could remedy this through the Exceptions Clause.a" Similarly,
when the Anti-Federalists raised concerns about onerous appeals and the
possibility of being dragged to Washington to defend small cases, the Fed-
299. Id. at 806. Professor Clinton admits that many comments were made in the ratifi-
cation debates which contradict his theory. See id. at 803-10. However, in light of his
conclusion that the Framers intended a merely distributive Exceptions Clause, he con-
cludes that the comments made by many of the Framers themselves must have been
disingenuous:
The federalist response ... also focused on the asserted congressional power to
protect jury trials under the exceptions and regulations clause. Indeed, most of
the important comments on the issue of congressional power over federal court
powers emerged in the context of the concern over jury trials, particularly in the
Virginia convention where the judiciary article was most thoroughly and heatedly
debated. Since it is demonstrably clear that the exceptions and regulations clause
was not drafted at the Philadelphia Convention to modify the review of law and
fact language in article III, comments such as Wilson's constitute post-Convention
revisionism of the meaning and purpose of that clause. When made by federal-
ists, like John Marshall, who had not attended the Philadelphia Convention and
who apparently had no access to the then unpublished notes and documents from
the Convention, such revisionism is understandable. Some of the comments
came, however, from delegates like Wilson, Madison, and Randolph who had at-
tended and even played major roles in the drafting of the judicial article. For
them such revisionism is best explained by the political context in which the state-
ments were made. Successful ratification of the document was more important
than historical accuracy or intellectual consistency, and these framers seized upon
all plausible constructions of clauses in the document which met their need to
respond to antifederalist concerns.
Id. at 806 (footnote omitted).
Once it is established that the Framers did intend the Exceptions Clause to mean exactly
what it has come to mean, see supra Part III.A, Professor Clinton's position becomes
untenable.
300. Although Professor Clinton pointed out that most comments can "be viewed
merely as a corollary to the assumed congressional power to distribute federal jurisdiction
among federal courts .... " he admitted that "[tihis interpretation is tenuous, . . . since the
federalist proponents of such powers did not clearly discriminate between cases appealed
to the Supreme Court from the inferior federal courts and those appealed from state
courts." Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 839.
301. See id. at 806; see also id. at 803-10 (presenting arguments concerning the protec-
tion of the right to a jury trial in civil cases).
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eralists responded that Congress could also alleviate this problem
through the Exceptions Clause.302
Unable to deny these recognized powers of Congress, Professor Clin-
ton interprets them as "a limited federalist willingness to concede a modi-
cum of congressional power over the scope of jurisdiction of the federal
courts in these two limited contexts. ' 303 In other words, Professor Clin-
ton reads the Constitution as being constructively amended by two "con-
cessions" by the Federalists. This explanation is unpersuasive.
The Federalists employed broader language during the debates than
Professor Clinton will admit. The two explicit powers are never discussed
as concessions or unique, but always as an ordinary exercise of the Excep-
tions Clause. In their response to the jury trial issues, the Federalists did
not limit their "concession" to congressional control over issues of fact.
30 4
Neither did they carefully limit Congress's power to the prevention of
onerous appeals.30 5 If the Federalists engrafted such concessions onto an
302. See id. at 826-28. "[A] few federalists ventured the view that Congress might limit
appeals in insignificant cases by its power of making exceptions and regulations for the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." Id. at 827.
303. Id. at 839.
304. Madison, for example, argued as follows:
But if gentlemen should contend that appeals, as to fact, can be extended to jury
cases, I contend that, by the word regulations, it is in the power of Congress to
prevent it, or prescribe such a mode as will secure the privilege of jury trial. They
may make a regulation to prevent such appeals entirely; or they may remand the
fact, or send it to an inferior contiguous court, to be tried; or otherwise preserve
that ancient and important trial.
3 JONATHON ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 534 (J.B. Lippincott Co. 1937) (1836). Somehow
Professor Clinton reads this quote as "saying nothing about issues of law." Clinton,
Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 806-07. On the contrary, Madison would permit Congress
to prevent appeals to the Supreme Court altogether. See 3 ELLIOT, supra, at 534 ("They
may make a regulation to prevent such appeals entirely .... ).
Randolph was even more explicit, stating, "[Congress] may except generally both as to
law and fact, or they may except as to the law only, or fact only." Id. at 572; see also
Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 808.
Even Justice Marshall interpreted the Exceptions Clause broadly, stating that "Congress
is empowered to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the
Supreme Court. These exceptions certainly go as far as the legislature may think proper
for the interest and liberty of the people." 3 ELLIOT, supra, at 560. That Justice Marshall
could take this position puzzles Professor Clinton. See Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note
1, at 810 ("It is difficult to understand how Marshall, who as Chief Justice was to become so
instrumental in establishing a strong federal judiciary as a bulwark of constitutional gov-
ernment and federal supremacy, could support and argue for so sweeping a congressional
control over the national judiciary." (footnote omitted)). The fact that he did so strongly
supports the traditional view that even the Federalists were not too concerned about the
possible abuse of broad powers under the Exceptions Clause.
305. Pendleton, for example, stated that "Congress may make such regulations as they
may think conducive to the public convenience .... The power of making what regulations
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Exceptions Clause that was never intended to give Congress any power
over the scope of federal jurisdiction, then one would expect them to
have spoken very carefully.
Professor Clinton argues based on inferences. Rather than point to
language which denies congressional power,3° 6 he relies on language
which is consistent with his position, but not inconsistent with the tradi-
tional view. For example, language about the desirability, even the neces-
sity, of a federal judiciary is neutral in a debate about congressional
authority to control jurisdiction. The need to provide for a federal judici-
ary capable of hearing every case which involves national interests does
not repudiate the desirability of a provision to limit that broad jurisdic-
tion from time to time.30 7
Given the widespread acceptance of a Supreme Court and the fact that
the extent of federal jurisdiction was causing the problems, it is not sur-
prising to find the debates focused on the specific jurisdictional issues
rather than on the Exceptions Clause. Extensive reliance on that clause
would have been neither particularly desirable for the Federalists nor suf-
ficiently reliable for the Anti-Federalists. That in no way suggests, how-
ever, that the Exceptions Clause was understood to mean anything other
than exactly what it says: Congress has plenary power to make exceptions
to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Another important source of opinion in the ratification process was
The Federalist.30 8 As the Supreme Court has explained,
and exceptions in appeals they may think proper may be so contrived as to render appeals,
as to law and fact, proper, and perfectly inoffensive." 3 ELLIOT, supra note 304, at 519-20
(emphasis added); see Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 827-28. This language seems
to view the prevention of onerous appeals in insignificant cases as but one use of the Ex-
ceptions power rather than as an expansion of that power.
306. Professor Clinton does cite to Patrick Henry's argument that Congress possessed
no such power in 3 ELLIOT, supra note 304, at 540-41. See Clinton, Guided Quest, supra
note 1, at 804. However, given that Henry was an Anti-Federalist, it is likely that he either
misunderstood the Constitution or was employing scare tactics to defeat it. Cf id. (arguing
that Henry was using such an interpretation to appeal to the fears of the Anti-Federalists).
In any event, as Professor Clinton admits, the Federalists responded with vehement disa-
greement. See id. at 804-10 (providing various Federalist arguments countering the Anti-
Federalist position that the Constitution infringed upon the right to a civil jury trial).
307. As Wilson argued:
There are ... cases in which [regulation] will be necessary; and will not Con-
gress better regulate them, as they rise from time to time, than could have been
done by the Convention? Besides, if the regulations shall be attended with incon-
venience, the Congress can alter them as soon as discovered. But any thing done
in Convention must remain unalterable but by the [amendment] power of the
citizens of the United States at large.
2 ELLIOT, supra note 304, at 494.
308. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 38, at 495.
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It is a complete commentary on our constitution; and is ap-
pealed to by all parties in the questions to which that instrument
has given birth. Its intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank;
and the part two of its authors performed in framing the consti-
tution, put it very much in their power to explain the views with
which it was framed. 9
Thus, it "has ever been regarded as entitled to weight in any discussion as
to the true intent and meaning of the provisions of our fundamental
law."
310
Much like the ratification debates generally, The Federalist was con-
cerned with defending the substantive Constitutional provisions and
rarely addressed the issue of Congress's authority to control the scope of
federal jurisdiction. However, The Federalist did address the issue in
passing in a number of important places.
The most notable example, and the one that most strongly supports the
traditional view, is in The Federalist No. 80. There, Hamilton begins by
discussing the sort of jurisdictional provisions that would be appropriate
under the proposed constitutional scheme. He then proceeds to compare
the actual Constitutional provisions to the ideal provisions. Not surpris-
ingly, they compare favorably. In the conclusion to that discussion, Ham-
ilton states:
From this review of the particular powers of the federal judici-
ary, as marked out in the Constitution, it appears that they are
all conformable to the principles which ought to have governed
the structure of that department and which were necessary to
the perfection of the system. If some partial inconveniences
should appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of
them into the plan it ought to be recollected that the national legis-
lature will have ample authority to make such exceptions and to
prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or re-
move these inconveniences. The possibility of particular mis-
chiefs can never be viewed, by a well-informed mind, as a solid
objection to a general principle which is calculated to avoid gen-
eral mischiefs and to obtain general advantages. 311
As important as this statement alone is, the setting of is even more
important. The Federalist No. 80 deals with "the judicial authority of the
Union"-i.e., the judicial power. It discusses the scope of federal juris-
diction as a whole, not simply the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
309. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821).
310. Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 280 (1878).
311. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 38, at 481 (emphasis added).
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tion,312 and nowhere are jury trials or the review of facts raised.
Therefore, the statement can be ascribed neither to a distributive con-
gressional power nor to a limited role of preventing the review of facts. It
is a stark and explicit statement that Congress can, under the Exceptions
Clause, exclude entire categories of cases from the federal judicial pur-
view altogether. Although it cannot be said to settle the matter, for it is
simply one point of view (albeit one that has always been accorded much
respect), this surely is a serious blow to those who would attack the tradi-
tional view of congressional authority.
3 13
Similar statements are repeated in The Federalist No. 81. For example,
the middle of that essay provides a summary of the argument, that the
Supreme Court shall have only limited original jurisdiction and appellate
jurisdiction subject to Congressional control. 314 Later in the same essay,
after a discussion of Supreme Court review of facts and of law, Hamilton
further states that Congress's ability to control Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction serves the public interest.315 Finally, in a summary two
paragraphs later, Hamilton reiterates the fact that Congress has control
over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 316  None of these
312. See id. at 480. Technically, THE FEDERALIST is incorrect, for only the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is subject to the Exceptions Clause. However, the fact
that Hamilton assigns it to the judicial power shows that it must have been understood to
be a very broad provision. If the Exceptions Clause were limited to a distributive role, as
argued by Professor Clinton and, in a modified form, by Professor Amar, such a mistake
would never have been possible. However, given a broad understanding of the clause, the
slip is a mere technicality: Congress can exclude cases from federal cognizance altogether
by combining its discretion not to establish inferior courts with its authority to make excep-
tions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
313. Unfortunately, both Professor Amar and Clinton ignore this portion of The Feder-
alist. See generally Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1; Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1.
314. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 38, at 488. Hamilton stated that:
We have seen that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be con-
fined to two classes of cases, and those of a nature rarely to occur. In all other
cases of federal cognizance the original jurisdiction would appertain to the infer-
ior tribunals; and the Supreme Court would have nothing more than an appellate
jurisdiction "with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress
shall make."
ld.
315. See id. at 490. Hamilton asserted:
To avoid all inconveniences, it will be safest to declare generally that the Supreme
Court shall possess appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, and that this
jurisdiction shall be subject to such exceptions and regulations as the national
legislature may prescribe. This will enable the government to modify it in such a
manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and security.
Id.
316. See id. at 491. Hamilton stated:
[I]n the partition of [the judicial] authority a very small portion of original juris-
diction has been reserved to the Supreme Court and the rest consigned to the
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passages, read in isolation, is as powerful as the first. A reader predis-
posed to do so could read each of them narrowly.317 Read together, how-
ever, they make it clear that Hamilton believed that Congress had broad
power to restrict the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under the
Exceptions Clause.
Two statements in The Federalist seem, at first glance, to contradict the
traditional view and therefore deserve attention. The first states that
"[t]he power of constituting inferior courts is evidently calculated to obvi-
ate the necessity of having recourse to the Supreme Court in every case
of federal cognizance., 318 If the word "necessity" is interpreted to mean
"constitutional requirement," then it would appear that distributive the-
ory has found some solid support. However, "necessity" can fairly be
interpreted far more loosely. It is often used in a qualified sense-i.e.,
necessary for some specific good or end.319 Under this view, Hamilton's
sentence could be completed as follows: ". . . in order to have federal
adjudication of the matter" (which, in Hamilton's opinion, was a decid-
edly good thing). In light of other statements made by Hamilton in The
Federalist, this seems to be the proper reading.
The second statement asserts that "[t]he evident aim of the plan of the
convention is that all the causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty
public reasons, receive their original or final determination in the courts
of the Union."32 It is important to recognize that this statement was
made in the context of a defense of Supreme Court jurisdiction over state
court cases, and not in the context of a discussion of the Exceptions
Clause. Read in this light, it merely affirms that Supreme Court appellate
subordinate tribunals;.., the Supreme Court will possess an appellate jurisdic-
tion, both as to law and fact, in all the cases referred to them, but subject to any
exceptions and regulations which may be thought advisable ....
Id.
317. For example, Professor Clinton reads the passage quoted at supra note 315 as con-
sistent with a power to preserve jury trials. See Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1, at 834
n.316. He probably would read the passages quoted at supra notes 314 and 316 as consis-
tent with a merely distributive Exceptions Clause. Cf Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 1,
at 834-35. However, while these passages may be consistent with Clinton's view, they cer-
tainly are not inconsistent with the traditional view. Nowhere does THE FEDERALIST limit
the Exceptions Clause to the tripartite role of distributing jurisdiction, preserving the jury
trial and limiting appeals in insignificant cases.
318. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 38, at 485.
319. In other parts of The Federalist, Hamilton himself uses the term "necessity" in the
looser sense. For example, in arguing that the judicial power should be coextensive with
the legislative power, he claims that "[t]he mere necessity of uniformity in the interpreta-
tion of the national laws decides the question." Id. at 476. As has already been seen,
however, uniformity of decisions, while certainly a good thing, is not a constitutional re-
quirement. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
320. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 38, at 494.
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jurisdiction can reach all the enumerated cases regardless of whether they
originate in a state court or a lower federal court. In any event, the "aim"
of the Constitution is not necessarily a strict requirement for every case.
It goes without saying that the power to make exceptions could interfere
with the "aim of the plan" in certain cases.
Finally, if these statements by Hamilton are construed strictly, they do
not permit exceptions for any cases, including those which may be
deemed "insignificant" or "neutral." Moreover, while the former state-
ment would sanction the practice of certiorari, since it only requires re-
course to the federal judiciary, the latter would not permit it, since final
determination by a federal court is required. These conclusions demon-
strate that even if Hamilton meant exactly that, his opinion should be
disregarded. However, since a strict interpretation of these ambiguous
statements would be grossly inconsistent with more explicit statements to
the contrary, it is safe to assume that they were not so intended.
This cursory investigation of the ratification process leads to a number
of conclusions. First, there is little evidence to support a merely distribu-
tive Exceptions Clause, and much evidence to support broader congres-
sional power. Second, Professor Clinton's attempt to reduce the broader
clause to two narrow concessions by the Federalists lacks credible textual
and historical foundations. Finally, one of the most reliable sources of
the "original understanding" of the Constitution, The Federalist, supports
the traditional view.
C. Subsequent History
The Judiciary Act of 1789321 first established the federal judiciary. It
was enacted by the first Congress, whose members included many of the
Framers from the Constitutional Convention and many of the ratifiers
from the state conventions. Whether or not it was deserving of the
honor, it has come to be generally accepted as "contemporaneous and
weighty evidence of [the Constitution's] true meaning." '322 It has there-
fore become de rigueur to demonstrate how one's theory of Article III is
consistent with the Judiciary Act of 1789.
In this case, however, to demonstrate such consistency would be almost
pointless.323 Because the traditional view espouses nearly plenary con-
gressional authority, Congress could have done little to discredit it. Any
321. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
322. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888), overruled in part on other
grounds by Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
323. But see supra note 180 (discussing the consistency of the Judiciary Act of 1789 with
the civil/criminal distinction of "cases" and "controversies").
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congressional action which would be problematic for the traditional view
would be equally or more problematic for those theorists who hold a
more limited view of congressional authority.
324
The only potential problem stems from Congress's inability to restrict
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which is granted by the
Constitution and is not subject to the Exceptions clause. It is commonly
said that Congress has no authority over the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction.32 5 Yet, in section 13 of the first Judiciary Act, the congres-
sional "grant" of Supreme Court original jurisdiction seems to be less
extensive than the constitutional grant. The Constitution grants jurisdic-
tion over "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls., 326 The Act provided that:
[T]he Supreme Court ... shall have exclusively all such jurisdic-
tion of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public
ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of
law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations;
and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by
ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul, or
vice consul, shall be a party.32 7
This is somewhat problematic. The constitutional term "affecting" is cer-
tainly broader than the specific grants in the Act. By what right can Con-
gress restrict the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction?
32 8
The answer to that question is the Necessary and Proper Clause.
32 9
The constitutional term "affecting" is extremely broad and, taken to its
limits, could swallow all distinctions. Almost anything can be said to "af-
fect" ambassadors, etc., to some extent. Thus, the term absolutely re-
quires qualification. Under the Necessary and Proper clause, Congress
324. For example, if Congress were to extend the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction,
see 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (original habeas corpus applications in Supreme Court), this would
violate virtually every theory of Congressional power since there is a strong consensus that
Congress is forbidden from expanding the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. See Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-75 (1803); see also infra note 359.
325. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
326. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
327. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80-81.
328. See Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1523 (stating that there is no "obvious
source of congressional authority to deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over those
[cases within its original jurisdiction].").
329. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The clause states that Congress has the power "[t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
ing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Id. (emphasis added).
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has the right to define "affecting" within reasonable limits, but without
intentionally making any "exceptions.
330
The Act also gave inferior courts and state courts concurrent jurisdic-
tion over certain cases within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
This grant of concurrent jurisdiction is not problematic, however, because
the Constitution does not grant the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction
over those cases. 331 Finally, the issue of whether the Supreme Court
could exercise appellate jurisdiction over those cases if they were tried in
an inferior court was not raised because the Supreme Court was not given
appellate jurisdiction over those cases.332
On the other hand, many alternative theories of Congress's jurisdic-
tion-stripping powers are demonstrably inconsistent with the Judiciary
Act of 1789.333 It does not require much effort to establish that Congress
made fairly healthy use of the Exceptions Clause in that Act.
Section 11 of the Act, for example, establishes a number of jurisdic-
tional requirements.334 Under this provision, Congress excluded from
330. Under this view, Congress would only possess enough power to define "affecting"
within "necessary and proper" limits. Of course, defining the term to mean less than the
maximum would restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, but as long as the definition
were reasonable, this would not be unnecessary or improper. As a practical matter, one
bright line minimum suggests itself: cases involving an ambassador, etc., as a party. Surely
Congress should not be able to go below this point, for any case "affects" the parties in-
volved. This interpretation would not be wholly unreasonable either, for it would not be
too far from the likely intent of the provision. Perhaps a more generous minimum, e.g.,
including family members, would be more appropriate. The actual resolution of the issue
is irrelevant; the point being made is simply that reasonably defining a broad and vague
term in good faith would not be the same as making an exception.
A major distinction must be made between Congress's authority over the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction under this theory and under Professor Amar's theory. See
Amar, Original Jurisdiction, supra note 95, at 478-83. That Congress could have such au-
thority under the Necessary and Proper Clause is not at all remarkable. But as Professor
Amar himself admits, "the clause [does not] empower[ I Congress to do anything it wants
to the federal courts." Id. at 482. In contrast to the minor power afforded to Congress
under this theory, Professor Amar's theory would extend congressional authority far be-
yond any "necessary and proper" limits. See supra note 95.
331. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
333. Of course, because there have always been some inferior courts, the theory that
they are constitutionally required cannot be refuted by the acts of Congress. See supra
notes 57-79 and accompanying text. However, since this position has no foundation or
little support, it is not of great concern.
334. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79. This section stated:
Sec. 11. And be it further enacted, that the circuit courts shall have original
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive
of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plain-
tiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the
State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State .... But no ...
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federal court cognizance certain civil cases in which the value in dispute
did not exceed a minimum dollar amount. Since every subsequent judici-
ary act has retained the practice of establishing jurisdictional thresholds,
it is clear that Congress has never felt that it "must vest" the entire judi-
cial power in the federal judiciary. Of course, Professor Clinton main-
tains that Congress was ultimately authorized to make exceptions for
insignificant cases, but whether a jurisdictional threshold of five hundred
dollars over two hundred years ago could be considered "insignificant" is
debatable.335
In any event, section 11 makes other exceptions. For example, it does
not cover all controversies "between Citizens of different states,"3 36 but
only those "between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a
citizen of another State. '337 It also contains an "anti-assignment clause,"
which further limits federal jurisdiction. 338 Not only are these exceptions
more than merely distributive, they also exceed the authority to make
exceptions for trivial or insignificant cases. They clearly reflect the use of
an Exceptions Clause consistent with a broad congressional power.
While section 11 may be problematic for Professor Clinton's theory, it
is perfectly consistent with the two-tier theory. According to Professor
Amar, section 11 deals only with the second tier of non-mandatory cases.
Thus, Congress is free perhaps even to exclude those cases from federal
court cognizance altogether.339 In order to discredit the two-tier theory,
an exception to the first tier of cases must be found.
Such an exception can be found in section 25, under which appeals to
the Supreme Court from state courts in cases arising under federal law
are permitted only if a federal law claim were denied, but not if it were
upheld.340 Congress did not vest the federal courts with jurisdiction over
district or circuit court [shall] have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents
of any promissory note or other chose in action in favour of an assignee, unless a
suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no
assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange.
Id.
335. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 260 (characterizing $500 as "no small sum in
the eighteenth century").
336. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
337. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78-79 (quoted at supra note 334).
338. Id.
339. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the extreme view that the
absence of "all" makes the requirement illusory).
340. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. at 85. Section 25 stated:
Sec. 25. And be it further enacted, that a final judgment or decree in any suit, in
the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could
be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an
authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their valid-
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"all Cases ... arising under ... the Laws of the United States" in these
jurisdictional grants.341 Professor Amar attempts to defend the two-tier
theory by arguing that in order "to have one's own case 'arise under'
federal law, one must claim a right rooted in federal law.",342 According
to Amar, if a party did not have his federal claim denied, it would not
matter that he could not appeal to the Supreme Court because that
party's case did not arise under federal law. However, this argument im-
properly turns on an ambiguity in the term "case." Although the term
can mean one party's side of a lawsuit 34 3-e.g., "State your case!"-its
more common meaning, and the meaning it clearly has in the Constitu-
tion, is the lawsuit itself.344 Thus, when the Constitution extends the judi-
cial power to all cases arising under federal law, it means all suits
involving federal law questions. Judicial power over such cases must have
been granted regardless of how they were decided in state courts. Other-
wise, as Professor Meltzer points out, the current scheme permitting
Supreme Court review over state cases upholding federal law claims
would "unconstitutionally extend[ ] the Supreme Court's jurisdiction be-
yond the bounds of article 11I.,,
41
Professor Amar claims further that "the section 25 'gap' is largely, and
perhaps wholly, an optical illusion" because "[i]n virtually every case in
which one party argues for a federal 'right,' the other side can argue that
it has a federal 'immunity. ' ' 346 Accepting Professor Amar's claim for the
sake of argument, he still fails to show that Congress realized this fact.
The fact that the limitation was included not once but three times in the
ity; or where is drawn question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exer-
cised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their
validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the con-
stitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States,
and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or
claimed by either party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute
or commission, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme
Court of the United States upon a writ of error....
Id. at 85-86 (footnote omitted).
341. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
342. Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1529.
343. See D. FENNING, ROYAL ENGLISH DIcTIONARY Case (1775) ("In law, the repre-
sentation of any fact, question, or the whole arguings of counsel on a particular point or
circumstances of a trial.").
344. See BLACK'S, supra note 131, at 215 (defining "case" as "[a] general term for an
action, cause, suit, or controversy, at law or in equity"); NOAH WEBSTER, supra note 159
(defining "case" as "[a] cause or suit in court; as, the case was tried at the last term. In this
sense, case is nearly synonymous with cause").
345. Meltzer, supra note 1, at 1587.
346. Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1530.
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same section strongly suggests that the first Congress intended it to be
more than a mere formality.347 Thus, the first Congress apparently be-
lieved it had the power to restrict federal court jurisdiction even over
cases arising under federal law. The early Supreme Court, which en-
forced this provision, apparently agreed.
348
Although, ultimately, Professor Amar considers this a "relatively mi-
nor" deviation from the constitutional plan,349 it is clearly inconsistent
with his theory. And although he may insist that "the general structure of
the Judiciary Act strongly supports [his] interpretation of Article III,
'
"350
the fact remains that the Act is perfectly consistent with the view es-
poused in this Article.
The "essential role" theories discussed earlier are demonstrably incon-
sistent with the Judiciary Act of 1789 as well. Under those theories, Con-
gress is free to make exceptions to federal jurisdiction, but not to the
point where they will "destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in
the constitutional plan., 35 1 Under the Act, however, the Supreme Court
had no appellate jurisdiction over federal criminal cases. 352 Surely any
"essential role" for the Supreme Court necessarily includes appellate ju-
risdiction over federal crimes. The fact that there was none belies Profes-
sor Hart's "essential role" theory.353 Furthermore, without appellate
jurisdiction over federal crimes, the Supreme Court could not ensure the
uniformity of federal criminal law. Thus, Professor Ratner's theory also
falters.354
Professor Sager's version of the essential role,355 requiring federal
court review of "state court decisions on constitutional challenges to gov-
ernmental behavior, '356 is undermined by another omission-the failure
of the Act to grant any federal court jurisdiction over habeas corpus
claims by prisoners held under color of authority of state law regardless
347. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 1589 (discussing how three separate clauses in section
25 limit the jurisdiction to cases where a state will not recognize the presence of a federal
right).
348. See, e.g., Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 268, 269-70 (1806) (following
Congress's restriction of jurisdiction).
349. Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 264. Compare id., with Meltzer, supra note 1, at
1591-92 ("Amar fails to convince me that section 25 did not leave a very large gap in
federal court 'arising under' jurisdiction.").
350. Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 264.
351. Hart, supra note 1, at 1365; see supra Part I.B.
352. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 §§ 9, 11, 22, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77, 78-79, 84-85.
353. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 31-49 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
356. Sager, supra note 1, at 65.
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of the issues involved. 357 Although it has been argued that this omission
is not significant because direct review on appeal of the criminal case
would still be available,358 a habeas corpus application is still a separate
civil "case" involving the separate and final decision of a different
court.3 59 If the first Congress understood the federal judiciary to have a
constitutionally-required "essential role," one would expect it to have
been more respectful of that role. This is particularly true since, under
Professor Sager's theory, the "essential role" is fairly narrowly
circumscribed.
Evaluating the competing theories against Supreme Court precedent is
the final remaining historical inquiry. As its designation suggests, the
traditional or orthodox view has done quite well. As discussed earlier,
cases such as Sheldon v. Sill 3 60 point to comprehensive congressional
power over the inferior courts, while cases such as Ex parte McCardle
3 6 1
point to an expansive Exceptions Clause. Since the Supreme Court has
assumed in at least one case that these powers can be combined,362 the
357, See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82; Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 103, 105 (1845) (holding that the Supreme Court could not issue a habeas corpus
writ to bring up a prisoner who was in custody of a state for any purpose besides being a
witness).
358. See Clinton, Early Implementation, supra note 1, at 1543 (noting that under Sec-
tion 25 of the Act, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction "to review any appeal of a criminal
conviction"); compare id. (expansive view of appellate habeas corpus jurisdiction), with Ex
parte Dorr, 44 U.S. at 105 (narrow view of appellate habeas corpus jurisdiction).
359. In Ex parte Bollman & Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), the Supreme Court
held that its "original" habeas corpus jurisdiction is actually an exercise of appellate re-
view. Id. at 100-01. This lends support to the view that a habeas corpus application is not a
separate case. Even interpreted narrowly, however, that decision was problematic. See id.
at 101-07 (Johnson, J., dissenting). It is far more difficult to read the case broadly. A
habeas corpus application made in state trial court simply cannot be considered an exercise
of appellate jurisdiction over a criminal case, particularly if that case has already been
reviewed by the highest court of the state and especially the U.S. Supreme Court. Neither
can a habeas corpus application made in federal district court be considered appellate re-
view over a criminal case that has already been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court. Thus, a habeas corpus application must be considered a separate
case from the underlying criminal case.
360. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850) (upholding the constitutionality of section 11
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which limited the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts); see
also supra note 10 (citing cases holding that Congress may limit the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts).
361. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-14 (1869) (holding that repeal of the Act of February
5th, 1867, which granted federal courts the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus, de-
prived federal courts of jurisdiction over such cases); see also supra note 15 (citing cases
holding that appellate jurisdiction must be granted by Congress).
362. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ("Article III left Congress free to
establish inferior courts or not as it thought appropriate. It could have declined to create
any such courts, leaving suitors to the remedies afforded by state courts, with such appellate
review by this Court as Congress might prescribe." (emphasis added)).
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case for a broad view of congressional power over federal jurisdiction is
compelling. In addition, there are many other cases which support, to
varying degrees, a broad congressional power to restrict federal
jurisdiction.363
By contrast, there are very few cases which would limit Congress's
power to any significant degree. The strongest case against broad con-
gressional power has already been considered at length; it is Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee.3" It is important to note that in Hunter's Lessee Justice
Story's analysis is flawed in a number of respects.3 65 Moreover, the rele-
vant portions of his opinion are not only dicta, but dicta in the alterna-
tive.3 66 It is not even clear whether Justice Story was proposing Professor
Amar's a two-tiered jurisdictional theory or a much less plausible two-tier
theory distinguishing between one tier of necessarily exclusive federal
court jurisdiction and a separate tier in which Congress could decide
whether federal court jurisdiction should be exclusive of or concurrent
with state court jurisdiction.367 Thus, Martin's authority as precedent on
the instant issue is questionable.
More problematic is the case of United States v. Klein .368 Decided in
1872, less than three years after McCardle, Klein was the first and most
significant case to limit Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause.
Like McCardle, Klein arose during the Reconstruction period. The
363. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443 (1944) (upholding Emergency
Price Control Act's restriction of attacks on validity of price regulations in a criminal pros-
ecution); Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 554 (1944) (upholding Congress's power to
restrain federal court review of Selective Service decisions); Lockerty, 319 U.S. at 188 (up-
holding Congress's power to restrict equity jurisdiction under the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942 to the Emergency Court of Appeals); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S.
323, 329-30 (1938) (upholding Congress's power to limit the federal courts' power to grant
injunctions in labor disputes).
364. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see supra notes 57-68, 80-90 and accompanying text.
365. For example, Justice Story erroneously believed that certain of the enumerated
cases could never be heard in state courts and that Congress was required to create inferior
courts. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
366. See, e.g., Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) at 336-37; Amar, Judiciary Act, supra
note 1, at 1503 n.9 (describing Justice Story's opinion as an "overall argumentative strategy
of presenting a series of overlapping and concentric arguments in the alternative about the
precise contours of the mandatory nature of federal jurisdiction").
367. See Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 336-37. Justice Story wrote: "At all
events, whether the one construction or the other prevail, it is manifest that the judicial
power of the United States is unavoidably, in some cases, exclusive of all state authority,
and in all others, may be made so at the election of congress." Id.; see also supra notes 68
and 164 and accompanying text. Compare Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1502-03
(illustrating Justice Story's two-tiered theory of article III), with supra note 84 and accom-
panying text (asserting that it is not clear whether Justice Story actually espoused a two-
tiered theory).
368. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
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claimant sought to recover the proceeds from the sale of property seized
during the Civil War. A federal statute, the Abandoned Property Collec-
tion Act, authorized such recovery if the -owner could prove "that he
ha[d] never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion., 369 The
claimant relied on a presidential pardon, which the Supreme Court had
previously held fulfilled the statutory requirement. 37° However, while
the case was pending before the Supreme Court, Congress passed a new
statute providing that a presidential pardon, accepted without an express
disclaimer, should be deemed conclusive evidence that the person had
given aid and comfort to the rebellion.37' The statute further provided
that "on proof of such pardon and acceptance ... the jurisdiction of the
court in the case shall cease, and the court shall forthwith dismiss the suit
of such claimant. '3 7' Thus, the courts were denied jurisdiction if they
found they would have to affirm because of a pardon.
The Supreme Court held the jurisdictional statute unconstitutional.373
Although the opinion "is not a model of clarity, '374 the Supreme Court
apparently based its decision on the fact that Congress was attempting to
"prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government
in cases pending before it."'3 75 This was particularly problematic because
the statute also attempted to "impair[ ] the effect of a pardon, and thus
infring[e] [upon] the constitutional power of the Executive., 376 This
holding is not particularly embarrassing for the traditional view. The stat-
ute in Klein was a blatant attempt by Congress to attach unconstitutional
strings to a jurisdictional grant. Essentially, the Court was told to agree
with Congress or dismiss the case. Congress "passed the limit which sep-
arates the legislative from the judicial power, ' 377 by intruding upon the
independence of the judiciary.
The most troubling aspects of the Klein opinion was the Court's state-
ment that "the language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not in-
369. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820, 820 (1863).
370. See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542-43 (1869) (holding that a
Presidential pardon is adequate proof of non-participation in the rebellion, thus enabling a
claimant to secure the return of his property under the Abandoned Property Collection
Act).
371. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
372. Id.
373. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
374. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 369.
375. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
376. Id. at 147. The Court reasoned that "the legislature cannot change the effect of
such a pardon any more than the executive can change a law. Yet this is attempted by the
provision under consideration." Id. at 148.
377. Id. at 147.
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tend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. 3 78
This may suggest to some that Congress may never withhold jurisdiction
as a means to an end, but only certain ends can be unconstitutional. The
Court was clear that wholesale exclusion of a class of cases from the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was not unconstitutional. 379 The
concern of the Court in Klein was not the removal of jurisdiction, but the
conditional nature of the grant that would have forced the Court to "rub-
ber stamp" the will of Congress.
The Court has stood by the traditional view of congressional authority
in subsequent cases. In The "Francis Wright,"380 the Court rendered one
of its strongest statements on the matter:
[W]hile the appellate power of this court under the Constitution
extends to all cases within the judicial power of the United
States, actual jurisdiction under the power is confined within
such limits as Congress sees fit to prescribe. . . . What those
powers shall be, and to what extent they shall be exercised, are,
and always have been, proper subjects of legislative control.
Authority to limit the jurisdiction necessarily carries with it au-
thority to limit the use of the jurisdiction. Not only may whole
classes of cases be kept out of the jurisdiction altogether, but
particular classes of questions may be subjected to re-examina-
tion and review, while others are not.381
McCardle thus survived Klein. Although in 1962382 Justice Douglas ques-
tioned whether the McCardle case would command a majority view, the
"brute force" or "count-the-votes" argument is questionable in the face
of the considerably more conservative Rehnquist Court.38 3
378. Id. at 145.
379. Id. The Court stated that if the act "simply denied the right of appeal in a particu-
lar class of cases, there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise of the
power of Congress to make 'such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction' as should
seem to it expedient." Id.
380. 105 U.S. 381 (1881).
381. Id. at 385-86.
382. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.ll (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
383. For example, on May 3, 1996, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on an expe-
dited basis in the case of Felker v. Turpin (No. 95-8836). The Court asked the parties to
address whether the provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, limiting the Supreme Court's review of second and successive federal habeas corpus
applications, was an unconstitutional restriction upon the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction. Although the ultimate opinion of the Court disregarded the issue, see Felker v.
Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996), there was media speculation that "the conservative major-
ity" of the Supreme Court was "racing to validate" the law. See Rush to Judgment, N.Y.




The records of the Constitutional Convention and the ratification pro-
cess, as well as congressional and judicial practice since the ratification of
the Constitution, all support a broad (if not an explicitly unlimited) con-
gressional power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus,
while the mandatory theories of jurisdiction are difficult to reconcile with
the historical evidence, the traditional view is fully vindicated thereby.
IV. STRUCrURAL ISSUES
As has been demonstrated, the text and the history of Article III sup-
port the traditional view. The structure of Article III provides additional
support. Various structural arguments have already been presented. One
example is the fact that the term "cases" clearly refers to both civil and
criminal cases, while the term "controversies" seems to refer only to civil
cases."s Another example is the distinction between judicial power and
jurisdiction, and Congress's ability to control the latter but not the for-
mer, which makes more sense from a structural point of view. Some ad-
ditional structural issues involved in the debate over congressional power
over federal court jurisdiction will now be addressed. 38 5 Together, the
textual, historical, and structural arguments should paint a comprehen-
sive picture of federal court jurisdiction.
Critics of Congress's jurisdiction-stripping powers ignore the fact that
Congress's control over federal court jurisdiction is one of the few
"checks and balances" which the Constitution provides to prevent the
judiciary from exceeding the bounds of its legitimate authority. More-
over, even without the power to exclude cases from federal court cogni-
zance, Congress still possesses ample authority to circumvent Supreme
Court opinions if it is inclined to do so. Thus, attempts to limit Con-
gress's jurisdiction-stripping powers are not only misguided, but also fu-
tile. Only the traditional view adequately reconciles the richness of the
American constitutional system.
A. Checks and Balances
The Framers sought to establish a system of government consisting of
three independent and coordinate branches of government. The system
developed, however, does not entail a complete "separation of powers."
Rather, that principle is tempered by the inclusion of "checks and bal-
384. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text; see also infra note 404 and accom-
panying text.
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ances." Each branch of government has power to police the others. For
example, although the Constitution vested all the legislative power in
Congress, the President has a veto power. In addition, the judiciary can
review the acts of Congress for their constitutionality. Checks and bal-
ances are no less important than separation of powers; indeed, the two
are complementary principles.
Concentration on the independence of the federal judiciary, to the ex-
clusion of explicit constitutional provisions that might limit that indepen-
dence, exaggerates the importance of separation of powers and
improperly ignores the significance of checks and balances. This ap-
proach does not comport with the overall design of the American consti-
tutional system. Integral to that system is the notion that each branch of
government should use any or all of its legitimate powers to prevent per-
ceived instances of overreaching by the other branches.386 Since the Ex-
ceptions Clause is a legitimate grant of power to Congress, Congress must
be permitted to use that power to prevent perceived instances of judicial
overreaching.
To be sure, there are other means by which Congress may prevent ex-
cesses by the judiciary. The power of impeachment is one potential
weapon. However, history has proven impeachment to be a rather insig-
nificant power,387 and impeachment for this purpose arguably abuses the
impeachment process.388 Perhaps the power not to increase the salaries
of the judiciary is a potential weapon to constrain the judiciary. The sal-
ary provision is clearly framed, however, to maintain judicial indepen-
dence and minimize Congress's influence.389 Many point to the
availability of constitutional amendments to overturn Supreme Court de-
cisions. However, the "availability" is extremely limited given the strict
386. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
387. For example, the Jeffersonians attempted to use the Impeachment power to re-
move "Federalist" judges from office, but were unable to do so. This led Jefferson to con-
clude that "[t]he impeachment weapon.., was a 'farce,' 'not even a scare-crow."' GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (12th ed. 1991).
388. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
50 (1980). Choper writes, "The use of [the Impeachment] power simply because Congress
disapproves of a Justice's votes or opinions cannot be seriously defended." Id.; see also
Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 230. Van Alstyne writes, "Nor was the impeachment power
ever intended to be employed to subject judges to trial for the 'high crime' or 'misde-
meanor' of disagreeing with Congress as to the constitutionality of its acts." Id. (footnote
omitted). But see infra notes 426-33 and accompanying text.
389. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 38, at 472-75. Hamilton noted that the
provision was intended to reflect the need for judicial salaries to keep up with "fluctuations
in the value of money and in the state of society," not "to change the condition of the
individual [judge] for the worse." Id. at 473.
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requirements of Article V.3 90 Moreover, the amendment process is not a
power of Congress, but belongs to the people.391 The amendment pro-
cess is therefore not an interbranch check on the judiciary at all. The only
generally accepted "true" power of the other branches to "check" the
judiciary is the power to appoint judges.392 Unlike other constitutional
"checks," however, the appointment power does not allow for immediate
or focused responses to the offending action.
Arguably, the Framers may have felt no need for "checks" on the judi-
ciary because the judiciary was perceived, in Hamilton's words, as "the
least dangerous" branch of government, and "beyond comparison the
weakest of the three. 393 However, this tells only half the story. It is
clear that an expansive federal judiciary was feared by many, which is
why Congress was only empowered to create the inferior courts.
Hamilton's statements proved inaccurate.394 The Warren and Burger
Courts were arguably dangerous and certainly powerful. The Supreme
390. Because of the difficulties inherent in the amendment process, see infra note 419
and accompanying text, it only has been used successfully to override Supreme Court deci-
sions on five occasions. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (setting the voting age; supersed-
ing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)); id. amend. XIX (granting suffrage to women;
nullifying Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874)); id. amend. XVI (allowing
income taxes; superseding Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), over-
ruled by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988)); id. amend. XIV (granting citizen-
ship to blacks; superseding Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)); id. amend. XI
(restricting judicial power over suits against a State by foreigners; superseding Chisolm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)).
391. See U.S. CONST. art. V. Congress may only "propose Amendments to [the] Con-
stitution," which must be ratified by the States. Id.
392. One question yet to be answered satisfactorily is why the President and Congress
are permitted to use this power in any fashion whatsoever. No one has argued seriously
that the Appointment power cannot be used as a hostile reaction to the Supreme Court's
decisions; or as a means to impose impermissible burdens on Constitutional rights; or even
to "amend" the Constitution outside of Article V. In fact, it would probably be conceded
that the appointment power can be used in a racially discriminatory manner-despite
Equal Protection. If the appointment power is immune to such scrutiny, then perhaps the
arguments are not as powerful as their proponents claim-and perhaps the Exceptions
power should be similarly immune.
393. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 38, at 465.
394. See Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Monsieur A. Coray (Oct. 31, 1823), in 15 ANDREW
A. LIPSCOMB, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 331-32 (1903):
At the establishment of our constitutions, the judiciary bodies were supposed
to be the most helpless and harmless members of the government. Experience,
however, soon showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous; that
the insufficiency of the means for their removal gave them a freehold and irre-
sponsibility in office; that their decisions, seeming to concern individual suitors
only, pass silent and unheeded by the public at large; that these decisions, never-
theless, become law by precedent, sapping, by little and little, the foundations of
the constitution, and working its change by construction, before any one has per-
ceived the invisible and helpless worm has been busily employed in consuming its
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Court even declared itself the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitu-
tion. '395 With such assertions, the judiciary transformed itself from the
least dangerous branch which could "never attack with success either of
the other two, ' 39 6 into the dominant branch which never could be at-
tacked with success by either of the other two. Surely some sort of checks
and balances would have been intended by the Framers to curtail the
judiciary had they foreseen such potential. It could perhaps be argued
that the Framers did not foresee such a possibility and, therefore, should
not be deemed to have guarded against it. This argument is unsatisfying
and could hardly be advanced by the Supreme Court, for without the
respect of the other branches, the Court would be unable to maintain its
authority.397 If indeed the Framers did not foresee such a powerful court,
neither did they foresee the possibility of Congress using the Exceptions
Clause to eviscerate the judiciary.398 If the Framers cannot be deemed to
have guarded against unforeseen dangers, then Congress's power is at
least as legitimate as the Court's.3 99
To be sure, the Exceptions Clause is an imperfect weapon. Congress
cannot dictate to any court the answer to a constitutional question.
Therefore, if Congress were to remove jurisdiction over an issue from the
federal judiciary, the result would be not an overruling of their decisions,
but simply a transfer of the matter to state courts for resolution. This is
the "balance" to Congress's "check." State courts are in no way con-
trolled by Congress. They are, however, governed by the Supremacy
Clause.4°° Some state courts would inevitably consider themselves bound
by the federal precedents; others, no longer subject to review, might
substance. In truth, man is not made to be trusted for life, if secured against all
liability to account.
Id.
395. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 549 (1969) ("[l1t is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution."); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution."). But see supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
396. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 38, at 466.
397. See id. at 465. Hamilton wrote:
The judiciary ... has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active reso-
lution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORcE nor WILL but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for
the efficacy of its judgments.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
398. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
399. Congress's power is actually more legitimate, for it is grounded in the explicit text
of the Exceptions Clause.
400. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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not.40 1 The best that Congress could hope for would be lack of uniform-
ity. This is a far cry from amending the Constitution or even overruling a
case. While it may seem preferable to some to lack uniformity on a par-
ticular issue rather than to have a repugnant uniform rule, the govern-
ment could not easily bear many such cases and certainly could not long
endure a complete lack of uniformity in federal law.4 02 Thus there are
practical limitations on excessive use of the Exceptions Clause.
Strangely enough, there are those who argue that these practical limita-
tions suggest the impropriety of jurisdiction-stripping as a check on the
judiciary.4"3 Far from being "utterly wretched" or even "odd," however,
the Exceptions Clause is virtually paradigmatic of checks and balances.
A check on one branch of government by another should neither transfer
power from the former to the latter, nor be too easily exercisable. Other-
wise, one branch could annihilate, rather than merely restrain, another
401. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
402. See Wechsler, Courts and Constitution, supra note 1, at 1006-07. As Professor
Wechsler pointed out long ago:
[G]overnment cannot be run without the use of courts for the enforcement of
coercive sanctions and within large areas it, will be thought that federal tribunals
are essential to administer federal law. Within that area, the opportunity for liti-
gating constitutional defenses is built in and cannot be foreclosed. The same ne-
cessity for federal tribunals will be felt in many situations that do not involve
proceedings for enforcement; it has led Congress ... to expand remedial jurisdic-
tion by such measures as the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the Tucker Act,
the Administrative Procedure Act and others I could name. The withdrawal of
such jurisdiction would impinge adversely on so many varied interests that its
durability can be assumed. Beyond this, if the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
alone is withdrawn in a given field, as happened in McCardle, issues are left to
final resolution in the lower courts, which may, of course, reach contrary results in
different sections of the country. If, in addition, all federal jurisdiction is with-
drawn, the resolution is perforce left to courts of fifty states, with even greater
probability in contrariety in their decisions. How long would you expect such
inconsistency in the interpretation of the law of the United States to be regarded
as a tolerable situation? There is, moreover, still another difficulty. The lower
courts or the state courts would still be faced with the decisions of the Supreme
Court as precedents-decisions which that Court would now be quite unable to
reverse or modify or even to explain. The jurisdictional withdrawal thus might
work to freeze the very doctrines that had prompted its enactment, placing an
intolerable moral burden on the lower courts.
These are the reasons why congressional control of jurisdiction has so rarely
been exerted as a method of expressing dissidence to constitutional decisions,
even when such dissidence has won the sympathy of Congress.
Id.
403. See, e.g., Baucus & Kay, supra note 1, at 1000 (" Thus, the exceptions clause would
be an odd creation-a legislative check on the judicial branch that does not return power
to Congress."); Sager, supra note 1, at 39 ("If we grant for the sake of argument that a
majoritarian check on the Court would be desirable, it must still be recognized that the
control of jurisdiction by Congress is an utterly wretched device to serve that end.").
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coordinate branch. When the President vetoes a congressional bill he dis-
likes, he does not gain the legislative power to pass a bill that he does
like. At best, he gains a position from which to force a compromise; at
worst, either his veto is overridden or no law at all is passed. Similarly, if
Congress withholds jurisdiction from the federal courts, it is not permit-
ted to decide the outcome of cases. 4°4 That is always the role of the judi-
ciary, whether state or federal.
Debate on the issue generally proceeds under the implicit assumption
that Congress is "bad" and the courts are "good." However, the reliabil-
ity and trustworthiness of the federal judiciary has its limits. As Lord
Acton brilliantly stated, "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power cor-
rupts absolutely." 405 No entity can be trusted with absolute power-es-
pecially not one that is tenured for life, such as the Supreme Court. That
the Supreme Court's authority is limited to "judicial power" means little
if, as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, it can define the limits
of that power. Surely, this could not have been the intent of the Framers,
who understood very well that "[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his
own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and,
not improbably, corrupt his integrity.
40 6
Unless checked by Congress, the Supreme Court theoretically could
render any act or omission of Congress or the President unconstitutional,
regardless of the plausibility of its reasoning. Admittedly, this is only a
theoretical possibility; in practice, the Court probably is limited to plausi-
ble interpretations of the Constitution-or at least popular ones. How-
ever, this provides little comfort. Most people, liberal or conservative,
can point to some egregious abuse of power by the Court. If it is not Roe
v. Wade,4 0 7 it may be Lochner v. New York. 40 8 Scott v. Sandford409 and
Plessy v. Ferguson4 10 are probably universal examples of judicial failure.
Any decision-maker-Congress, the President, or the Supreme Court
-can abuse its power or simply be wrong. But that is no reason to nullify
404. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
405. Letter to Mendell Creighton (Apr. 5,1887), in ACroN, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND
POWER 335-36 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed. 1972).
406. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 38, at 79 (James Madison). It continues:
"With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties
at the same time." Id. This is a strong argument against the Supreme Court's ability to
decide that a jurisdictional act is unconstitutional because it was motivated by hostility to
their own decisions.
407. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating state anti-abortion laws).
408. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invaliding state maximum hour legislation).
409. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating congressional act freeing slaves in cer-
tain territories) (superseded by Constitutional Amendment).
410. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding state "equal but separate" laws).
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such power. Justice Story recognized this principle long ago in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee,41 where, in defending Supreme Court review over state
court judgments, he stated:
It is always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or exist-
ence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse. It is still more
difficult, by such an argument, to ingraft upon a general power a
restriction which is not to be found in the terms in which it is
given. From the very nature of things, the absolute right of deci-
sion, in the last resort, must rest somewhere-wherever it may
be vested it is susceptible of abuse.41
The Supreme Court is neither perfect nor infallible.413 There is no reason
to suppose that the Supreme Court should have the final say in every
matter. It has no right to violate the prerogatives of the other branches,
and its transgressions should be no less feared than those by the other
branches.
Since the Constitution grants Congress the power to make exceptions
to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, this power must be
respected by that Court-even when Congress is using that power as a
check on the federal judiciary. Of course, if Congress violates some con-
crete provision of the Constitution in the jurisdictional statute, then the
Supreme Court should declare the law unconstitutional. But the Court
should not fashion some vague "essential role" for itself or otherwise in-
terpret the Constitution loosely in order to aggrandize itself at the ex-
pense of Congress.
It has been noted that the power of judicial review, which is highly anti-
majoritarian and nowhere explicitly provided for in the Constitution, 414 is
of questionable legitimacy in a democracy.415 Congress's authority to
control federal court jurisdiction has been said to add legitimacy to that
411. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
412. Id. at 344-45; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 38, at 481 ("The possi-
bility of particular mischiefs can never be viewed, by a well-informed mind, as a solid ob-
jection to a general principle which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs and to obtain
general advantages.").
413. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) ("We are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
414. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 38, at 482 ("[T]here is not a syllable in the
[Constitution] which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws according
to the spirit of the Constitution.").
415. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
841, 846-49 (1975) (arguing that Congress has broad power over the federal judiciary in
part because "a system which really did put nine men with life tenure, in an absolutely
invulnerable position" would be undemocratic).
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power.416 If the Court has been granted jurisdiction by Congress, then
the Court's decisions, even if unpopular, have at least been suffered to
exist by the democratically-elected legislature. On the other hand, if
Congress withdraws jurisdiction, then judicial review is not only anti-
majoritarian, but arguably a nullity altogether, since a court without juris-
diction is no court at all.417 For the Court to attempt to force its opinions
on Congress and the nation under these circumstances would be highly
improper. It would also be highly imprudent, for the courts neither have
nor were intended to have any means to actually enforce their decrees.418
In short, despite the independence of the federal judiciary-or perhaps
even because of it-congressional control over federal court jurisdiction
is an integral part of the American constitutional system.
B. "Amending" the Constitution by Act of Congress
One final issue that needs to be addressed concerns amending the Con-
stitution. The amendment process is a difficult one, requiring two super-
majority votes. 419 It is often said that because Congress is not authorized
to amend the Constitution directly by a mere statute, it should not be
able to amend the Constitution indirectly by means of a jurisdictional act.
This argument is unsound because an act that may be outside the realm of
one of Congress's enumerated powers may nevertheless be perfectly ap-
propriate under another independent power.42° In any event, a with-
drawal of federal jurisdiction would only move the matter to the state
courts for resolution; it would not enact Congress's interpretation.42 '
416. See Black, supra note 415, at 846 (arguing that the fact that "every assumption of
jurisdiction by every federal court since 1789 has been on the basis of an Act of Congress
giving jurisdiction to that court.... That is the rock on which rests the legitimacy of the
judicial work in a democracy."); Wechsler, supra note 1, at 1048 (agreeing with Black).
In what can only be described as a tongue-in-cheek argument, Professor Tribe has main-
tained that it is the existence of judicial review that adds legitimacy to majority rule, see
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 131-32-as if in a democracy it were majority rule that needed
justification! If a life-tenured body of sages is somehow to represent "principle," then
perhaps the United States would do well to rid itself of democracy altogether and surren-
der to a benevolent dictatorship by the Supreme Court.
417. See Black, supra note 415, at 846-47.
418. See supra note 397 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's lack of
power to enforce its decision).
419. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
420. One pertinent example will illustrate this principle poignantly. Even if Congress
cannot "amend" the Constitution by means of its control over federal court jurisdiction, it
can do so by means of the Appointment power. See supra note 392 and accompanying text
(discussing the Appointment power as a means to check the judicial branch).
421. See supra notes 400-01 and accompanying text (discussing the theoretical removal
of certain issues from federal to state jurisdiction).
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Thus, Congress would not be indirectly "amending" the Constitution; it
would only be regulating jurisdiction.
The fact that the federal judiciary does not have the power to amend
the Constitution is often conveniently overlooked. There can be no deny-
ing, however, that when the Supreme Court overrules a prior constitu-
tional decision, it is in effect amending the Constitution. If the courts
cannot amend the Constitution directly, perhaps they should not be able
to do so indirectly, either. Unlike a mere jurisdictional statute, moreover,
such "amendment" by the Supreme Court provides a substantive rule of
law which must be adhered to by other courts and presumably by the
other branches of government.422 If it is problematic to allow Congress
indirectly to "amend" the Constitution on the vote of hundreds of elected
representatives, then it must be equally or more problematic to allow the
Supreme Court to amend the Constitution on the vote of a mere handful
of people who are politically unaccountable. Conversely, if the Court can
do indirectly what it has no power to do directly, then the Congress can
do so as well, provided it is acting under one of its enumerated powers.
Since these arguments will not be persuasive to everyone, one final
point must be made to contradict those who seek to prevent Congress
from indirectly "amending" the Constitution. That point is that there are
plenty of other avenues for the other branches to "amend" the Constitu-
tion outside of Article V.
The simplest way to indirectly "amend" the Constitution is to appoint
sympathetic justices. 423 This was done by Presidents Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush, among others. Through
attrition and appointment, President Roosevelt transformed a staunchly
conservative court that was blocking New Deal legislation under the
guise of "substantive due process" into a liberal court that not only dis-
carded the concept of "substantive due process," but also retreated from
attempting to place any limits on Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce. Similarly, Presidents Reagan and Bush transformed the ac-
tivist and liberal Warren and Burger Courts into the more conservative
Rehnquist Court of today. Few would argue that these personnel
changes were not of great constitutional significance.
A quicker way to accomplish the same objective would be to "pack"
the Supreme Court with agreeable justices. Rather than waiting for attri-
422. But see supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing differing theories of
what constitutes the supreme law of the United States).
423. Of course, filling vacancies on the federal courts of appeals and even the federal
district courts can have a significant impact on the ideological direction of jurisprudence as
well.
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tion to create vacancies, the size of the Court could be expanded to turn a
minority of sympathetic votes into an instant majority. This strategy was
pursued by President Roosevelt who believed that, because of the dire
circumstances of the Great Depression, he could not wait for the sitting
justices adverse to the New Deal legislation to retire from the Court.
President Roosevelt's plan failed, but on a political level rather than a
constitutional level.4"4 It would have been a perfectly legitimate exercise
of Congress's power to constitute the Supreme Court, for there is no con-
stitutional restriction on either the size of the Court or the appointment
of idealogues. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how the Supreme
Court could possibly rule such legislation unconstitutional.42 5
A third way to indirectly "amend" the Constitution is somewhat similar
but significantly more difficult and perhaps even underhanded: impeach-
ing Supreme Court justices with "offending" views. Since appointment of
new justices would probably be unnecessary to create the desired major-
ity, this could be accomplished by Congress alone, without the aid or ap-
proval of the President.426 This is a difficult process, however, because it
would require a two-thirds vote of the Senate for each impeachment con-
viction.427 It is also underhanded because removal on impeachment re-
quires a conviction of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors., 42 8 Of course, because the Senate has "the sole Power to
try all Impeachments, ' '42 9 its decision would not be reviewable by the
Supreme Court or any other court.43' However, the Senators would be
424. See Gunther, supra note 1, at 908 (stating that court-packing is "a technique
widely recognized as constitutionally authorized albeit criticizable in the strongest terms as
a matter of policy").
425. Even assuming the matter to be justiciable, which is by no means clear, see supra
note 28 and accompanying text (listing factors relevant to political question analysis), the
matter could hardly be litigated in the Supreme Court before the new Justices took their
positions on the bench. Even if it could be, the Supreme Court would have a difficult time
getting its opinion to be taken seriously by Congress and the President. Both would pre-
sumably harbor hostility to the Court since their cooperation, through legislation and ap-
pointment, would have been necessary to "pack the Court" in the first place.
426. For example, if the Supreme Court were split 5-4 against Congress's point of view,
the impeachment of two of the offending Justices would create a new 4-3 majority without
the appointment of new Justices by the President.
427. See supra note 387 and accompanying text (discussing the relative insignificance of
the power to impeach).
428. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4. The Federalist went so far as to defend the lack of any
provision for removing such judges on account of "inability," i.e., senility, on the grounds
that "such a provision would either not be practiced upon or would be more liable to abuse
than calculated to answer any good purpose." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 38, at
474.
429. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
430. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) (holding that Congress's exer-
cise of Impeachment power was not justiciable).
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"sitting ... on Oath or Affirmation,"4 31 and at least ought not to convict
for purely political reasons.432 Nevertheless, impeachment is arguably le-
gitimate if the Members of Congress believe that, by repeated usurpa-
tions of power under the guise of constitutional decision-making, the
Justices in question were guilty of "Treason,... or other high Crimes [or]
Misdemeanors" against the Constitution. 33
Another approach would be to manipulate jurisdiction. Rather than
remove jurisdiction from the federal judiciary, Congress could vest it in a
newly-created specialty Article III court with no right of appeal to the
Supreme Court. For example, Congress might create an "Abortion
Court" to have exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving abortion is-
sues. The newly-created Abortion Court might be filled with pro-life
judges and could quite possibly-and legitimately-overrule Roe v.
Wade.434 Stare decisis is not a constitutional requirement,435 and since
the Abortion Court would be the highest court on the matter, it would be
authorized to revisit Roe v. Wade when "appropriate."
Such a plan would be constitutionally unassailable, and would be per-
fectly acceptable under the mandatory theories of jurisdiction because
the judicial power over the constitutional issue in question remains vested
in an Article III court. There would be no due process claim because
there is no right to an appeal to the Supreme Court.43 6 Nor would there
431. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
432. See supra note 388 and accompanying text (discussing potential abuse of the power
to impeach).
433. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. According to The Federalist, "[tjhere never can be danger
that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature,
would hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was
possessed of the means of punishing their presumption by degrading them from their sta-
tions." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 38, at 485. Apparently, this was considered by
the Federalists themselves to be a legitimate cause for impeachment. See also Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, J.). Justice Marshall stated that the
Supreme Court "ha[s] no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,
than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the consti-
tution." Id.
434. 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (invalidating state anti-abortion laws).
435. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (maintaining that
"stare decisis is not an 'inexorable command"'); Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212
(1910) ("The rule of stare decisis . . .is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called
upon to consider a question once decided.").
436. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text (maintaining that the Supreme
Court has long held that due process does not require appellate review).
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be any equal protection claim because no class of litigants would be dis-
criminated against.437
These are just four means by which Congress can legitimately "amend"
the Constitution; others could be imagined.438 In each of the methods
discussed above, the "amendment" occurs without meeting the require-
ments of Article V and yet is perfectly legitimate-or at least unreview-
able. Thus, the argument that Congress cannot do indirectly what it is not
authorized to do directly fails. Moreover, the "amendments" affected by
those proposals are far more complete than any "amendment" that could
be accomplished by means of mere jurisdictional exceptions because they
would directly result in a new body of constitutional law. In addition,
they do not share the inherent limitations of the exceptions method which
serve as a practical check on congressional excess.439 Thus, the argument
437. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress may not
discriminate against a particular class of litigants since no person may be denied equal
protection under the law).
438. For example, Congress could use its power under the Exceptions Clause to prevent
the Supreme Court from reviewing facts in any case, see supra Part II.G.3. This would
severely cripple the Court's power of judicial review. By carefully finding the appropriate
facts, state courts or juries could shield their judgments from any legal review. Cf. HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 661 ("Judicial review, to be effective, must include some con-
trol over the fact finding function; if the fact finder (jury, agency, lower court) is free to act
at will, control over the lawfulness of decisions is lost.").
Perhaps the most extreme power, possessed by both Congress and the President, is the
ability to simply refuse to appoint any new justices to the Supreme Court. Over time, this
would permit either branch to annihilate the Court altogether; the President can only ap-
point with the consent of the Senate, and Congress cannot take away the President's power
to nominate Supreme Court justices. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Admittedly, this
would require a great deal of time and the concurrence of many Presidents or Congresses,
but the very possibility is remarkable.
Moreover, there are a number of actions that a vindictive Congress could take to limit or
simply punish the judiciary, each of which could have a less dramatic but nonetheless real
effect on constitutional adjudication. For example, rather than make exceptions, Congress
could vest the Supreme Court with exclusive jurisdiction over cases within its original juris-
diction. This could tie up the Court's time with cases affecting Ambassadors and those in
which a State is a party, leaving much less time for other matters. Congress could conceiv-
ably "regulate" the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction by requiring it to hear every
criminal appeal before it is permitted to hear any civil case in any given term. In addition
to punishing the court with tedium, this would prevent the Supreme Court from hearing
many controversial civil issues. Yet it would be perfectly defensible on the ground that
criminal cases are more important. Congress could also resurrect the practice of requiring
the Justices to ride circuit. While not a very effective limitation on the Supreme Court's
power, it would certainly be a form of punishment. Ultimately, Congress could abolish the
inferior courts altogether, thereby severely punishing and drastically limiting the federal
judiciary, if not the Supreme Court itself.
439. See supra notes 400-02 and accompanying text (discussing intrinsic limits on con-
gressional use of its power under the Exceptions Clause).
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that jurisdictional exception-making is a particularly egregious means
also fails.
Congress's powers over the judiciary are susceptible to abuse, just as all
of its enumerated powers are susceptible to abuse. But its control over
jurisdiction can no more be prevented from "indirectly amending" the
Constitution than can its control over the Supreme Court personnel.
Those who fear for the judiciary under the traditional view need not be
too concerned; the courts have managed to maintain their independence
for over 200 years. Critics can take comfort in the fact that few of the
various methods for "amending" the Constitution described in this Arti-
cle have actually been employed. Although Congress has often consid-
ered doing so, it has rarely acted to remove jurisdiction from the federal
courts out of hostility to their decisions.
Perhaps, then, congressional authority over federal court jurisdiction is
not so regrettable after all. It provides a check on the judiciary and yet is
no more dangerous than other congressional powers. In fact, because of
its inherent limitations, it is less dangerous. Thus, attempts to rewrite the
Constitution to limit this power are misguided and efforts to prevent indi-
rect "amendment" of the Constitution by acts of Congress are ultimately
futile.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began with the orthodox position that Congress possesses
nearly plenary authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
A survey of a number of theories limiting Congress's jurisdiction-strip-
ping powers followed, suggesting various weaknesses inherent in each.
Despite their shortcomings, the theories proposed by Professors Clinton
and Amar are significant because, rather than focusing primarily on pol-
icy arguments (which are always a matter of personal preference), they
relied heavily on the actual text, history, and structure of Article III.
Keeping their insights in mind, this Article carefully examined the text of
Article III, finding that a truly comprehensive interpretation is perfectly
consistent with the traditional view. Next, evaluation of the historical evi-
dence illustrated the validity of the traditional view, and the illegitimacy
of competing theories. Finally, this Article turned to the structure of the
American constitutional scheme and showed how the traditional view
aptly reconciles the competing yet complementary principles of "separa-
tion of powers" and "checks and balances." In addition, this Article illus-
trated that attempts to prevent Congress from indirectly amending the
Constitution by jurisdictional means are both misguided and ultimately
futile. In light of all the above, this Article now concludes that the tradi-
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tional view provides the best account of Congress's power to restrict fed-
eral court jurisdiction.
Professor Amar has framed the debate over the interpretation of Arti-
cle III as a comparative one. He argues that the appropriate question in
assessing the various theories is "which reading of article III is more plau-
sible, under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard," 440 and insists
that a "complete, coherent and convincing account of congressional
power to limit federal jurisdiction, 441 is the appropriate standard. Ac-
cepting the implicit challenge issued by Professor Amar, this Article has
presented "a careful and integrated counternarrative of the 'traditional'
position that [hopefully approaches] the required level of coherence and
plausibility." 2
This interpretation of the text of Article III is certainly more compre-
hensive than any competing interpretation. Professor Amar relies pri-
marily on "shall" and "all" to support the two-tier theory, but this Article
has shown that these words, properly understood, do not mean exactly
what he thinks they mean. When the entire text of Article III is consid-
ered, the two-tiered theory fares poorly while the traditional view is vin-
dicated. This interpretation may, in certain respects, lack the support of
judicial precedent, but it does not ignore any of the language of Article
III and is well-supported by the context and structure of Article III.
Moreover, considering the language one would use to implement each of
the competing theories, it is clear that Article III most strongly supports
the traditional view. A draftsman of the Constitution, aware of Professor
Amar's theory, might have employed "all types of cases" and "civil cases"
in lieu of "all cases" and "controversies," and "hereby" in lieu of "shall."
However, unaware of Professor Amar's theory, the original draftsman
would not have been so troubled. On the other hand, Professor Amar
himself admits that the language is a rather awkward implementation of
his two-tiered theory.443
The traditional view is also supported by the weight of history. At the
very least, the evidence has been shown not to support any competing
theory. Professor Amar relies primarily on dictum from Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee and on the various drafts of the Constitutional Conven-
tion's Committee of Detail. As he admits, however, Hunter's Lessee is
440. Amar, Judiciary Act, supra note 1, at 1566.
441. Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 206; see also Amar, Reply, supra note 1, at 1671
(noting that he has "always explicitly framed the issue as a comparative question").
442. Amar, Reply, supra note 1, at 1671.
443. See, e.g., Amar, Reply, supra note 1, at 1654 ("[T]he language of article III is




demonstrably wrong in many respects; 444 as has been demonstrated, it is
also wrong with respect to "shall" and "all." Moreover, the Committee
of Detail drafts do not support Professor Amar's theory after all. Admit-
tedly, among the Framers there was no one who zealously advocated ple-
nary congressional authority over federal court jurisdiction. However,
there was a wide-spread recognition that Congress had broad powers
under the Exceptions clause, and there is little evidence to show that this
was intended to be limited in any way.
Finally, while not quite as ambitious as others interpretations, the
structural arguments presented here are on much more solid ground.
Professor Amar can establish only that some categories of cases are more
important than others-a fact which few would care to dispute. He can-
not establish that his two-tier structure corresponds exactly to the order
of importance, much less that federal court jurisdiction over the impor-
tant categories of cases should be required in every instance. As for the
independence-of-the-judiciary arguments, only the theory espoused in
this Article adequately addresses the fact that "separation of powers" is
constitutionally tempered by "checks and balances."
But the ultimate factor, the one that cannot be over-emphasized, is the
plausibility factor. This Article's view is the traditional view. This Article
does not seek to prove that for approximately 200 years everyone else has
missed the boat; nor does it attempt to erect a fanciful, convoluted struc-
ture from the sparse text. It merely claims that things really are as simple
as we believed them to be.
Along the way, this Article endevoured to show that a continuance of
the traditional view is all for the best. But that is really beside the point.
We may not like the choices made by the Framers, but we are stuck with
the Constitution they left us-at least until we choose to amend it. Ours
is a government of laws, among which the Constitution is paramount.
The judiciary is no more above the law than is the President or Congress.
Like it or not, the courts must respect the fact that the Constitution has
granted Congress nearly plenary authority to restrict federal court
jurisdiction.
444. See, e.g., Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 1, at 212 (rejecting some of Justice Story's
positions).
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